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Book ^A/^t— 



WAR BOOK 

OF THE 

UNIVERSITY' OF WISCONSIN 

PAPERS ON THE CAUSES AND ISSUES OF THE WAR 

BY 
MEMBERS OF THE FACULTY 



UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN 
MADISON 
19m 



o5 



1^^'> 



COMMITTEE OF PUBLICATION 

WiLLARD G. BlEYER 

Professor of Journalism 

G. C. FlSKE 

Associate Professor of Latin 

Edward H. Gardner 

Assistant Professor of English 

Grant M. Hyde 

Assistant Professor of Journalism 

Frederic A. Ogg 

Professor of Political Science 

Frederic L. Paxson 

Professor of History 

F. C. Sharp, Chairman 

Professor of Philosophy 



The material in this volume is not copyrighted and may be used 
without the permission of the authors or of the University of 
Wisconsin. 

Approved by the Committee on Public Information, Washing- 
ton, D. C. 

D. of D« 
AUG 5 1918 



PREFACE 

This book brings together articles on the war written by 
members of the faculty of the University of Wisconsin and 
published week by week during the academic year 1917-18, 
as the University of Wisconsin War Pamphlets. An edi- 
tion of 20,000 copies of each pamphlet was distributed in 
Wisconsin, upon request, to individuals, public libraries, 
traveling libraries, high schools, and county councils of de- 
fense. Since the number of requests for these pamphlets 
greatly exceeded the size of the edition authorized, it has 
been thought desirable to reprint them in permanent form. 

In addition to the pamphlets a series of shorter news- 
paper articles on the same subjects was prepared by the 
writers for publication each week in Wisconsin daily and 
weekly papers. These newspaper articles, which were also 
translated into German by members of the German De- 
partment of the University, were sent out in stereotype 
I)lates by the Wisconsin State Council of Defense to four 
hundred AViseonsin papers printed in English and to forty 
papers printed in German. 

These articles discuss the causes of the war, the methods 
pursued by Germany in carrying it on, the conditions under 
which the United States entered the conflict, and the sig- 
nificance of the war as a world-wide struggle between autoc- 
racy and democracy. 

The aim in preparing the longer articles which are here 
brought together has been to present in concise form the 
most important material bearing on the questions at issue, 
for readers who have not had the opportunity of exam- 
ining for themselves the documentary evidence. For per- 



4 PREFACE 

sons who desire to make a further study of various phases 
of the subjects discussed, carefully selected bibliographies 
have been supplied. 

The newspaper articles and the pamphlets, as well as 
this volume, have been prepared and published under the 
direction of the Committee on War Publications of the Uni- 
versity Faculty. The writers have had access to all of the 
available material relative to the war, much of which was 
especially collected and sifted by the committee. The arti- 
cles are not the product of casual impressions, committed 
to paper in the intervals of professional work. Each one 
represents a serious study on the part of the author, and was 
written in cooperation with the committee and with the 
other contributors to the series. This book is thus literally 
the joint product of the work of a considerable number of 
persons, many of whom have given a large amount of time 
to its production. 



CONTENTS 

PART I 
WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WAR? 

PAGE 
INTRODUCTIOX H 

I. Germany's Secret War Council 

0". J. Campbell, Jr., Assistant Professor of Englisli 
Direct evidence of the meeting — Diplomats prepare a 
trap — An imitation of Bismarck's strategy — Ger- 
many provokes Russian mobilization — Germany long 
determined to force war — 1914 Germany's moment to 
strike — The Lichnowsky and Miihlon revelations. ... 15 

II. Germany's A:.:mTioN for World Power 

Frederic A. Ogg, Professor of Political Science 
The mania for conquest — The army and navy as instru- 
ments — The Berlin government blocks armament re- 
duction — Stirring up war fever — Arbitration propos- 
als and treaties of no avail — Was Germany a guar- 
dian of peace? 30 

III. Why Germany Wanted War 

G. C. CoMSTOCK, Dean of the Graduate School 
German thought and will — Pan-Germanism — Pan-German 
dreams — Pan-Germany today — Our danger and our 
duty — Supplementary note from a recent German 
Chancellor 45 

IV. How Germany Explains Her Acts 

Charles E. Allen, Professor of Botany 
A wrong confessed — Not so wrong after all — Dernburg 
explains the violation of Belgium — Yet another offi- 
cial explanation — "Necessity" fails to justify the 
crime — The case of Russia — The conclusion of the 
whole matter Gl 



CONTENTS 



PAGE 



V, Why Russia, F'RA^CE and Britain Entered the War 
G. C. Sellery, Professor of History 

Russia protects Servia against Austria — The Russian 
mobilization — France as an ally of Russia — Britain's 
policy with respect to Belgium — ^Britain and Ger- 
many ' 75 



PART II 

HOW- GERMANY MAKES WAR 

VI. Did Germany Wrong Belgium? 

G. C. FiSKE, Associate Professor of Latin 
Belgium a neutralized state — August 2, 1914 — Belgium 
forced into war — Germany's charges — The Belgian 
"secret documents" — Germany's duplicity — What the 
attack on Belgium means to us 89 

VII. How Germany Makes War 

M. S. Slaughter, Professor of Latin 
Civilians as screens — Hostages — The policy of extermina- 
tion — Deportations — The accused advertises his 
crimes 101 

VIIL What "FrigHtfulness" Means 

E. B. McGiLVARY, Professor of Philosophy 

Germany's obligations under the Hague Agreement — The 
spirit of the German War Manual — Germany's de- 
nial of laws of war — ^Germany's instructions contrary 
to the Hague Agreement — Germany supports Hague 
Agreement only when to her interest — The policy of 
f rightfulness was adopted in time of peace 119 

IX, Germany's War on Neutrals 

W. H. Page, Professor of Law 

Organized piracy — Picking a quarrel with Denmark — 
"No ministers abroad, only spies" — Disease germs for 
Roumania — Bombs for Norwegian ships — "Spurlos 
versenkt" — Running amuck 131 



CONTENTS 

X. How Germany Overthrew International Law 

John Bradley Winslow, Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
Definition of international law — Barbarian warfare knew 
no law — Growth of international law— Germany's 
violations of international law — The Prussian phil- 
osophy of war-^What a victory of Prussianism 
means 



PAGE 



141 



PART III 
MILITARISM IN GERMAN LIFE AND THOUGHT 

XL German Autocracy and Militarism 

W. F. Giese, Professor of Romance Languages 

The old and the new Kultur in Germany— Nature of the 
German state — Excesses of militarism — Militarism in 
German education— Militarism and the soldier- 
Militarism and the civilian— Subordination of the 
lower classes ^^^ 

XIL Some Moral and Religious Ideas of Modern Ger- 
many 
F. C. Sharp, Professor of Philosophy 
Friedrich Nietzsche— Heinrich von Treitschke— The Ev- 
olutionists ^^^ 



PART IV 

THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 

XIII. Our Right to Ship Munitions 

Edward B. Van Vleck, Professor of Mathe- 
matics 
Was the sale of munitions legal?— Was it neutral?— Was 

it moral?— Was it wise? ^^^ 



CONTENTS 



Pas^e 



XIV. Germany's War on Us in Time of Peace 

William A. Scott, Director of the Course in 
Commerce 
Germany the foe of democracy — Twenty years of in- 
trigue — ^Sowing the seeds of domestic dissension — 
A campaign of corruption — The resort to violence — 
Hiding behind lies — America's response 193 

XV. German Submarines and the British Blockade 

Carl Russell Fish, Professor of History 
What freedom of the seas means — British blockade meth- 
ods — German submarine methods — The United States 
and the British blockade — The United States and the 
German submarines — The German pleas — The Brit- 
ish case versus the German 203 



PART V 
THE ISSUES AT STAKE 

XVI. Germany's Gain from Germany's Defeat 

Charles S. Slighter, Professor of Applied 
Mathematics, and George Wagner, As- 
sistant Professor of Zoology 
The government of Germany — The Prussian system — The 
power of the war-lord — Manufacturing public opin- 
ion — ^The caste system — Germany's gain from Ger- 
many's defeat 213 

XVII. Why Workingmen Support the War ^ 

John R. Commons, Professor of Economics 
American industrial democracy — The German menace to 
American labor — German socialistic imperialism — 
True international democracy — What we are doing 
for the soldiers — Who are paying the taxes — ^Who are 
determining prices — The war and the workingman. . 225 



CONTENTS 9 

Page 

XVIII. If Germany Wins 

William H. Kiekhofer, Associate Professor 
of Economics 
The price of defeat — The perpetuation of Pan-Germany — 
Militarism and the certainty of another war — The 
death of democracy — A staggering indemnity 241 

XIX. "The World Must be Made Safe for Democracy" 

W. L. Westermann, Professor of History 
The Servian democracy and its fate — The fate of the Bel- 
gian people — Germany and the Baltic states — Rus- 
sia betrayed — Why we must fight for democracy in 
Europe 253 



INTRODUCTION 

The following papers trace the steps by which the United 
States has been transformed in less than three years from 
a peaceful nation to a democracy in arms, fighting for its 
very existence. 

The papers in Part I discuss the question, Who is re- 
sponsible for the war? In Germany's Secret War Council 
we see the guiding spirits of the German autocracy gather- 
ing at Potsdam on July 5, 1914 and deliberately deciding 
to use the murder of the Austrian Crown Prince as a pre- 
text for starting a world war. In Germany's Ambition for 
World Power is supplied the evidence that the decision for 
war was no sudden impulse but the culmination of the am- 
bitions, plans, and policies of at least two decades. Why 
Germany Wanted War shows what were the prizes which 
tempted the German ruling classes to thrust aside alike the 
claims of honor and humanity and the counsels of prudence 
in order to play the role of conquerors. How Germany 
Explains Her Acts attempts to put the finishing touch upon 
the proof of Germany 's responsibility for the war by show- 
ing through the study of a particular instance (Belgium) 
that the German official apologists in defending their case 
argue as no one ever argues who has a good cause to de- 
fend. Incidentally it also shows how much reliance can be 
placed alike upon the statements and promises of the Ger- 
man Government. WJiy Russia, France, and Britain En- 
tered the War explains why Russia defended Servia against 
the aggressive designs of Austria and exhibits Russia as re- 
quiring from Servia a conciliatory attitude toward the de- 
mands of the Austrian government. It further points out 



12 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

that France was bound by treaty to come to the aid of 
Russia, and that Britain was bound alike by ties of honor 
and self-interest to defend Belgium. It also reveals these 
countries working desperately to avert a catastrophe which 
(as they could not know at the time) had been fully de- 
termined upon by their opponents in advance. 

Part II exhibits Germany at war. In the first paper, 
Bid Germany Wrong Belgium, we find Germany starting 
her career of European conquest by violating the neutral- 
ity of Belgium. This is shown to have been a crime 
against civilization and to threaten the very existence of 
all small states. How Germany Makes War presents the 
German army in action in Belgium, northern France, and 
Poland. It is adjudged guilty of systematic atrocities, 
ordered by the German High Command to break the spirit 
of Germany's enemies. The paper entitled What Fright- 
fulness Means describes the German War Manual compiled 
by the General Staff for the guidance of its officers in war. 
It proves that f rightfulness, or ' ' Schrecklichkeit ", was a 
policy not adopted hastily under the stress of circum- 
stances after the outbreak of hostilities, but was a part of 
the general war policy deliberately devised by the military 
authorities years before in time of peace. In Germany's 
War on Neutrals may be seen the successful extension of the 
same system of Frightfulness to all neutrals whose rights 
stand in the way of Germany's success. How Germany 
Overthrew International Law completes and summarizes 
the indictment. It presents the alternative, the Law of 
Frightfulness or the Law of Nations, and shows that the 
latter must triumph if civilization is to endure. 

Part III discusses the nature and some of the causes of 
the German militaristic spirit. German Autocracy and Mil- 
itarism describes this spirit as it finds expression in the 
words of German leaders, and as it and its twin brother, 



INTRODUCTION 13 

the spirit of autocracy, manifest themselves in German 
life. In so doing it offers a suggestion as to the fate in 
store for the United States if this spirit through victory 
should gain the power to shape American social and polit- 
ical institutions. Sojne Moral and Religious Ideas of Mod- 
ern Germany is a study of certain writers who have con- 
tributed much to the more repulsive forms of militaristic 
ideals and have done more than their share in arousing in 
their fellow-countrymen a feeling of the necessity, the 
beauty, and the glory of war. 

Part IV deals with America's entrance into the war. 
Our Right to Ship Munitions considers Germany 's earliest 
cause of hostility toward us and proves it to be entirely 
without justification, since it represents a right recognized 
by international law, — a right, indeed, indispensable to a 
peace-loving democracy. Germany 's War on Us in Time of 
Peace exhibits Germany making war against us on our own 
soil from the autumn of 1914. Finally, the paper German 
Submarines and the British Blockade tells how Germany 
tried to force us off the seas, the open highway of the 
nations. 

Part V presents the fundamental issues of the war. It 
shows what difference it makes to us and the world whether 
we win or lose. In Germany's Gain from Germany's De- 
feat the destruction of the German military system, which 
exploits the German common people for its own ends, is 
proved to be the only hope for the true well-being of Ger- 
many itself. Why Workingmen Support the War shows 
the stake of American workingmen in the war and the ex- 
tent to which they share in its conduct. If Germany Wins 
brings home the consequences to us of a German victory. 
Such a victory would mean that hereafter the people of 
America would live their lives under the menacing shadow 
of Greater Germany. Face to face with the alternative, 



14 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

be prepared to fight or to perish, we should be compelled 
to introduce the abhorred militaristic system of Europe; 
and we should always have to reckon with the danger of 
the ultimate extinction of our democratic form of govern- 
ment, and even of the submergence of our separate national 
existence into a new World Empire, as despotic and all- 
embracing as was that of Rome. The last paper of the 
series, "The Woi'ld Must Be Made Safe for Democracy," 
leads by a different road to the same conclusion. Germany, 
Austria-Hungary, and Turkey are showing — in Belgium, 
in Servia, in Armenia, and in the states but yesterday freed 
from the grip of Russian autocracy — what enormities they 
are capable of committing where they have secured the 
power to follow their own will. They are serving notice 
upon us that our sympathies and our concern for our own 
future alike call us to make common cause with the world's 
democracies. 



GERMANY'S SECRET WAR COUNCIL, JULY 5, 1914 

By 

0. J. CAMPBELL. JR. 
Assistant Professor of English 

The world at last knows just how and when Germany- 
decided to launch this stupendous war. On July 5, 1914, 
the Kaiser presided at a meeting of German and Austrian 
military leaders, diplomats, and big business men in Ber- 
lin or at his palace at Potsdam. There this irresponsible 
group determined to use the murder of the Austrian Crown 
Prince at Serajevo on June 29 as an opportunity to pro- 
voke the great war which Germany had long been prepar- 
ing. The truth of this assertion can now be established by 
evidence which is overwhelming. 

DIRECT EVEDENOE OF THE MEETING 

The most direct evidence of this meeting comes from 
Constantinople. Early in July, 1914, Herr Wangenheim, 
the German Ambassador to Turkey, was hastily summoned 
to Berlin. When he returned to his post on July 15, he 
told the Italian Ambassador, Signor Garroni, the purpose 
of his journey. The two men were intimate friends; be- 
sides, a confidential communication to the representative 
of one of Germany's supposed allies was natural. At any 
rate, he told Signor Garroni that he had been summoned 
to Berlin to attend a meeting of German diplomats, mili- 
tary men and financiers. He had been called to report on 



16 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

the Turkish situation. The conference, he said, had de- 
cided upon a European war. Signor Garroni asked him 
in some surprise what the provocation was to be. He re- 
plied that an Austrian note to Servia on the Serajevo mur- 
ders was to make demands of a sort that would surely lead 
to war. All this Signor Garroni reported officially to his 
government.^ These circumstances are corroborated inci- 
dentally by Mr. Einstein, at that time member of our le- 
gation in Constantinople. He asserts in a letter to The 
London Times'^ that Signor Garroni reported to him the 
conversation with Herr Wangenheim and that the revela- 
tion made so great an impression on him that he wrote it 
down in his diary. 

Our own ambassador to Turkey, Mr. Henry L. Morgen- 
thau, received an even more detailed account of this meet- 
ing from Herr Wangenheim.^ In an outburst of enthusi- 
asm at the arrival in the Dardanelles of the Goehen and 
Breslau — vessels whose escape from the British fleet Herr 
Wangenheim had directed by wireless — he became confi- 
dential. He told Mr. Morganthau that he had attended 
a conference in Berlin at which the date for beginning the 
war had been positively fixed. The Kaiser had presided. 
Von Moltke, the chief of staff, was present ; so was the sin- 
ister Admiral von Tirpitz. The leaders of industry, the di- 
rectors of railways, the bankers were present, — everyone, in 
fact, whose aid would be necessary for carrying on the war. 
The representative of each interest was asked in turn if 
he was ready for war. All answered in the affirmative, 
except the financiers. They asked for two weeks in which 



^New York Nation, Sept. 6, 1917. 

2 London Times, Aug. 4, 1917. 

3 The New York World, October 14, 1917. A fuller statement by Mr. 
Morganthau is to be published in The World's Work for June, 1918. 



GERMANY'S SECRET WAR COUNCIL, JULY 5. 1914 17 

to arrange their loans and to unload their foreign securi- 
ties. This is picturesque and circumstantial evidence from 
an eye-witness. 

Direct corroborative evidence of the authenticity of this 
meeting comes from the Reichstag itself. Herr Haase, the 
Socialist deputy, on replying to the Chancellor's state- 
ment about the origins of the war, said, ' ' We do not forget 
the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, nor the conference in 
Berlin, on July 5, 1914, and the activity of von Tirpitz 
and Falkenhayn in those days. ' '* This statement fixes the 
date of the meeting, the proceedings of which Herr Wan- 
genheim has described. 

We have, moreover, abundant additional evidence to 
confirm the truth of his description. From July 10 to 
July 25, 1914, all the great stock markets in the world ex- 
perienced an acute and mysterious depression. For ex- 
ample, on the New York stock exchange in that interval 
Union-Pacific slumped from 1543^ to 125l^; B. and 0. 
from 901/4 to 78%. At that time financial experts were 
completely baffled by the decline. Now we can see that 
German bankers were making use of the time given them 
to unload their foreign securities. German owned stocks 
were quietly pushed into the market in such quantities that 
prices were forced down violently. Then the bankers, too, 
were ready and on July 25 the provocative Austrian ulti- 
matum to Servia was sent. 



* London Times, July 23, 1917, quoted from the Leipziger Volkszeitung 
of July 20, 1917. 

2— W. B. 



18 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 



DIPLOMATS PREPAKE A TRAP 

From July 5 to July 25, German and Austrian diplomats 
acted like men about to spring a trap. Count Tisza, later 
Austrian premier, confesses in an interview with Col. S. S. 
McClure^ that Austria thought when it sent its note to 
Servia that the chances of Eussia 's interference were about 
fifty-fifty. Such interference they knew meant a general 
European war. Yet Berchtold, the Austrian foreign min- 
ister, at the very moment at which he was composing the 
provocative note to Servia, assured the Italian ambassador 
to Vienna that the situation was not grave.® Viviani, the 
French Premier, in a speech in the Chamber of Deputies, 
Aug. 4, 1914, said that the Austro-Hungarian government 
had repeatedly given assurance that its demands upon 
Servia would be ''extremely moderate".'^ If Austria had 
been sincere in her desire to settle a local quarrel with 
Servia, would she deliberately have concealed her intention 
from the nations of the world, including her ally — Italy? 
By no means. Her actions are preeminently those of a 
nation about to spring a carefully set trap. 

GERMANY IMITATES BISMARCK'S STRATEGY 

Germany, too, deliberately lulled the world into a sense 
of false security. The Kaiser went in his yacht to Norway. 
The Chancellor left Berlin for a rest. The diplomats, al- 
most without exception, went on their accustomed summer 
vacations. In this respect the German officials were imitat- 
ing Bismarck's strategy. In fact, the resemblance between 



^Obstacles to Peace, p. 56. 

« English White Papers, No. 1. 

''^ Beck, James M., The Evidence in the Case, p. 32. 



GERMANY'S SECRET WAR COUNCIL, JULY 5, 1914 19 

their actions in 1914 and Prussia's in 1870 are too great 
to be accidental. Bismarck sought to provoke France 
through Spain by putting forward Prince Leopold of Ho- 
henzollern as a candidate for the Spanish throne. He 
struck at what he knew to be a cardinal principle in French 
foreign policy. Yet he could maintain the fiction that the 
question was one that concerned Spain alone, — this in 
spite of the fact that the Prince himself accepted the 
throne against his will at a war council presided over by 
the King of Prussia and attended by army chiefs, ' ' to ren- 
der a great service to the fatherland".*^ In the same way 
Germany sought to provoke Russia and France through 
Austria's quarrel with Servia. This, too, she maintained 
persistently was a local matter in which Germany and the 
rest of Europe had no vital interest. Yet a Prussian war- 
council, as formidable as that which imposed the Spanish 
candidature upon Prince Leopold, determined that a pro- 
vocative Austrian note be sent to Servia. After this step 
had been taken, Germany prepared an alibi just as she had 
in 1870. In 1870, as in 1914, it was the holiday season 
when diplomats were not at their posts. The German offi- 
cials in 1870, too, left Berlin. The old emperor went to 
take the cure at Ems. Bismarck went to his country seat 
nominally iU, after he had instructed his underlings to 
say that the Spanish candidature was a purely Spanish af- 
fair. 

Germany's contradictory and misleading statements 
about her foreknowledge of the Austrian ultimatum prove 
that in 1914, toO; she was attempting to create the false 
impression that Austria's attitude toward Servia con- 
cerned only those two countries. The diplomatic repre- 



" Cf . King- of Roumania's Memoirs; quoted in Fortnightly Review, 
October, 1917, p. 517. 



20 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

sentatives of Germany at first denied that their govern- 
ment had any foreknowledge of the contents of the Aus- 
trian note, and yet these categorical denials were soon 
modified. In her White Book Germany states positively 
that she assured Austria that any action which that coun- 
try might consider it necessary to take toward Servia would 
meet her approval. That Germany should give her ally 
carte hlancJie in a situation so fraught with danger is in- 
credible. We no longer need to believe so absurd a state- 
ment. Both Count Tisza and von Jagow have admitted in 
conversation^ that Germany did know in advance of the 
Austrian note. The German Ambassador to the United 
States, moreover, has written in The Independent^^ that 
Germany did approve of the ultimatum in advance. This 
fact she tried at first to conceal in order to keep up the 
fiction that the quarrel between Servia and Austria was 
purely local. 

GERMANY PROVOKES RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION 

In one other respect Germany's action was an imitation 
of that of 1870. After Bismarck had carefully staged the 
Spanish candidature. Prince Leopold suddenly withdrew^ 
as a candidate. Bismarck returned to Berlin in despair. 
His plot seemed about to fail. Then chance put a new in- 
strument of deceit into his hands. Benedetti, the French 
Ambassador, was instructed to ask the King of Prussia to 
bind himself never again to support Hohenzollern candi- 
dates for the Spanish throne. Abeken, a councillor in 
the King's entourage, sent Bismarck a telegram reporting 
the King's final conversation with Benedetti. The tele- 
gram in its original form was a description of a friendly 



^Philadelphia Ledger, Avig. 6, 1917. 
i» September 7, 1914. 



GERMANY'S SECRET WAR COUNCIL, JULY 5. 1914 21 

parley. Bismarck in the presence of von Moltke deliber- 
ately condensed and mutilated it until the latter said it was 
made to sound ' ' like a flourish to a challenge ' '.^^ The form 
was meant to be provocative and it was. Then Bismarck 
had his will and was able to say that war was forced upon 
Germany by martial France. 

On July 31, 1914, Austria for the first time agreed to 
discuss with Kussia the merits of her note to Servia.^- Again 
Germany saAv her carefully staged provocation of the war 
disappearing. At this crisis either the government or the 
war party surrounding the Crown Prince imitated in a 
clumsy way Bismarck's forgery of the Ems telegram. On 
July 30 at 2 :25 p. m." newspaper vendors began to cry an 
extra edition of the Lokal Anzeiger which announced the 
mobilization of the German army. This paper, be it re- 
membered, had prior right to army dispatches and is known 
as the Crown Prince's organ. The hawking of the papers 
was confined to one small district of Berlin, in which Wolff's 
Press Bureau had its office. There the representative of 
the Russian telegraph agency sat and worked. As soon 
as he heard the news, he sent word immediately to the 
Russian Minister in Berlin, who in turn telegraphed the 
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs post-haste. This mes- 
sage went through immediately and caused the Czar to 
give the order for a general mobilization. One half hour 
after the paper had appeared the German Minister of For- 
eign Affairs telephoned the Wolff Bureau that the news 
was false and the edition was suppressed. Then the Rus- 
sian Ambassador sent a second telegram correcting the 
information he had just given. This telegram was mys- 



^-^ BismarcTc, the Man cmd the Statesman,, By Himself. 
" English White Paper No. 133. 

ri Russian Orange Book, Nos. 61 and 62; French Yelloio Book, No. 
10.5 ; and Dillon. E. J., Ourselves and Germany. 



21 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

teriously delayed in transmission for several hours, al- 
though the first one had been sent with speed and accu- 
racy. Therefore, it arrived too late to halt the Russian 
order for mobilization. The Lokal Anzeiger explains this 
incident by saying the papers announcing the mobilization 
had been printed and that the vendors found them in the 
office and sold them by mistake. This explanation, absurd 
in itself, is the more unconvincing when it is remembered 
that the papers were sold only in that small district in 
which the office of the Wolff Bureau was situated. The 
edition was as clearly intended to provoke the enemy to 
warlike measures as was the Ems telegram. It was, too, 
as successful. Bethmann Hollweg, it ought to be said, has 
admitted in their essentials the above facts and given as 
official the explanation of the Lokal Anzeiger. These facts 
brand as false Germany's reiterated statement that the pre- 
mature mobilization of the Russian army caused the war. 

GERMANY LONG DETERMINED TO FORCE WAR 

Germany never intended to permit diplomatic exchanges 
to thwart her determination of bringing on war. On July 
31 the Kronprinzessin Cecelie received the following wire- 
less message : ' ' War has broken out with England, France 
and Russia. Return to New York. ' ' That is, one whole day 
before war was declared on Russia, four days before Eng- 
land entered the conflict, while Germany was still osten- 
sibly making every effort to avoid war, she could warn a 
valuable cargo to prepare for a war she knew would come. 

That the Serajevo murder was a mere pretext for start- 
ing war against Servia and through her upon Russia is 
now well understood by everyone. Austria had long been 
hostile to Servia and had wished to crush her in 1913. Ac- 
cordingly in the autumn of that year she suggested to Italy 



GERMANY'S SECRET WAR COUNCIL, JULY 5, 1914 23 

that the latter power join her in an attack upon Servia.^* 
Italy declined and Austrian statesmen were compelled to 
wait for such an excuse as the murder gave them. 

Other facts prove that long before the Serajevo murders 
Germany had decided that "the day" should come some- 
time in 1914. In the year before one-half of the copper 
export of the United States was taken by Germany. The 
gold purchase of the German Imperial Bank in 1913 had 
made an extra-ordinary increase. In 1911 it was 174 
million marks ; in 1912, 173 million marks ; but in 1913, 317 
million marks. ^^ In May, 1914, she had called back her 
reservists from the Far East, in June, those from Natal. 
In the same month arms for cruisers were sent to Buenos 
Aires. On June 15, contracts were let in America for coal- 
ing cruisers at sea on specified dates in August and Sep- 
tember. Yet the Austrian Prince was not murdered until 
the 29th of June. 

1914 GERMANY'S MOMENT TO STRIKE 

There are many reasons why Germany should have cho- 
sen the summer of 1914 as the time in which to stage her 
long planned war. 

In the first place, the ruling classes had been made un- 
easy by the growth in power of the Social Democrats. The 
new army estimates passed in 1913 would run out in 1915. 
That budget had been passed in the Reichstag by a majo- 
rity of two votes. The Kaiser feared that never again 
could he muster a majority for his militaristic program. 
The temper of the country toward militarism had showai 
itself too clearly in December, 1913, in the remarkable vote 
of censure against the Chancellor in his defense of the Za- 



" Speech of Foreign Minister Giolitti in Italian ChaniTDer. Dec. 5, 1911. 
1^ Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, p. 100. 



24 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

bern affair.^^ When the Reichstag adjourned in May, 1914, 
moreover, the Social Democrats for the first time remained 
in their seats and tried to drown the customary cheers for 
the Kaiser with hoots and jeers. This seemed particu- 
larly ominous to William II and apparently did much to 
win his consent to the war.^'' 

Moreover, Germany's military position in comparison 
with that of its enemies seemd to be at its zenith. In 
June, 1914, the enlarged Kiel Canal was opened, through 
which the greatest battle-ships could pass from the Baltic 
to the North Sea. In Zeppelins, poison gas, flame throw- 
ers and heavy artillery, the military leaders thought they 
had irresistible weapons unmatched by the enemies. 

Never again could Germany expect to find the military 
situation of her antagonists so favorable for her. France 
had voted a law for three years ' military service, but it had 
not yet gone into effect ; the same was true of the universal 
military service law voted in Belgium. The military 
shortcomings of France revealed in a speech by M. Charles 
Humbert delivered in the Senate on July 13, had long been 
known in Germany. The forts were said to be defective 
in structure, the guns to be without ammunition, the men 
without boots.^^ 

Russia was about to improve her military position. 
France had made a loan to her on condition that strategic 
railways be built in Poland, but construction had not been 
started. Until these lines were completed Germany had 



i^Zabern is a town in Alsace. There friction between the populace 
and the military garrison in 1913 reached a climax when a young 
Prussian officer struck with his sword a Tame shoemaker who had 
laughed at him. Popular indignation became so great that martial 
law was declared. Despite violent criticism in the Reichstag, the mili- 
tary authorities were upheld by the Government and the officer com- 
mended. 

" Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, p. 91. 

IS London Times, July 14, 1914. 



GERMANY'S SECRET WAR COUNCIL, JULY 5, 1914 25 

seventeen strategic railways running to the German-Rus- 
sian frontier, the Russians but five. Revolts by working- 
men in Russia during 1914 were supposed by Germany to 
be the beginning of a revolution. 

England, too, was thought to be on the verge of an Irish 
revolution. Sir Edward Carson's Ulster army was re- 
ported by German spies to be the instrument of a civil war. 
The King himself had used the term civil war in his proc- 
lamation summoning the futile conference to meet at Buck- 
ingham Palace. The German ambassador in London had 
reported to his government that England did not wish to 
enter the war. The United States was threatened by tur- 
moil in Mexico. The summer of 1914 for all these reasons 
offered Germany a world situation immensely favorable 
for her. 

Therefore, the moment that the Serajevo murders were 
committed, the Kaiser knew that his opportunity had come. 
He summoned, therefore, a small group of men, who sat 
down together and planned how the deed of a mad assassin 
could be made to embroil Europe. So dire an exercise of 
autocratic power the modern world had never seen. That 
group of men cynically decreeing disaster and death to 
millions of human beings is autocracy at work. Against 
that we are fighting. 

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE 

THE LICHNOWSKY AND MUEHLON REVELATIONS 

The main facts which the above narrative has attempted 
to establish have been confirmed by three documents which 
have appeared in Germany since the publication of the 
paper. The first is a Memorandums^ of Prince Lichnow- 



19 For a complete text, see New York Times, April 21, 1918. The 
Memorandum is printed with practical completeness in the Chicago 
Tribune, April 20, and following. 



26 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

sky, who was the German Ambassador to England at the 
outbreak of the war. It was written in the summer of 1916 
and intended as a defense of his diplomatic policies for his 
family archives. These private notes were given a wider 
circulation by what he terms an ' ' unprecedented breach of 
confidence ' '. The second document is the official answer to 
Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum made by Herr von 
Jagow,^*^ German foreign minister during the closing days 
of the former's career at London. The third is a mem- 
orandum written by Dr. Miihlon^^i a former member of the 
Krupp Directorate, now living in Switzerland and re- 
cently engaged in diplomatic negotiation for Germany with 
Roumania. Disregarding the larger aspects of these docu- 
ments, I shall consider only their bearing on the existence 
and purpose of the Potsdam Council of July 5, 1914. 

Lichnowsky refers to the meeting casually as to a fact 
well known to the readers of his memorandum. His story 
is substantially as follows. At the time of the murder of 
the Austrian Crown Prince, Lichnowsky was on the Kaiser's 
yacht. A few days later when he passed through Berlin, 
he found that officials there believed that the murder had 
precipitated a serious international situation. They ail 
took an uncompromising attitude and one of unmistakable 
hostility towards Russia. He heard that the German Am- 
bassador to Austria had been rebuked for advising modera- 
tion in Vienna toward Servia. A little later, on his way 
back to London, he learned that Austria intended to pro- 
ceed against Servia with the utmost vigor in order to put 
an end to an intolerable state of affairs. Then follows a 
significant sentence which I quote in fuU. 



20 For a complete text, see New York Times, April 28, 1918 ; Chicacjo 
Tribune April 28 and 29. It was originally published in the semi-offi- 
cial Norddeutsc'he Allgemeine Zeitung on March 23, 1918. 

21 For the text, see the New York Times, April 21, 1918. The letter 
was written before the resig-nation of Dr. Helfferich as Vice Chancellor, 
last November, and was printed in the Berliner Tagehlatt. 



GERMANY'S SECRET WAR COUNCIL, JULY 5, 1914 27 

''Subsequently I learned that at the decisive conversa- 
tion at Potsdum on July 5 [the italics are mine] the in- 
quiry addressed to us by Vienna found absolute assent 
among all the personages in authority ; indeed they added 
that there would he no harm if a war with Russia were to 
result. So, at any rate, it is stated in the Austrian protocol 
which Count Mensdorf, Austrian Ambassador, received in 
London. ' ' 

This is new evidence of startling force. A protocol sent 
to Count Mensdorf, which Lichnowsky must have seen or 
heard of, establishes the existence of the sinister Potsdam 
Council. The deliberations of this body, Lichnowsky de- 
clares decisive, — decisive for war. Vienna's inquiries as 
to whether she could count on Germany's support of her 
punishment of Servia received emphatic assent. It might, 
indeed, precipitate war; but a wai' with Russia would ''do 
no harm". 

Von Jagow makes no attempt to deny these assertions. 
He contents himself with saying obscurely, "On July 5 I 
was absent from Berlin". Dr. Miihlon makes a definite 
reference to the same council. In the middle of July, 1914, 
he had a conversation with Dr. Helfferich of the Deutsche 
Bank. From him he learned that the Austrians had just 
been with the Kaiser, that in a week's time Vienna would 
send a very severe ultimatum to Servia. Dr. Helfferich 
added that the Kaiser had expressed his decided approval 
of this course. To Dr. Miihlon 's protest that such action 
would provoke a world war, Dr. Helfferich replied that it 
certainly looked like it. It looked like it obviously to the 
men who carried on the "decisive conversation at Pots- 
dam". 

The plan of Germany after July 5 on the one hand to 
quiet possible suspicions of her warlike aims and on the 
other to resist all attempts to prevent their realization, finds 



28 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

fresh confirmation in these three documents. Dr. Miihlon 
learned from Helfferich that the Kaiser had gone on his 
northern cruise only as a "blind"; that he had not ar- 
ranged the cruise on the usual extensive scale, but was re- 
maining close at hand and keeping in constant touch. 

Herr Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, the head of the 
great Krupp works, reported to Dr. Miihlon that in an in- 
terview with the Kaiser early in July he had found him 
determined upon war. I quote from Dr. Miihlon 's mem- 
orandum: "The Kaiser had told him that he would de- 
clare war immediately, if Russia mobilized, and that this 
time people would see that he did not turn about. The 
Kaiser's repeated insistence that this time nobody would 
be able to accuse him of indecision had, he said, been al- 
most comic in its effect". 

Germany 's first claim that in sending her ultimatum Aus- 
tria had acted without Germany's previous knowledge, 
Dr. Miihlon brands as false. It could only mean that Ger- 
many had not seen the text of the ultimatum. Herr Krupp 
von Bohlen learned from von Jagow that he as a diplomat 
would never have made any such demands as appeared in 
the ultimatum. When he was called in the affair, however, 
the Kaiser had so far committed himself that it was too 
late for any procedure according to diplomatic custom. 
In other words, during von Jagow 's absence from Berlin 
on July 5, the Potsdam Council had bound Germany so ir- 
revocably to the mad course which was to lead to war that 
the foreign minister found himself powerless to modify 
Austria's demands. 

Lichnowsky reports that to his protests against this pol- 
icy von Jagow said, in effect, that the time was favorable to 
Germany. Russia was not ready, he said ; Austria was al- 
ready accusing Germany of lack of spirit ; and, on the other 
hand, Russia was becoming more and more anti-German. 



GERMANY'S SECRET WAR COUNCIL, JULY 5, 1914 29 

''Therefore/' he said, ''we must risk it." To diplomats 
thus committed to war the conference of ambassadors, pro- 
posed b.y England to find a way of avoiding war, could not 
be considered "because," as von Jagow says, "it would 
doubtless have led to a serious diplomatic defeat." He 
continues, "A fresh diminution of our prestige was not en- 
durable for our position in Europe and the world. The 
prosperity of states, their political and economic successes, 
are based upon the prestige that they enjoy in the world." 
War was invoked to build up this German prestige. In 
these statements the program of the military autocracy 
stands revealed and condemned. 

In the light of these three documents the German plot for 
the provocation of the war stands more clearly revealed 
than ever. At Potsdam on July 5 a number of autocrats 
committed Germany and Austria to a policy of war. Events 
subsequent to that date were arranged to blind the world 
and to make the conflict inevitable. Thus were prestige 
and power to be won for the ruling classes in Germany 
while mankind was crucified. 



GERMANY'S AMBITION FOR WORLD POWER 

By 

FREDERIC A. OGG 

Professor of Political Science 

What is Germany fighting for? She was attacked by 
no one of the nations now in arms against her. In the 
closing days of July, 1914, when the peace of Europe hung 
by a hair, England and France begged her to throw her 
influence against war; and without a doubt she could 
have prevented a blow from being struck if she had cared 
to do so. She was big, rich, strong, prosperous, influential, 
safe. Why did she want war ? 

The Kaiser himself answered the question when, in 1915, 
he said: ''The triumph of the greater Germany, which 
some day must dominate all Europe, is the single end for 
which we are fighting." Nothing could be more definite 
than that ! And no one can dispute the Kaiser 's right to 
say what the war is for ; after all, it is Tiis war. 

But it must not be supposed that the purpose to dominate 
Europe, and therefore the world, w^s formed after the 
war began. Had it been, some excuse might be found; 
for in the heat of conflict rulers and peoples sometimes 
lose their heads and cry out for things that they cannot 
and should not have. 

The German policy of domination was formulated long 
ago, in times of profound peace, and in the most cold- 
blooded manner. In proof of this one could cite state- 
ments by the score, coming from the Kaiser, from the im- 



GERMANY'S AMBITION FOR WORLD I'OWER 31 

perial chancellors and other high administrative officials, 
from members of the imperial and state legislatures, from 
university professors, from historians, from poets, from 
journalists. There was little effort at concealment. It 
now seems remarkable that so much could have been said 
so openly without throwing the rest of the world into panic. 

As eveiybody knows, the growth of modern Germany in 
all that goes to make up national prosperity and power is 
nothing short of marvelous. Only our own country and 
Japan can furnish parallels to it. No nation, ivJien the 
present ivar began, had a more favored position in the 
trade, finance, and politics of the world; none teas forging 
ahead at a swifter pace. 

There was, of course, no fault in this. Every nation has 
a right to build up its prosperity and strength in all hon- 
orable ways. The great difficulty with Germany is that, 
having prospered so magnificently, she allowed her head to 
be turned by her successes. If she had developed thus 
fast, why not make the pace yet faster? Need there be any 
limit to her growth in wealth, numbers, size? Why not 
elbow other nations out of the way and seize the dominance 
of Europe, of the oceans, of the eastern hemisphere — yes, 
of the world? There was no lack of enthusiasts to urge 
her on, nor of prophets to predict her easy and complete 
triumph. 

And so it came about that in the midst of their building 
of factories, extending of trade, and accumulating of riches, 
the German people yielded gradually to the insidious idea 
of world dominion — a world dominion which could be se- 
cured, too, only by riding roughly over the rights of other 
peoples, by craft, and by sheer conquest. It is not fair 
to say that everybody in Germany fell in enthusiastically 
with this program. Some openly opposed it and many 



32 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

doubted its wisdom. But the elements that determine pub- 
lie policy, under the Empire's undemocratic scheme of gov- 
ernment, adopted it wholeheartedly and rammed it down 
the nation 's throat. 

THE MANIA FOR CONQUEST 

The contention with which the new imperialistic creed 
started was that the German people is the ''chosen of 
God", superior to all other peoples, and therefore fittest 
to rule. Closely related was the notion that this people, 
and especially its sovereign, the Kaiser, is favored in a 
peculiar degree with divine guidance. ''We are the salt of 
the earth," declared the Emperor in a speech at Bremen 
in 1905. "The Teutons are the aristocracy of humanity," 
writes the anthropologist Woltmann, "the Latins, on the 
contrary, belong to the degenerate mob. " " The world owes 
its civilization to Germany alone," asserts Wirth, "and 
the time is near when the earth must inevitably be con- 
quered by the Germans." "We are morally and intellec- 
tually superior to all, without peers," writes Professor 
Lasson of the University of Berlin; "it is the same with 
our organizations and with our institutions." A book 
widely used in the schools says that the Russians are 
slaves and the French monkeys. 

"God has called us to civilize the world," affirmed the 
Kaiser in the Bremen speech above mentioned; "we are 
the missionaries of human progress." "We shall conquer 
everywhere," he declared again, "even though we be sur- 
rounded by enemies on all sides ; for their lives a powerful 
ally, the good old God in heaven, who . . . has always 
been on our side." A small volume could be filled with 
expressions of this sort. 

The ambition to dominate has developed rapidly since 



GERMANY'S AMBITION FOR WORLD POWER 33 

1900. In that year the Kaiser expressed the hope that 
Germany would become "as closely united, as powerful, 
and as authoritative as once the Roman Empire was"; and 
two years later he confessed, in a speech at Aix-la-Chapelle, 
that "it is to the empire of the world that the German 
genius aspires." On another occasion he defined Ger- 
many's aim to be to win for herself "a place in the sun." 
"That the German Empire is not the end, but the begin- 
ning, of our national development, ' ' wrote the editor of the 
Berlin Zeit-Fragen in 1897, "is an obvious truth." In 
his Germany and (lie Next War (published in English 
translation in 1911) Friedrich von Bernhardi, a Prussian 
cavalry general and former member of the general staff, 
wrote: "An intense longing for a foremost place among 
the powers and for manly action fills our nation;" also, 
"in the next war, world power or downfall will be our 
rallying cry. ' ' 

' ' Room ; they must make room, ' ' exclaimed Tanneberg in 
his Greater Germany in 1911; "the western and south- 
ern Slavs — or we. Since we are the stronger, the choice 
will not be difficult. "We must quit our modest waiting at 
the door." "The German people is so situated in Eu- 
rope," the same author rejoices, "that it needs only to 
run and take whatever it desires. ' ' 

Moreover, the advocates of imperial aggrandizement left 
no doubt that the method was to be war. "We Germans," 
wrote von Bernhardi in the book mentioned, "have a far 
greater and more urgent duty towards civilization to per- 
form than the great Asiatic power. We, like the Japan- 
ese, can fulfill it only by the sword. ' ' In the introduction 
to a book which he wrote in 1913 entitled Germany 
in Arms the Crown Prince spoke to the same effect. "It 
is only, ' ' he says, ' ' by relying on our good German sword 

3— W. B. 



34 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

that we can hope to conquer that place in the sun which 
rightly belongs to us, and which no one will yield to us 
voluntarily. . . . Till the world comes to an end the 
ultimate decision must rest with the sword." One recalls 
in this connection the Kaiser's address to the army at his 
accession wherein he said, "So we are bound together — I 
and the army — so we are born for one another, and so we 
shall hold together indissolubly. ' ' One cannot forget, too, 
the toast which was long a favorite on the Imperial ships 
of war, Auf den Tag — "To the day" — i. e., the day on 
which the German men-of-war should be let loose against 
the British navy. 

These, then, are the ideas that of late have dominated the 
Empire's governing classes. The Germans are superior to 
all other peoples. They are fittest to rule. God intended 
that they should rule. Therefore they will rule. Their 
rule is to he established hy the sword. And it is to he 
world-wide. 

These doctrines were proclaimed by the government. 
They were set forth, with ingenious argument, by writers 
and scholars. They were taught in the schools. They 
were made the theme of sermons. They were brought close 
home to the people through the newspapers, the labor 
unions, the chambers of commerce, and a dozen other 
agencies. The nation, as a whole, was made to believe 
them. 

The effects long ago became apparent upon Germany's 
conduct as a nation. The Empire began to meddle with 
matters that did not properly concern it. "Nothing must 
go on anywhere," the Kaiser once remarked, "in which 
Germany does not play a part." More than once — as 
when the Kaiser's government tried to form a coalition of 
European nations against us in 1898 to prevent our going 



GERMANY'S AMBITION FOR WORLD POWER 



35 



to the rescue of Cuba-our own country has found out 
what this German purpose to have a hand in everj^hing 
means in practice. 

THE ARMY AND NAVY AS INSTRUMENTS 

The projects of conquest successively unfolded as the 
imperialistic purpose sank deeper into the national mind 
will be described in a later paper in this series. For the 
present we are concerned only with establishing the fact 
that such an imperialistic purpose existed and controlled. 
A proof that at once suggests itself is the building up in 
Germany of the gi^test army, and especially of the 
greatest military system, in the world. Like all nations, 
Germany had a right to maintain an army. Her exposed 
frontiers may be regarded as entitling her to keep an army 
somewhat larger than a nation differently situated. But 
the Empire was founded by the sword; and the whole 
theory of the government ever since 1871 has been that it 
. IS by the sword that the nation is to be maintained and 
extended. Universal military service, huge military budg- 
ets, subordination of every indi-vddual and social interest to 
the ends of military efficiency— all spoke eloquently of the 
German purpose to have an army for something more 
than the ordinary uses of defense. The armed forces were 
intended for aggression, when the time for aggression 
should come. How otherwise account for their sudden 
increase on a peace footing, in 1913, by 140,000 officers and 
men? 

_ Likewise the navj^. When the Empire was established 
m 1871, It had only a few ships. About 1885 a small navy 
began to be created for the protection of the Empire's 
growing overseas commerce. Then came the present 
Kaiser with his plans for German maritime supremacy 



36 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

In 1898 an epoch-marking navy bill passed the Reichstag, 
providing at one stroke for the construction of a fleet of 
nineteen battleships and forty-two cruisers, and asserting 
in its preamble that the Empire required a navy not only 
to protect her commerce, but chiefly in order that her 
strength ''might be such that even the greatest sea-power 
[England] must hesitate to attack Germany unless she 
were willing to risk her whole position as a great power/' 
Later the purpose was officially stated to be to make the 
navy so strong that "Germany may be able to compel 
respect for her wishes in any international complication 
or development in any part of the world." Between 1900 
and 1912 the building program was repeatedly revised so 
as to meet this larger end. 

THE BERLIN GOVERNMENT BLOCKS ARJMAMENT 
REDUCTION 

Still more significant was the German government's at- 
titude toward proposals for a reduction of armaments. In 
1898 the Czar of Russia invited the nations having diplo- 
mats at his capital to send representatives to a conference 
to consider whether some scheme might not be adopted for 
limiting the present staggering outlays upon the in- 
struments of war. The conference was held at The 
Hague. Some things were accomplished for the cause of 
peace. But practical proposals on disarmament had to be 
dropped on account of the inflexible opposition of Ger- 
many, whose delegates took the position that armaments 
were ''not a burden but a privilege". A second confer- 
ence was held at The Hague in 1907. In the meantime the 
Kaiser declared to King Edward VII of England that he 
would go to war rather than allow the question of dis- 
armament to be discussed; and by reason of Germany *s 



GERMANY'S AMBITION FOR WORLD POWER 



87 



Stand the conference could do nothing but pass a useless 
resolution to the effect that the governments should ''re- 
sume the serious examination of the question". Less bel- 
ligerent states, including England, were keenly disap- 
pointed. 

After 1907 Germany persistently wrecked every proposal 
on the subject of armament restriction, eitJier by flat re- 
fusals or by imposing impossible conditions. 

Here are two instances. In 1912 the British govern- 
ment sent Lord Haldane to Berlin, unofficially, to ''sound 
out" the Emperor and Chancellor and find whether it 
would not now be possible to get the long sought agree- 
ment to limit naval armaments. Germany offered to agree 
to a rather indefinite slowing-up of naval construction, 
provided Great Britain should bind herself uncondition- 
ally to remain neutral in any European conflict in which 
Germany might be involved! Germany was to be free to 
attack France, Russia, Holland, perchance Belgium, and to 
terrorize the continent, while Great Britain stood idly by. 
The monstrous offer was properly rejected; although in 
his reply the British foreign minister magnanimously said 
to the German ambassador that Great Britain would 
neither make nor join in any unprovoked attack on Ger- 
many, and that she was not, and would not become, party 
to any international agreement having aggression on Ger- 
many as its object. Suggestions in 1912 and 1913 by Win- 
ston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, that the two 
powers agree on a cessation of naval-construction— a sort 
of "naval holiday"— for one year drew from Berlin no 
response. 

"Any agitation in Germany in favor of disarmament," 
wrote Professor Hans Delbriick of the University of Ber- 
lin in 1914, just before the war, "is absolutely unpardon- 



g§ UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

able. Germany is, among all the powers, the only one 
which possesses not only sufficient men but sufficient gold 
to increase armaments on land and sea to an extraordinary 
degree. . . . We stand, not at the end, but at the be- 
ginning, of a great development." 

STIRRING UP WAR FEVER 

Not only were the German ruling classes bending every 
energy in the years before the war to bring up the army 
and navy to the maximum of strength ; they were systemat- 
ically cultivating a feeling among the people that war was 
both inevitable and desirable. We have this from thor- 
oughly reputable German sources. Here is one bit of 
testimony. At the close of 1913 Otfried Nippold, professor 
of church history at the University of Jena, returned home 
from an extended residence in Japan. Shocked by the ex- 
traordinary growth of the war spirit in Germany during 
his absence, he brought together a collection of statements 
advocating war and conquest emanating, simply during 
the years 1912 and 1913, from representative German citi- 
zens, organizations, and publications. These expressions 
made up a volume of over one hundred pages. Concerning 
them Nippold writes: ''The evidence submitted in this 
book amounts to an irrefutable proof that a systematic 
stimulation of the war spirit is going on. . . . These 
men do not only occasionally incite people to war, but they 
systematically inculcate a desire for war in the minds of 
the German people. Not only in the sense that they ought 
to be prepared for war and ready for all eventualities, 
but in the much more far-reaching sense that they want 
war. War is represented not merely as a possibility that 
might arise, but as a necessity that must come about, and 
the sooner the better. ' ' 



GERMANY'S AMBITION FOR WORLD POWER 39 



ARBITRATION PROPOSALS AND TREATIES OF NO AVAIL 

Americans have of late taken a deep interest in arbitra- 
tion as a means of settling international disputes, and in 
the past ten years our government has signed scores of 
arbitration treaties. International arbitration was coupled 
with the limitation of armaments as a topic for considera- 
tion at the Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907, and on 
both occasions the subject was discussed at length. In 
1899 the German representatives declared that their gov- 
ernment was not in a position to accept obligatory arbitra- 
tion and felt that it had already conceded much in agree- 
ing to the establishment of a Permanent Court of Arbitra- 
tion. Again in 1907 the Germans, seconded by the Aus- 
trians, declared emphatically that they would vote against 
every proposal to establish obligatory arbitration by means 
of a world treaty such as the United States was then ad- 
vocating. The attitude of the Berlin government obviously 
sprang from the Imperial purpose to uphold the rule of 
might, and it blocked effective action. 

Only one more evidence of Germany's imperialistic pur- 
poses can be mentioned. In 1914 — but a few months be- 
fore the outbreak of the present war — representatives of 
Great Britain and Germany signed a treaty settling the 
many territorial disputes between the two nations in a 
manner surprisingly favorable to Germany. Paul Rohr- 
bach, an imperialist whose books and pamphlets on public 
affairs were for years more widely read in Germany than 
those of any other writer, himself pronounced the British 
concessions ''astonishing" and declared that they ''met 
every reasonable demand ' '. That in the face of such terms 
Germany wanted war indicates that what she was really 



40 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

aiming at was world dominion — a dominion of such char- 
acter that no nation could be made to accept it until 
brought to its knees by force. 



WAS GERMANY A GUARDIAN OF PEACE? 

In reply to this whole indictment persons of pro-German 
inclination will raise the hackneyed cry: Germany kept 
the peace for forty-three years, while England, Russia, 
Italy, Spain, Japan, the United States, and lesser powers 
were waging a dreary succession of bloody and costly wars. 
The statement of fact is true and the explanation simple, 
Bismarck had no scruples about using war or any other 
means to attain his ends. But he believed that the stabil- 
ity and growth of the new German Empire demanded 
peace. As long as the Iron Chancellor remained at the 
helm the aims of German diplomacy, therefore, excluded 
every movement of aggression that could precipitate a 
conflict. 

But in 1890 the old and trusted pilot was dropped and 
William II, at the age of thirty-one became (in effect) his 
own chancellor. In a few years a different spirit began 
to show itself. The attempt to form a coalition against us 
in 1898 has been mentioned. ^'If I had had a navy," the 
Kaiser is reported to have declared, ''I should have taken 
Uncle Sam by the scruff of the neck. ' ' The reason for the 
failure to make war on us then and there was not want of 
will, but want of ships. In his Imperial Germany, ex- 
Chancellor von Billow tells why Germany did not attack 
England at the time of the Boer war. The explanation is 
the same — too small a navy. But — as was evidenced by the 
annexation of the Chinese territory of Kiao-chow in 1897 — 
when the Empire could seize without risk, it did not scruple 



GERMANY'S AMBITION FOR WORLD POWER 41 

to do SO. Furthermore, the Kaiser saw to it that every 
resource was employed to remedy the fatal lack of a navy. 
In the earlier twentieth century Germany twice just 
missed coming to blows with France, in both cases about 
Morocco. In the first instance (1905) France backed 
down; in the second (1911), Germany. In government 
circles at Berlin it has been confessed that the demonstra- 
tion of 1911 was intended, not to precipitate war — the 
Empire was not ready for that — but to ''feel out" the 
situation and ascertain precisely where France, England, 
and other nations stood in relation to one another. It is 
known, too, that French investors began drawing their 
money out of Germany by the hundred millions and in a 
few days would have brought about a financial panic which 
would foredoom a war to failure. 

In 1908 Germany's ally, Austria-Hungary, in violation 
of a solemn agreement, annexed the two Slavic provinces of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia, as the guardian of 
Slavic interests, threatened war. But Germany leapt ''in 
shining armor" to the side of its ally and terrorized the 
aggrieved peoples into submission. True, Germany went 
for four decades without a war in Europe! But during 
the last two of them she was mixed up in more disputes 
and conflicts than any other great power. 

Germany's declaration of war in 1914 was but the cul- 
minating expression of a long-growing spirit of aggression 
and ruthlessness. People who have talked in an intimate 
way with representatives of the Empire's influential classes 
have heard this acknowledged without hesitation. "What 
such spokesmen tell you in private one man has had the 
courage to say in public — the Empire's one thoroughly in- 
dependent and fearless journalist, Maximilian Harden. 
"Not as weak-willed blunderers have we undertaken the 



42 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

fearful risk of this war," he writes. ''We wanted it. 
. . . May the Teuton devil throttle those whiners whose 
pleas for excuses make us ludicrous in these hours of lofty 
experience. We do not stand, and shall not place our- 
selves, before the court of Europe. . . . Germany 
strikes. If it conquers new realms for its genius, the 
priesthood of all the gods will sing songs of praise to the 
good war. . . . Now strikes the hour for Germany's 
rising power." 



GER:\rAXY's a:\ibi^iox for world power 43 



Bibliography 

Anon. J 'Accuse! By a German; trans, by A. Gray. Lon- 
don. 1915. A powerful indictment of Germany's ag- 
gressive policies. 

Bang, J. P. Hurrah and HaUelujah; the Teaching of Ger- 
many's Poets y Prophets, Professors, and Preacliers. 
New York. Doran. 1917. 

Bernhardi. Friedricli von. Germany ancl the Next IVar. 
Trans, by A. H. Powles. New York. Longmans. 
1914. Germany's mission as a nation discussed by a 
Prussian cavalry officer. 

Billow, Bernard von. Imperial Germany. Trans, by 
Marie A. LcAvenz. New York. Dodd Mead. 1914. 
Pt. I. By an ex-chancellor of the German Empire. 

Conquest and Kidtur; Aims of the Germans in their own 
Woixls. Issued by L^. S. Committee on Public In- 
formation. "Washington. 1917. 

Frobenius, H. Germany's Hour of Destiny. New York. 
McBride Nast. 1914. 

Hurd, A., and Castle, H. German Sea Power. New York. 
Scribner. 1913. 

McLaren, A. D. Peaceful Penetration. New York. But- 
ton. 1917. Describes Germany's methods of extend- 
ing her control in countries outside Europe. 

Perris, H. Germany and the German Emperor. New 
York. Holt. 1912. Chap. 9. 

Rohrbach, Paul. German World Policies. Trans, by Ed- 
mund von Mach. New York. Macmillan. 1915. A 
very influential book by an ardent German imperialist. 



44 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

Saunders, George. Builder and Blunderer. New York. 

Button. 1914. Chaps. 4-5. 
Schierbrand, Wolf von, [ed.] The Kaiser's Speeches, 

New York. Harper. 1903. 
Thayer, W. R. [ed.] Out of their Oivn Mouths. Utterances 

of German Rulers, Statesmen, etc. New York. Ap- 

pleton. 1917. 



WHY GERMANY WANTED WAR 

By 

G. C. COMSTOCK 
Dean of the Graduate School 

Germany and Austria-Hungary profess that they 
were forced into the Avorld war. War at some time was 
inevitable, they say, because of the hostile jealousy of 
their neighbors, England in particular ; and they declare 
that the event was forced at the beginning of August, 
1914, by mobilization of the Russian army against them. 
Rightly to appreciate these claims and the purpose that 
lies behind them one needs to know something about the 
workings of the Teuton mind, and this is not an alto- 
gether easy matter; for as that brilliant journalist, Max- 
imilian Harden, assures us ''foreigners do not think as 
we Germans do/' 

GERMAN THOUGHT AND WILL 

We cannot doubt, however, that Germans want much 
the same things that other men want, wealth, power, 
prestige. We cannot criticise them for such desires 
without at the same time condemning ourselves. But 
we may fairly ask how much wealth and whose wealth 
do they want ? How do they seek power and prestige ? 
Does Germany want more than her fair share of good 
things, or does her thought differ from ours as to what is 
a fair share, and as to the means by which she may justly 
obtain that share? 



46 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

We turn to German words and acts for answer to 
these questions and in doing so we find a Babel of dis- 
cordant voices each telling what it wants for Germany. 
Out of this Babel we have to pick the things that are 
really significant of Germany's thought and purpose, 
and we have two principal aids toward a wise choice. 
One of these is their highly developed class system, un- 
der which the opinion of Michel the peasant, or Hans 
the wage earner, counts for nothing unless there are mil- 
lions who share it ; while the ambition of one man higher 
up, a kaiser or a crown prince, may mean much to the 
land and to the outside world. But no opinion, from 
Michel up to William Hohenzollern is significant of 
what Germany really seeks unless it squares with what 
Germany does, and here is our second clue to the German 
purpose. What kind of purpose best fits into these years 
of German war? The voice that here runs counter to 
deeds does not tell Germany's united purpose. When, 
for example, Professor Wundt calls, ''sheer lunacy, the 
idea that Germany would do violence to a neutral state 
that was itself willing to keep the peace", must it not be 
said in all candor that Germany did such violence to 
Belgium and to the United States. Germany's act re- 
pudiates the professor 's word. 

The Prussian organization places in the hands of a 
ruling class the power to determine Germany's relations 
with the outside world, the power of war and peace, 
with scant regard to the wishes of the German people. 
Equally it places in the same hands, through control of 
army, church and school, power to shape the ideas of 
young Germany to suit its own purpose. Through 
control of the universities, the press, the opportunities 
for public meeting and public speech, those same hands 
have power to keep the Teuton tree bent the way its 



WHY GERMANY WANTED WAR 47 

twig was inclined; and they use that power. In large 
measure the mind and will of the German people have 
been standardized from above, by implanting in them 
certain common ideas and fears, to which strong appeal 
may be made by the rulers in executing any plan for 
which the public has been trained. 

Among these inspired ideas we count: That Germany 
is surrounded by enemies jealous of her greatness and 
resolved at least to check her growth, perhaps to stamp 
out her existence : That Germany must always be pre- 
pared to defend herself by force of arms, for no reliance 
can be placed upon treaties of peace or agreements to 
respect her rights : That war is sure to come from time 
to time and in it Germany must always strike first: 
That Germany needs to expand; she needs more land 
and in particular she needs under her own control lands 
that will supply the raw material required in her great 
manufacturing industries: That foreign trade is Ger- 
many's life blood and for its protection she needs 'Hhe 
freedom of the seas"; that is, in the words of Ger- 
many's chief naval critic, Count Reventlow, ''com- 
mand of the seas". ''We want such a jumping off 
place for our navy as would give us a fair chance of 
dominating the seas and of being free of the seas daring 
a war." : : i'l^rj*!- 

This is in part the foundation upon which a great vol- 
untary organization, The Navy League, has for nearly 
twenty years urged upon the German people the need 
for a great fleet. It has won its campaign and produced 
both a great German navy and a great foreign suspic- 
ion of that navy's purpose. For the foreigner knows the 
German doctrine that since war is sure to come some 
time, its dangers may best be met in advance by a " pre- 
ventive war" which shall crush the prospective enemy 



48 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

before he is ready to strike, or even before he knows he 
is a threatening foe. For defense, either real or of the 
"preventive" kind, the German army has for many 
years been maintained as the strongest military force 
in the world, and in the three years immediately pre- 
ceding the war, the German people submitted to an ex- 
traordinary burden of new taxation to make that army 
still greater and stronger. It is hard to believe that 
the authors and backers of the army and navy campaign 
did not intend to use the w^eapons thus created at 
crushing cost. 

Underlying these popular German fears and prepara- 
tions for impending need was a feeling that the world 
has been unjustly parcelled out among Germany's rivals. 
Russia and the United States hold great continental 
domains fit for the support of nations a thousand mil- 
lions strong. France and England have colonial pos- 
sessions of comparable extent, while Germany, shut in 
by political boundaries of an artificial kind, her Junkers 
said, cannot hope to compete with these powers in the 
future unless she, too, can have a larger place in the 
sun. Expand or suffocate is the alternative presented 
to the German mind, not chosen but thrust upon it ; and 
an ardent belief that the German people and the Ger- 
man civilization are the best and highest that the world 
has yet produced puts into that alternative a peculiar 
sting. 

While not complete I believe these lines contain a fair 
statement of popular belief and feeling at hand for use 
by the German ruling class. But these beliefs and feel- 
ings were not universally held. A large body of Ger- 
man Socialists professed to reject many of these ideas. 
It professed to be in closer sympathy with the laboring 



WHY GERIklANY WANTED WAR 49 

class of other lands than with the wealth and power of 
its own home. It professed to seek the welfare of men 
rather than of a nation. Much larger groups of alien 
race, French, Bohemian, Pole, Slav, bitterly resenting 
Grerman rule and Austrian oppression, lived under them, 
sullen and hopeless. And there were other centers of 
opposition or hostility to the ruling class. But when 
war came all these were silent and the German people 
seemed to rally to its rulers with confident enthusiasm, 
willing to give itself to German need and German profit 
as expounded from above. This instinctive loyalty is a 
fact of great importance in our enforced struggle with 
the German power, since it is at some dividing line in 
German thought and sentiment, a possible rift between 
government and people, that President Wilson has di- 
rected his famous appeal from the one to the other; 
from a governing class in whose honor and honesty he 
can place no further trust, to a people that may still be 
sound at heart and worthy to hold a great place in the 
civilized world. If that rift does not exist and manifest 
itself, the appeal will fail. If, however, the unanimity 
of 1914 was in large part a craze and panic in which 
German thought and alien feeling were alike swamped 
for a time in the mob mind, then the President's appeal 
may prove to be a great factor in determining world 
history. 

PAN-GERMANISM 

So long as government and people stand together in 
Germany their common purpose will run along the lines 
of hope and fear already sketched, and their immediate 
aim is most plainly shown by the faction that calls itself 
Pan-German. In the years preceding the war this fac- 
tion grew prodigiously among the upper and middle 



50 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

classes, in the army, in ''big business", and among the 
office holders. Since the war's outbreak its propaganda 
literature has been so widely distributed through mili- 
tary channels as to call forth sharp Socialist criticism 
in the Reichstag, and official reply to this criticism con- 
tains more of confession and justification than denial of 
the charge that the government is actively Pan-German. 
The Pan-German seeks expansion for the fatherland, for 
its purse as well as its Kultur. He proclaims that no 
German should be lost to it. Even though he makes a 
new home across the seas he should cherish and serve the 
old home, even against the new, as he has sometimes 
done in America during the past four years. The Ger- 
man power, they say, should acquire new lands in which 
to plant its people and their Kultur and from which to 
draw trade and profit for Germany. Since the most de- 
sirable parts of the world are already occupied and 
strongly held by other people, German expansion must 
be by force at their expense, unless they willingly 
yield, as the rulers of Turkey and Austria have done. 
The Pan-German sees that wisdom must be exercised in 
choosing the right places for expansion, but he holds that 
no German should hesitate to sacrifice himself, or should 
scruple about the rights of others, where the interests 
of Germany are at stake. Deutschland is ueher alles 
in the German mind; and by virtue of her superiority 
she may take what she will in the world. In the end all 
men will profit by it and Germans will gain a speedier 
reward. 

But let no man think that this purpose was any new 
or hastily concocted scheme of a few ambitious leaders, 
Germany has long believed that her growth and great 
prosperity during the past forty years are based on the 
victorious French war of 1871, and the huge indemnity 



WHY GERMANY WANTED WAR 51 

exacted from its victim. It hopes and believes that a like 
success may be had again, and a popular poet of forty 
years ago has put the idea into picturesque verse in 
honor of their old war god: 

Thor stood at the midnight end of the world, 

His battle-mace flew from his hand: 
"So far as my clangorous hammer I've hurled 

Mine are the sea and the land!" 
And onward hurtled the mighty sledge 

O'er the wide, wide earth, to fall 
At last on the Southland's furthest edge 

In token that His was all. 
Since then 'tis the joyous German right 

With the hammer lands to win; 
We mean to inherit world-wide might 

As the Hammer-God's kith and kin. 



PAN-GERMAN DREAMS 

But there are difficulties in the way of such a pro- 
gram, and jealous neighbors oppose German expansion 
at their expense. Germany must be wise as well as bold 
in dealing with them, and the world, therefore, has been 
ransacked during the past twenty years for openings in 
which the cost of expansion should not exceed the profit. 
A demonstration made by the Kaiser against the north 
coast of South America, in 1902, was stopped only by 
vigorous interference from Washington. Twice within 
the last decade the northwest coast of Africa has been 
tried, with only partial success. A murder of two Ger- 
man missionaries in China was followed by the seizure, 
on the western shore of the Pacific, of a colony which 
had been selected prior to the murder, as a desirable 
center of German civilization. The southern hemi- 
sphere and the islands of the sea have similar stories, 



52 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

but all of these are minor incidents. The great Pan- 
German dream was for a Central European Empire. 
Prussia, organizing and controlling all German speaking 
peoples between the Alps and the Baltic sea, is to be 
the nucleus of this power, which shall in good time 
spread in every direction. Holland, Belgium and nor- 
thern France are needed for it, not only for their land 
and wealth, but to give fuller access to the sea and to 
those distant colonies that Germany had commenced to 
acquire and to which the Central Empire must greatly 
add. Political control of these lands is not enough, for 
their native peoples might, and probably would, remain 
hostile to the conqueror and be a source of annoyance to 
him, as has been painfully true among the subject peo- 
ples of Poland and Alsace. Belgian, Slav and French 
must therefore be forced off their land and Germans put 
in their place to supplant old ideas and the old speech 
and to establish in their stead German thought and lan- 
guage. Pan-Germanism calls this "expropriation"; in 
plain English it is wholesale robbery. 

To north and south and east of Central Europe lie 
other opportunities, some of which, in Russia, have been 
realized, probably beyond anticipation. Others are re- 
served for the future, and Denmark, Norway, Sweden 
know their danger and live in fear of it. But bigger 
than any of these and of more immediate promise in the 
days before the war, was that great backward region 
that for 3000 miles stretches away from Austria, past 
Constantinople and Persia, to the gates of India. Here 
are lands, once the richest and most cultured part of the 
world, that now are fallen into ruin and are feebly held 
by decadent races, who are unwilling or unable to real- 
ize their possibilities. Here lay the Pan-German vision 



WHY GERMANY WANTED WAR 53 

of a half -empty part of the earth into which a great or- 
ganizing power like Germany might come, bringing or- 
der, civilization, even welfare to the native races, with 
power and profit for itself. And just to one side of this 
region is Egypt, the neck of the British Empire. To 
seize it would at one stroke paralyze Germany's most 
hated rival, open to trade and colonization the heart of 
Africa and add to Germany's army millions of black 
recruits. To many a Pan-German the road from Berlin 
to Bagdad and Cairo seemed the place in the sun where 
might be made good that unfair distribution of the 
world in which dependencies and colonies had been 
denied to the fatherland and their wealth squandered 
on less worthy peoples. Even Germany's alleged ''hos- 
tile" neighbors had in the days before the war recog- 
nized that among the Moslem peoples of the near east 
there was a legitimate field for her ambition, if carried 
out by fair and humane methods, with justice toward the 
rights of others. 

The Kaiser, William II, appears to have realized very 
early in his reign the possibilities of German expansion 
toward the southeast. In ostentatious tours he pro- 
claimed himself at Jerusalem as the friend and protector 
of Moslems, not in these lands alone but throughout the 
world. At Constantinople he personally built up the 
traditions of German friendship and aid that have been 
carefully developed for thirty years, until in her gov- 
ernment, her army and her commerce, Turkey became 
first a tool and then a bondsman to Germany, unable to 
escape from servitude. The Balkan states were provided 
with German royalty and the Austrian Empire firmly 
bound in a German alliance. The ''peaceful penetration" 
of the Orient, the ''Drang nacli Osten", went on apace 
and rough shod over unwilling peoples until the Balkan 



54 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

wars of 1912 threatened for a time to raise up a barrier 
between the Teuton and Turk. Servia, a petty Slav 
state, long harrassed by Austria and long hostile to her, 
was the front if not the head of a group of small allied 
nations that stood firmly astride that main artery of 
German push, the Berlin-Constantinople railway, and 
for a time they seemed to block the Pan-German scheme. 
But these allies quarrelled bitterly among themselves 
until Austria, seizing upon the murder of a prince as an 
opportune moment, with German aid and against Rus- 
sian opposition, crushed Servia, won over Bulgaria 
and reopened the road to the East. Today the German 
power stretches unbroken from the North Sea to the 
heart of Asia. The goal has been reached and the begin- 
nings of the Pan-German dream have been brilliantly 
realized, although they are not yet completely assured. 

PAN-GERMANY TODAY 

The Pan-German vision of before the war squares 
with the German acts and achievements in the war and 
together they show WHAT GERMANY DID WANT 
in 1914. What does she want now? Germany seeks 
peace in 1918, and seeks it with good reason and entire 
sincerity, since she has achieved her purpose. True, her 
war balance sheet as of to-day would show formidable 
entries on the debit side; her industries disorganized, 
her foreign trade wiped out, international good will 
shifted from an asset into a huge liability of suspicion 
and hatred, her colonies lost, her people half starved, the 
number of her fighting men seriously reduced, and pop- 
ular morale shaken. But on the other side of the ac- 
count are credits well worth while. Booty, alone, is no 
mean item. In live stock and merchandise and machin- 



WHY GERMANY WANTED WAR 55 

ery, seized in the enemy country, sent home and appro- 
priated to her own use, there is plunder running into 
huge sums. Fines, assessments, taxes, and forced labor 
exacted from conquered peoples, are probably an even 
greater asset. Crime has bound Germany's allies to her 
in a dependent union from which the vassal can find no 
escape. The Central European Empire, Mittel Europa, 
is an accomplished fact, and it has suffered no greater 
war damage than have its rivals. The population under 
German rule has been increased three-fold, and if it can 
have a generation in which to rest and recuperate, under 
Prussian training it will furnish a military power as 
ready for another onslaught, bye and bye, as was the 
Germany of 1914, and one far more formidable to the 
world. Even though something in Belgium and France 
should have to be given up and written off the account, 
what remains is an ample first installment of Pan-Ger- 
manism. 

Germany wants now to strike a balance and close 
the account on a basis of no annexations (save hers 
in the east and south) and no indemnity to others for 
the outrage, plunder, and f rightfulness that she has in- 
flicted upon the world. One simple people listened to 
the German voice, promising them such a peace without 
penalties, and their folly has delivered both Russia and 
Roumania into the hands of a cruel master. Contrary 
to her express stipulation Germany is to-day demanding 
from disorganized Russia the permanent cession of great 
provinces inhabited by millions who abhor her yoke. If 
one may trust the reports that come from both Russian 
and German sources, she is also demanding a great mone- 
tary indemnity that she promised not to require. But 
''Not kennt kein Gehot" and German ''big business" 
claims that an indemnity must be had to make good 



56 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

the losses it has suffered in the war. "Real Politik 
consists in a cool and clear marshalling of forces regard- 
less of moral and other irrelevant considerations.'' 
Germany seeks to repeat her Eussian fraud, and on such 
a basis she continues to urge upon the world that she 
now wants peace. But the world has said, and continues 
to say, that such a peace would be worse than war, and 
more unrighteous. It would be an unjust and unstable 
peace, covering up instead of cutting out the fatal can- 
cer of German arrogance, greed and lust for world 
dominion. 

OUR DANGER AND OUR DUTY 

Our war balance sheet, like Germany's, has lost one 
great credit item. Our ideals have been shattered. We 
believed before the war that men were growing better 
and we cherished the vision of a world in which nations 
as well as men had learned justice and had found that 
respect for their neighbor's rights is wise and profitable 
as well as just. We have dreamed of a union of nations 
that should maintain, even among backward peoples, 
the new and better moral standard of equal rights aiid 
equal justice for all, whether they be big or little, weak 
or strong. That item of good will finds scant place in 
to-day's account. Germany's own explanation of her 
aims and methods, her practice of mingled intrigue and 
violence, mark her as unfit for such a league of peace, 
morally incompetent, and a major obstacle to its success. 
We who have believed that ''through the ages some in- 
creasing purpose runs ' ' seek in vain for that increase in 
the modern German spirit. It is the same spirit that in- 
spired their predecessors of two thousand years ago 
whom Julius Caesar drove back across the Rhine in de- 
fense of the civilization of his day. Indeed, how much 



WHY GERMANY WANTED WAR 57 

of human uplift is shown in that still longer roll of cen- 
turies that separates Pan-Germany from another pred- 
atory horde that took as from the mouth of its God the 
command : 

When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then 
proclaim peace unto it. And it shall be, if it make thee an- 
swer of peace and open unto thee, then it shall be, that all 
the people that is found therein shall be tributaries unto thee, 
and they shall serve thee. And if it make no peace with 
thee, but will make war against thee, then thou shalt besiege 
It. And when the Lord thy God hath delivered it into thine 
hand, thou shalt smite every male thereof with the edge of 
the sword. But the women and the little ones, and the cattle 
and all that is in the city, even all the spoil thereof, shalt 
thou take unto thyself; and thou shalt eat the spoil of thine 
enemies, which the Lord thy God hath given thee. 

Who can better describe the present German war, 
with its blasphemous appeal to God as partner in its 
barbarisms? We and the children that shall take our 
place, dwell in such a threatened city and must share its 
fate or ward off the impending doom. A common peril 
rests upon everyone within our gates regardless of the 
land from which he came or the language spoken in his 
daily life. Teuton and Slav, Latin and Irish are Amer- 
icans and share in the American life and burden equally 
with those of other stock. As Americans we all face 
a common duty to repel the threatening hordes of cen- 
tral Europe, fortunate in that we may fight our battles 
across the sea rather than in our own dooryards. Tavo 
alternatives lie before us and before the outside world 
that shares our peril: Either, let every nation borrow 
the German idea and build for itself a military organi- 
zation that shall make the world a group of hostile 
camps, each devoting its main effort and its best thought 



58 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

to arms, believing and intending that war shall come 
from time to time, bringing booty to the winner and 
ruin to the vanquished, world without end. Or, let us 
break now the power of that impending barbarism. 
Who can hesitate before such a choice, or who can doubt 
that civilization outside of central Europe must hold its 
shoulder to the present task and push it through to vic- 
tory? In Lloyd-George's pregnant phrase ''we must go 
on or go under" and America has chosen to go on. 



SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE FROM A RECENT GERMAN 
CHANCELLOR 

The preceding paper was based upon a study of G-er- 
man acts and plans, but without knowledge of a secret 
exposition of those plans made by the former German 
Chancellor, Michaelis, to his Austrian confederates. 
This exposition, as recently read to the main committee 
of the Reichstag by the socialist deputy Haase, and 
printed in the New York Times for March 18, 1918, is 
given below. It furnishes a striking confirmation of the 
substantial correctness of interpretation reached in the 
foregoing article. 

The motive of all of Germany's acts is the lack of terri- 
tory, both for the development of commerce and colonization. 
Germany has to solve two problems — the freedom of the seas 
and the opening of a route to the Southeast. And these two 
problems can only be solved through the destruction of 
England. 

Our object is the permanent securing of the German Empire 
in Central Europe and the extension of its territory. No 
one who understands the significance of this war can doubt 
that, in spite of our wish to be moderate, we shall not allow 
ourselves to be deterred from extending the borders of the 
empire and from, under all circumstances, annexing such 



WHY GERMANY WANTED WAR 59 

territories as are fitted for colonization and are subjected to 
the influence of the sea power. 

We can weaken her (Russia) materially by taking away 
her border territories, the Baltic provinces. By using skill- 
ful policies the Baltic provinces can easily be Germanized. 
They will be settled with Germans and their population will 
double itself.. That is the reason why they must be annexed. 
The frontier between the German Empire and Poland 
must be materially altered. ... The lakes, which we shall 
not leave in the hands of the Russians at any price, will be in- 
cluded within our borders. 

In the Vosges the boundary line must be improved by the 
annexation of some. valleys, so that the German frontier troops 
can no longer be fired upon from French territory. France 
will lose Briey and a strip of land west of Luxemburg. The 
value of Briey in an economic and military sense is evident 
from the fact that 16,000,000 tons of iron ore are produced 
there. For the safeguarding of the German and Luxemburg 
iron industry Longwy must remain in our hands. 



60 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 



Bibliography 

Cheradame, Andre. The Pan-Gernian Plot Unmasked. 
New York. Seribner. 1918. A forceful presenta- 
tion of the Prussian scheme for world-wide dominion. 

Chirol, V. The Middle Eastern Question. New York. 
Button. 1903. Chaps. 17-19. On Germany's rail- 
road invasion of Asiatic Turkey. 

Fullerton, William M. Problems of Power. New York. 
Seribner. 1913. Bk. Ill, Chap. 3. 

Jastrow, Morris. The War and the Bagdad Railway. 
Philadelphia. Lippincott. 1917. Chaps. 3^. 

Lewin, Evans. The German Road to the East; an Ac- 
count of the "Brang nxich Osten" and of Teutonic 
Aims in the Near and Middle East. London. 
Heinemann. 1917. 

Marriott, J. A. R. The Eastern Question; a Study in 
European Diplomacy. Oxford. Clarendon Press. 
1917. 

Muir, Ramsay. The Expansion of Europe. Boston. 
Houghton Mifflin. 1917. Chap. 9. 

Naumann, Friedrich. Central Europe. Trans, by C. M. 
Meredith. London. King. 1916. Germany's po- 
litical and economic aims in central Europe ex- 
plained by a well-known member of the Reichstag. 

Seton-Watson, R. W. German^ Slav, and Magyar. 
London. Williams and Norgate. 1916. Chaps. 6-8. 
Good brief account of the Pan-German plans. 

Usher, Roland G. Pan-Germanism. Boston. Hough- 
ton Mifflin. 1913. 



HOW GERMANY EXPLAINS HER ACTS 

By 

CHARLES E. ALLEN 
Professor of Botany 

Americans have tried hard to understand the German 
point of vieAV in the Great War. Germans have tried hard 
to help us— and the rest of the world— to understand. 

For our enlightenment they have poured out torrents 
of written matter. They have sent special emissaries to 
instruct us, men like Dernburg— and Bolo Pasha. 

Yet we have been unable to sympathize with the German 
cause. Why? Is the difference between Germany's world 
outlook and ours so great that only the ''iron fist and 
shining sword" can bring accord? Or is it possible that 
Germany has been forced by her leaders into a course not 
defensible by arguments that will convince the world 
outside or even, in their saner moments, the German people 
themselves ? 

We may be helped in our attempts to answer such ques- 
tions as these if we examine briefly the explanations that 
Germans of high official position have offered for those 
German deeds which have seemed most repugnant to us of 
other lands. 

A WRONG CONFESSED 

Of Germany's belligerent acts, none has been more often 
explained— and none has more needed explanation— than 
the invasion of Belgium. We are familiar with the first 



62 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

public explanation — that of Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg 
on August 4, 1914 : 

We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no 
law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, have possibly already 
sntered Belgian territory. Gentlemen, that is a breach of inter- 
aational law. It is true that the French Government has de- 
clared at Brussels that France would respect Belgian neutrality 
IS long as her adversary respected it. We knew, however, that 
France stood ready for an invasion. France could wait, we could 
aot. A French invasion in our flank on the lower Rhine might 
lave been disastrous. Thus we were forced to ignore the right- 
:ul protest €f the governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. The 
ivrong — I speak openly — the wrong we thereby commit we shall 
:ry to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached. 
He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his highest 
possession can consider only how he is to hack his way through. 

To the same effect were various official statements of von 
Jagow, head of the German Foreign Office, on August 4 
md the days immediately preceding. 

The Kaiser's cablegram of August 10 to President Wil- 
son referred to '' Belgian neutrality, which had to be 
dolated by Germany on strategical grounds, news having 
been received that France was already preparing to enter 
Belgium.'* 

And Dr. Dernburg, the Kaiser's personal spokesman in 
this country, said:^ 

Our invasion of Belgium was an act necessary to the preserva- 
tion of our national existence, and, while we have regrets to 
i^oice, we have no apologies to make for it. 

The same attitude toward international obligations was 
manifest in Bethmann Hollweg 's classic remark to the 
departing British Ambassador: 

Just for a word — "neutrality," a word M'"hich in war time had 
50 often been disregarded — ^just for a scrap of paper Great Britain 
was going to make war on a kindred nation. 



Nexo York Times^ September 6, 1914. 



HOW GERMANY EXPLAINS HER ACTS 63 

All who were authorized to speak for Germany thus 
admitted in the early weeks of the war that the invasion 
of Belgium was contrary to international law and treaty 
obligations, and excused the wrong by the necessity of 
gaining a strategical advantage in the coming struggle. 

Even in those days it seemed well to mitigate somewhat 
the baldness of this justification, and the necessity was 
made to appear more urgent by the claim that France was 
about to strike at Germany through Belgium. 

Later the further plea was made that France had actually 
violated Belgian neutrality. At first no proof was offered ; 
Dernburg admitted that the only evidence was contained 
in private letters. Finally several affidavits were pub- 
lished^ to demonstrate that French soldiers had been seen 
in Belgium before the war. These affidavits were at once 
shown to rest partly on rumor, partly upon a confusion of 
Belgian and French uniforms, and partly upon the fre- 
quent visits to Belgium in time of peace of French soldiers 
on leave — just as visiting German soldiers were always to 
be seen in neighboring countries. 

Any infringement of Belgian neutrality by France in 
contemplation or in fact has been denied by the French 
and Belgian governments. It is negatived by the proven 
disposition of French troops at the outbreak of the war. 
And the events following the German invasion demon- 
strated that France not only had not prepared to attack 
Germany through Belgium, but that she had not even made 
ready to defend herself against a German attack from 
that quarter. 

The justification that ''France would have done it if 
we hadn't" thus disappeared; and the sole German defense 
for the wrongful act remained that stated by the Chancel- 
lor: ''Necessity knows no law.'* 



2 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Novem'ber, 1914. 



64 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

NOT SO WRONG AFTER ALL 

But as the war dragged on and Germany's military goal 
was not reached, it appeared that the necessity of winning 
does not, to impartial minds, justify a gross breach of faith. 
Then new explanations began to appear. 

First came the finding of certain ''secret documents" 
in Brussels. Now the official apologists pointed out that 
the Chancellor had been quite mistaken when he spoke of 
the wrong done Belgium. On the contrary, Belgium had 
basely plotted the undoing of peace-loving Germany. 

In presenting to Americans the awfulness of Belgium's 
crime, Dernburg said : 

While Belgium pretended neutrality and friendship toward 
Germany, it was secretly planning for her defeat in the war 
which was considered unavoidable. 

Dernburg 's discussion of this subject^ illustrates the 
difficulties that confront the explainer of German acts. 
"Only the prompt action at Liege,." he says " . . . 
prevented the English landing and invading Belgium." 
Dr. Dernburg has never told us how the capture of a 
fortress on the eastern border of Belgium could keep troops 
from crossing the western and southern borders ; nor why 
the English so perversely proceeded (and have proceeded 
to the present day) to send troops into Belgium when such 
an ''invasion" was effectually "prevented." 

Belgium's abandonment of her own neutrality, Dern- 
burg points out, was ' ' evidenced also by the placing of all 
Belgium's fortresses on the eastern frontier." Now before 
the war there were just three fortresses of importance in 
Belgium: Liege, Antwerp, and Namur. Liege alone is 
near the eastern frontier ; Antwerp, on the north, guarded 



* New York Times Current History of tM War, 1 : 1101. 



HOW GERMANY EXPLAINS HER ACTS 65 

against possible attack from Holland; and Namur, in the 
south, could defend only against French invasion. It is 
inconceivable that a former colonial secretary, a man of 
learning and affairs, should expect a statement so plainly 
absurd to deceive intelligent readers. Perhaps he did not ; 
he was writing for us Americans. 

"What are the documents adduced to prove the guilt of 
Belgium? Simply the memoranda of two conversations 
between the Chief of the Belgian General Staff and the 
Military Attache of the British Legation, in which were 
discussed the measures that might be taken to defend Bel- 
gian neutrality in case of a German invasion. 

There is nothing in these conversations that can possibly 
be construed as committing the respective governments; 
had there been, it would have been merely an agreement 
to defend the provisions of a treaty to which Germany was 
herself a party. 

But the new insistence upon Beldum 's guilt embarrassed 
Bethmann Hollweg. He had confessed the commission of 
a wrong; now his champions insisted there had been no 
wrong. He sought to relieve his embarrassment by a new 
confession which he put in the following words :^ 

When, on the 4th of August, I spoke of the wrong we were 
committing by marching into Belgium, it was not yet certain 
whether the Brussels government would not in the hour of 
need decide to save the country and withdraw to Antwerp under 
protest. . . . For military reasons it was imperative on 
August 4 under all circumstances to maintain the possibility 
of such a development. Even at that time there were many 
indications of the Belgian government's guilt. Positive written 
proofs were not then at my disposal. 



* Speech in the Reichstag-, December 2, 1914. 
5— W. B, 



66 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

Similar in substance was Bctlimaim Ilollweg's state- 
ment a few weeks later :^ 

Wlien I spoke [on August 4] I already had certain indications, 
but no absolute proof upon which to base a public accusation, 
that Belgium long before had abandoned its neutrality in its 
relations with England. Nevertheless, I took Germany's responsi- 
bilities toward the neutral states so seriously that I spoke 
frankly of the wrong committed by Germany. 

Thus, in confessing ' ' frankly " to a ' ' wrong ' ' on August 
4, Bethmann HoUweg, it now appears, knew that the inva- 
sion of Belgium was not a wrong. He had falsely sub- 
jected his nation to everlasting reproach. This new con- 
fession should, it would seem, settle the moral status of the 
government of which he was the head. But it was not 
quite satisfactory to von Jagow, next to the Chancellor the 
leading member of that government. So, to make matters 
perfectly clear, von Jagow offers this additional explana- 
tion :^ 

When the Imperial Chancellor made his declaration on August 
4, 1914, he could not know that Belgium had already at heart 
taken up her attitude. Since then this has been abundantly 
proved. 

This is most puzzling. Did the Chancellor tell the 
truth in December and January when he admitted that he 
had prevaricated in August? Or did von Jagow tell the 
truth in 1916, and was the Chancellor untruthful in con- 
fessing to a falsehood ? 

The confusion is partly relieved by the statement from 
King Albert of Belgium^ that the conversations embodied 
in the "secret documents" had been promptly com- 
municated to the German Military Attache at Brussels. 



•A United Press interview published January 25, 1915. 
» Reichstag debate. April 6, 1916. 
^ New York World, March 22, 1915. 



HOW GERMANY EXPLAINS HER ACTS 67 

Therefore, on August 4, 1914, Bethmann Hollweg and von 
Jagow really knew all that was to be known of Belgium's 
''guilt." Not the later discovery of that guilt, but the 
need of a new excuse for their conduct, was the reason for 
their wabbling. 

In Bethmann Hollweg 's interview of January, 1915, 
he had not only the ''frank" confession of wrong on 
August 4 to explain away; there was also his unlucky 
"scrap of paper" remark. By this also, it seems, he had 
not meant what he said. 

In that last interview with the British Ambassador, the 
Chancellor now explains, he had said "that among the 
reasons which had impelled England to go into the war 
the Belgian neutrality treaty had for her only the value 
of a scrap of paper." 

Then, telling of the hopes he had entertained of bring- 
ing about an understanding with England and the United 
States which should guarantee world peace, "In comparison 
with such momentous consequences," he exclaims, "was 
the treaty not a scrap of paper?" 

Here, in adjacent paragraphs, are two quite different 
explanations of this famous remark — one, what Bethmann 
Hollweg meant it to mean to the British Ambassador ; the 
other, what in retrospect it seemed to have meant to 
himself. 

Unfortunately, neither version jibes with what he actu- 
ally said on August 4. 

DERNBURG EXPLAINS THE VIOLATION OF BELGIUM 

Meanwhile Dr. Dernburg, in his capacity of official 
explainer, was having his own troubles. They led him to 
publish^ a revised and elaborated explanation. 



Saturday Evening Post, November 21, 1914. 



68 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

He now argues, first, that treaties are closed on tKe 
basis of circumstances existing when they are made, and 
are not binding when circumstances change. Since no 
conceivable set of conditions could fail to change materially 
within a few months, this remarkable plea amounts to 
maintaining that no treaty is ever made (by Germany at 
least) with the intention of living up to its terms. 

Second, ''when the war broke out there was no enforce- 
able treaty in existence to which Germany was a party." 
By the treaty concluded between England and the North 
German Confederation in 1870, Dernburg says (the italics 
are his) : 

Both countries guaranteed Belgium's neutrality for the dura- 
tion of the [Franco-Prussian] loar and for one year thereafter. 
The war came tO' an end with the Frankfurt Peace in 1871, and 
the treaty between Belgium [England?] and the North German 
Federation expired in May, 1872. 

To make this argument, Dernburg stopped his reading 
of the treaty at a semicolon. Here is the provision in the 
treaty of 1870 itself: 

This treaty shall be binding on the high contracting parties 
during the continuance of the present war between the North 
German Confederation and France, and for twelve months after 
the ratification of any treaty of peace concluded between these 
parties [here the Doctor preferred to stop]; and on the expira- 
tion of that time the independence and neutrality of Belgium 
will, so far as the high contracting parties are respectively con- 
cerned, continue to rest as heretofore on Article I of the quintu- 
ple treaty of the 19th of April, 1839. 

Article I of the treaty of 1839, thus reaffirmed in 1870, 
and publicly admitted by von JagOAv in 1913 to be still in 
force, guaranteed the independence and perpetual neutral- 
ity of Belgium. 



HOW GERMANY EXPLAINS HER ACTS 69 

Dernburg's third point is that, as shown by the "secret 
documents," Belgium had forfeited her own neutrality. 

Thus his argument sums up like this: 

First, there was a treaty, but Germany never intended 
to live up to it. 

Second, there was no treaty. 

Third, there was a treaty, but Belgium's action had 
invalidated it. 

YET ANOTHER OFFICIALi EXPLANATION 

Interesting for comparison with Dernburg's methods are 
those of Professor Walther Schoenborn, who discusses Bel- 
gian neutrality in Germany and tJie World War. This 
book, prepared under government auspices by a group of 
German educators and statesmen, is probably the most au- 
thentic statement of the official conception of the nature, 
purposes, and mission of the German Empire. 

Schoenborn admits that the neutrality of Belgium was 
guaranteed by international law as formulated in the 
Hague convention of 1907, so long as she (Belgium) was 
' ' actually neutral in a given war. ' ' 

However, he says, the moment a neutral state becomes 
involved in a war, the provisions of the Hague convention 
cease to apply to it. Such a state may become involved 
either by its own act or through an attack by another 
state. Now, by the ultimatum of August 2, Germany 
threatened Belgium with war in case Belgium resisted, as 
the Hague convention required her to resist, an invasion 
of her neutrality. Schoenborn says : 

By the presentation of the ultimatum Belgium was already, 
at least conditionally, involved in the war. As soon as that 
condition arose the fifth Hague convention automatically ceased 
to apply to Belgium, and disregard of its provisions did not 
signify a break of international law. 



70 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

To this eminent lawyer, then, the whole structure of 
international law seems rather less than a scrap of paper. 
Neutrality, as Bethmann HoUweg declared, is only a word 
— a word that vanishes when an international bully issues 
an ultimatum. An ultimatum is the one really important 
scrap of paper. 

But Schoenborn is compelled to confess that the treaties 
concerning Belgian neutrality constituted a legal guaranty 
to which Germany was a party. This barrier to Ger- 
many's ambition is to be overcome only by resorting to 
the doctrine of necessity; as he puts it: 

A further observance of the neutralization treaties of 1839 
was incompatible with the vital interests of Germany; conse- 
quently the treaties ceased to have any binding force upon her. 

The treaties, too, became scraps of paper when Ger- 
many's interest so ruled! 

The list of explanations might be extended indefinitely — 
of explanations that contradict not only one another but 
too often also the established facts. "What then, shall we 
conclude, was the real reason for the invasion of Belgium? 

The only possible answer to this question is of course 
the answer given at the moment of the act — a wrong, 
known to be a wrong, was committed that Germany might 
win. The necessity of winning the game excused all 
treachery, revoked all obligations. The principle upon 
which the professional gambler deals from the bottom of 
the deck is the principle upon which Imperial Germany 
wages war. 

"NECESSITY" FAILS TO JUSTIFY THE CRIME 

At the outset the doctrine of necessity seemed unques- 
tionable to the German leaders. They had no thought 
that it would shock their people. As for the rest of the 



HOW GERMANY EXPLAINS HER ACTS 71 

world, no matter. When, in the course of a few weeks, 
Germany should master Europe, who would care what 
the subjected or the neutral nations might think? 

But the weeks passed, and Germany was not supreme. 
She found herself opposed, not by the armies of a powerful 
coalition only, but by the conscience of a world. The good 
will of neutral nations is important to a state engaged in 
a life-and-death struggle. A moral justification must be 
found for the acts whose criminal nature had at first been 
cynically admitted. 

But this task was too great. How great, is shown by 
the bungling way in which it was undertaken. No con- 
vincing new explanation could be offered, because the only 
possible explanation had already been given. 

Other ruthless acts of Germany and her allies — the 
Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, the declaration of war on 
Russia and France, the Armenian massacres, the sub- 
marine warfare on non-combatants and neutrals — these 
and many more have been defended by explanations that 
explain as little as do those offered for the invasion of 
Belgium. 

By explanations that contradict one the other — as when 
the German government defends the submarine horrors 
by appeals to international law, while cabling in cipher to 
Luxburg in Buenos Aires (August 25, 1917) : ''Block- 
aded area rests on the principle of retaliation, not on in- 
ternational law." 

By explanations that seek to shift the responsibility — 
like blaming the loss of the Lusitania first to the actions 
of England, then to the callousness of the Cunard officials, 
then to the recklessness of the American government, and 
finally to the criminal heedlessness of the murdered vic- 
tims. 

By explanations coupled with pledges made only to be 



72 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

broken, like those following the sinking of the Lusitania, 
renewed after the destruction of the Sussex. 

By downright falsehoods — like the claim that the Lusi- 
tania was armed, a claim based, it has been legally proved, 
upon perjury secured by German agents. 

THE CASE OF RUSSIA 

As the fate of Belgium, so that of Russia demonstrates 
the value of German promises and protestations. Believ- 
ing the assurances conveyed in the acceptance by the 
Reichstag of the principle of ''no annexations and no in- 
demnities," Russia laid down her arms. Von Kiihlmann, 
Germany's latest Foreign Minister and happiest juggler 
with words, opened the peace conference with the promise 
that ' ' our negotiations will be guided by the spirit of peace- 
able humanity and mutual esteem." 

Then followed the German terms — concrete embodiment 
of ' ' the spirit of peaceable humanity. ' ' Russia was to 
give up an immense territory, because, while under Ger- 
man martial law, the "people" of Lithuania, Poland, and 
the Baltic provinces had demanded "independence and 
separation from the Russian Empire." 

Next it appeared that German armies were to continue 
in occupation of the provinces thus "freed," under which 
conditions, as von Kiihlmami beautifully expressed it, "we 
have . . . confidence in the attractive force of the 
great German State for these peoples." 

Then came the conclusion of a peace between the Central 
Powers and the made-in-Germany government of Ukrainia, 
detaching another generous slice from Russia. 

After some further weeks of hesitation, the German 
conditions now having grown to the point of robbing 
Russia of most of Caucasia, the Russian representatives, 
lest still worse mio^ht follow, sio^ned a treaty of peace. 



HOW GERMANY EXPLAINS HER ACTS 73 

And now, this scrap of paper being safely stowed in 
its proper pigeon-hole, the German armies continue their 
devastation of Russian territory while German intrigue 
extends its pollution to the shores of the Pacific. 

THE CONCLUSION OF THE WHOLE MATTER 

We have seen how German promises are kept ; how Ger- 
many explains the breaking of her promises. We are 
offered protestations innumerable of German sincerity, 
a whole literature that extols German faith. When Ger- 
man sincerity and German faith are put to the test, how 
are the protestations borne out? 

A man or a nation conscious of having acted honorably, 
explains the past, should explanations be needed, simply, 
straightforwardly, consistently. One conscious of deceit 
and treachery offers explanations wavering, apologetic, 
self-contradictory. Into which category do German official 
explanations fall? None can doubt that Dernburg, Beth- 
mann Hollweg, von Jagow, men each and all of command- 
ing ability, have made the most of Germany's case. If 
what they have given us is the best that can be said, what 
will be history's verdict upon the Germany of the early 
twentieth century? 

Tannenberg says: "The German people is always 
right, because it is the German people, and because it 
numbers eighty-seven millions." 

In these words are summed Mp the theory of the German 
State, the excuse for German aggression, the basis upon 
which German power will henceforth rest, should German 
power be allowed to survive the present struggle. 



74 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 



Bibliography 

The reader who wishes to make further excursions in the 
field of German apologetics will find the following books 
useful — and, in spots, entertaining. 

Dernburg, Bernhard. Germany and tJie War. New York. 
1914. The Fatherland Corporation. 

SearcJiligJits on the War. New York. 1915. The Father- 
land Corporation. 

Modern Germany in Relation to the Great War. Trans, by 
W. W. Whitelock. New York. 1916. The most seri- 
ous attempt made by Germans to defend their case. 
Written by a group of very eminent men in the politi- 
cal and university world. 

The Truth about Germany. New York. 1914. A semi- 
official piece of apologetics, written primarily for 
American consumption. 



WHY RUSSIA, FRANCE, AND BRITAIN ENTERED 
THE WAR 

By 
G. C. SELLERY 

Professor of History 

Who caused the war? That question must be examined 
again and again, as new evidence is disclosed and as old 
evidence is subjected to ever closer scrutiny. 

RUSSIA 

The protecting friendship of Russia for Servia has been 
an A B C of European politics for many years. Russia 
has felt bound by ties of race and religion, and by self- 
interest, to protect her small sister state, Servia. For two 
centuries it has been Russia's ambition to get access to 
the Mediterranean, either by conquering European Turkey 
or by having it fall into the hands of friendly Balkan 
States. It was therefore as certain in 1914 that Russia 
would try to protect Servia as that the United States, 
under the Monroe Doctrine, would try to protect a South- 
American republic. 

The great rival of Russia in the Balkans has been Aus- 
tria, who has long desired to annex or control the Balkan 
States, especially since Prussia ''threw her out of Ger- 
many," in 1866. In 1878, after Russia's successful war 
against Turkey, the great powers awarded to Austria, who 
had taken no part in the war, the control of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Turkish provinces inhabited by Serbs and 
located between Servia and the Austrian dominions. In 



76 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

1908, when Russia was weak from the Russo-Japanese war 
and from revolution, Austria annexed Bosnia and Herze- 
govina, and Servia and Russia protested in vain, for Ger- 
many stood beside Austria ' ' in shining armor. ' ' 

Austria's attack upon Servia in July, 1914, was a re- 
newed and bolder advance to the Southeast, and it was 
doubly perilous to Servia and to Russia, because Germany 
was by this time deep in intrigue for the domination of 
Turkey. For this attack the murder of the Austrian Crown 
Prince was merely a pretext. This fact, widely suspected 
in 1914, has since been placed beyond all doubt by con- 
vincing . evidence. For example, Austria asked her ally 
Italy for aid in an invasion of Servia in 1913.^ 

Every government in Europe understood perfectly that 
an attack by Austria on Servia was likely to cause a 
widespread war. Germany and all the other powers con- 
cerned clearly showed recognition of this danger in their 
diplomatic documents. For example, on July 23, before 
he knew what was in the Austrian ultimatum, Grey, the 
British foreign minister, expressed to the Austrian ambas- 
sador the hope that ''if there were difficulties, Austria and 
Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them 
directly with each other" (B 3). On July 24 the Belgian 
government sent to its diplomatic agents a circular letter, 
to be used if the international sky grew darker, stating 
that ''Belgium confidently expects that her territory will 
remain free from any attack, should hostilities break out 
upon her frontiers."^ 

The Austrian attack began with the terrific ultimatum 
of July 23, 1914 (B 4), whose terms, as Professor Del- 



^ Collected Diplomatic Documents (I^ondon, 1915), p. 401. The ex- 
hibits in the Austrian, British, French, German, and Russian looks 
of documents, republished in this volume, will be cited by initial and 
number. Thus. G 23 means Exhibit 23 in the German White Book. 

' Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 300-301. 



WHY THE ALLIES ENTERED THE WAR 77 

briick has admitted, would have placed Servia ''under 
her [Austria's] permanent control."^ Servia appealed 
to the Czar for aid, saying: ''We are prepared to accept 
those of the Austro-Hungarian conditions which are com- 
patible with the position of an independent State, as well 
as those to which your Majesty may advise us to agree 
. . ." (R 6). 

The Czar advised Servia to make all possible concessions 
and, to the surprise of the world, Servia agreed to all the 
demands except two, which required her to accept the 
"cooperation" of Austrian officials and police in her in- 
ternal affairs, and these Servia offered to submit to the 
Hague Tribunal or the great powers (B 39). But Austria, 
sure of German support, treated Servia 's reply as a refusal, 
and hastened preparations for war. Thereupon Russia 
(July 25) formally announced to the world that she would 
not permit Servia to be crushed (R 10). 

The efforts of Russia, France, Britain, and Italy to 
induce Austria (and her principal, Germany) to settle the 
Servian problem with Russia, or to permit the great powers 
to work out a satisfactory solution, were too numerous to 
be listed in this short paper.-* In all of them Russia was 
conciliatory: she would accept any settlement safeguard- 
ing the territory and independence of Servia. On July 29 
the Czar proposed to Emperor William that the dispute 
should be referred to the Hague Tribunal.^ This proposal 
for arbitration, which was in harmony with the enlightened 
opinion of the world, met with no response. All these 
proposals, in fact, were refused, evaded, or ignored by 
Austria and Germany. With wearisome monotony they 



'Atlantic Monthly, Feb., 1915, p. 234. 

* See index to Collected Diplomatic Documents, under "Mediation 
Proposals." 

'Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 542. 



78 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

repeated the refrain, Austria's quarrel with Servia is no 
one else's business. 

On July 29 Eussia strengthened her diplomatic hand 
by calling out thirteen army corps in southern Russia. 
The step was proper, for on the preceding day Austria had 
begun war on Servia and had mobilized troops against 
Russia.^ Germany was notified by Russia that her par- 
tial mobilization against Austria had no aggressive purpose 
behind it (B 93, B 96). 

Convincing proof that this was the truth is found in the 
Russian offer of July 30: ''If Austria, recognizing that 
the Austro-Servian question has assumed the character of 
a question of European interest, declares herself ready to 
eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate the 
sovereign rights of Servia, Russia engages to stop her 
military preparations" (R 60). 

Let any reader who may once have taken stock in the 
German argument, that Russia "spoiled everything" by 
her general mobilization order of July 31, carefully con- 
sider this offer of July 30. The first half of it asked 
Austria to admit that Europe was involved in the Austro- 
Servian dispute, and surely the desperate efforts of the 
diplomats had made that clear enough. The second half 
merely asked Austria to give practical effect to her re- 
peated assertion (which was in contradiction with part of 
her ultimatum) that she did not intend to encroach upon 
Servian sovereignty. Now, if Germany and Austria ac- 
cepted the Russian offer of July 30, then the peace of 
Europe would be assured, and there would be no Russian 
order for general mobilization on the morrow, for even the 



« This partial mobilization against Russia is repeatedly denied in the 
Austrian and German hooks, but there is no doubt about it. Bethmann 
Hollweg himself, in his speech of Aug. 4, 1914, admits that Austria 
had mobilized two corps "to the north," i e., against Russia. Col- 
lected Diplomatic Documents, p. 437. 



WHY THE ALLIES ENTERED THE WAR 79 

order of July 29 would be cancelled. If, on the contrary, 
the offer of July 30 were rejected, then Eussia would have 
to prepare for the worst. 

The answer of Germany was a flat refusal. Von Jagow 
did not reply that the proposal while inaccep table might 
serve as the basis for negotiations. Not at all. He 
slammed the door by saying brusquely that ' ' he considered 
it impossible for Austria to accept" the Russian proposal 
(R 63). 

Early on July 31— at 1 a. m., the French ambassador 
at Vienna reported (F 115)— Austria replied to Russia's 
partial mobilization by ordering a general mobilization, 
and within three hours Russia followed suit.^ Russia's 
general mobilization was, of course, made inevitable by 
Germany's refusal of the offer of July 30, unless Russia 
was prepared to surrender Servia. On the other hand, 
Russia's continued offers of a peaceful settlement, July 31 
and August 1, show that her order for general mobilization 
had not lessened her zeal for peace. 

Indeed the prospects for peace seemed to brighten as 
July 31 wore on. Austria, acting probably on a hint from 
Bethmann Hollweg,^ now expressed a lame willingness to 
take up matters with Russia (A 53). Both Russia and 
Austria declared that their orders for general mobiliza- 
tion were no barriers to a peaceful settlement (B 120, 
A 53).^ Russia, acting on Grey's suggestion (B 103), 
bettered her offer of July 30 and telegraphed Austria and 
the other powers that if Austria would consent to stop the 



■^The proof that Austria's general mobilization preceded Russia's is 
now complete. See J. W. Headlam, History of Twelve Days (New York. 
1915), p. 218, note; The Crime, by a German (New York [19171 ). 
chap. VI. 

»Was the Chancellor now anxious for peace, but the Kaiser deter- 
mined on war? It appears so. See J. W. Headlam, The German 
Chancellor and the Outbreak of the War (London [1917] ). 

» Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 411. 



80 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

advance of her troops in Servia and permit the great 
powers to ''examine the satisfaction which Servia can 
accord to the Austro-Hungarian government without in- 
jury to her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, 
Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude" (B 
132, R 67) . Later in the day (July 31) , when the language 
of the Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburgh made it 
appear that Austria now favored a peaceful settlement, 
Russia went still further, and actually abandoned her re- 
quirement that Austria should halt the advance of her 
troops in Servia (B 133, F 120, R 73). 

Unfortunately, Berlin had other ideas. At midnight 
(July 31-August 1) Germany sent her fateful ultimatum, 
demanding that Russia cancel her mobilization within 
twelve hours or Germany would mobilize her forces (G 24, 
B 121, R 70, F 117). This was a threat of war and was 
so understood everywhere. 

For Russia to obey this ultimatum would have been 
madness. Germany did not order Austria to cancel her 
mobilization or to stop her invasion of Servia, nor did 
Germany offer to give up her own preparations, which, 
under the screen of a declaration of "State of danger of 
war" (July 31), were now nearing the point of complete 
mobilization.^** 

There was still a chance that Germany would recoil from 
the final step. Austria was now carrying on cordial ''con- 
versations" with Russia. Russia assured the British am- 
bassador (August 1) that her offer of July 31 still held 
good and that "in no case would Russia begin hostilities 
first" (B 139). The Czar telegraphed the Kaiser (August 



10 This is shown by the Kaiser's telegram to King George, August 1, 
in which he says that his troops "are at this moment being kept back 
by telegraph and telephone from crossing the French frontier" (Col- 
lected Diplotnatic Documents, p. 540). 



WHY THE ALLIES ENTERED THE WAR 81 

1) : ''I comprehend that you are forced to mobilize, but 
I should like to have from you the same guarantee which 
I have given you, viz., that these measures do not mean 
war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for . . . 
the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts 
. . . ."^^ This moving telegram of the Czar was Russians 
dignified answer to the German ultimatum. Now, if Ger- 
many at the last moment repented, the way was open; 
she could construe her ultimatum literally, i. e., could 
mobilize — and negotiate. 

Germany, however, was resolved to substitute the sword 
for peaceful negotiation, and August 1, at 7 :10 p. m., 
declared war on Russia (R 76). 

FRANCE 

If Germany attacked Russia, France was bound to sup- 
port her. This was the duty of France under the terms 
of the Dual Alliance, formed in 1891 and serving as an 
answer of France and Russia to the Triple Alliance, or- 
ganized in 1882 by Germany and Austria with Italy. Each 
alliance provided for mutual assistance by its members in 
a defensive war. In 1914 Italy declared that as her allies 
were the aggressors she was absolved from supporting them 
(F 124). France, however, was convinced that Russia 
was not the aggressor, and therefore was resolved to help 
her if war broke out (B 6, R 55, F 101). 

The important question, then, is this : Did France strive 
sincerely, intelligently, and vigorously, July 24- August 1, 
to prevent the threatening war? The answer is an em- 
phatic yes, written large in the Collected Diplomatic Docu- 
ments. 

Moreover, France herself abstained from any word or 



" Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 413. 



82 UNIVERSITY OP WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

act which might provoke Germany. France did not order 
the mobilization of her forces until the afternoon of August 
1, more than a day later than the veiled German mobiliza- 
tion (''State of danger of war"), and she at the same time 
formally declared that this precautionary measure did not 
mean war, and that she would redouble her efforts to se- 
cure a peaceful settlement (F 125, F 127, B 136, R 74). 
Moreover, to avoid the possibility of any clash with Ger- 
man troops, France drew her forces back six miles from 
the eastern frontier, and thus left the inhabitants of a strip 
of France unprotected, in order to demonstrate her devo- 
tion to peace (F 106, F 136, B 40). 

On July 31, Germany instructed her ambassador at Paris 
to ask France to state whether she Would remain neutral in 
the event of a Eusso-German war (G 25) . In case France's 
answer to this question was yes, the German ambassador 
was told to demand that France hand over her fortresses 
Toul and Verdun to Germany as a pledge of neutrality. 
These instructions, admitted by Bethmann Hollweg to be 
genuine,^^ indicate that Germany had no real grievance to 
charge against France, and therefore felt it might be nec- 
essary to goad her to war or use her refusal to surrender 
her great fortresses as an excuse to attack her. 

The same conclusion, — ^that France's behavior had been 
studiously correct, — is to be drawn from Germany 's declar- 
ation of war, August 3 (F 147). The declaration is based 
on charges that French airmen had bombed German rail- 
roads, etc. The charges are absurd, as is now generally 
admitted, for would France expose a strip of eastern France 
in order to avoid giving Germany an excuse for war and at 
the same time send over airmen to bring on war? And 
did not von Jagow, the German foreign secretary, tell 



^Chicago Tribune, March 17, 1918. 



WHY THE ALLIES ENTERED THE WAR 



83 



the British ambassador on July 30 that ''he knew France 
did not desire war" (B 98) ? 

The testimony of Jaures, the great French Socialist, 
given in the last speech he made (July 29) before his 
death, is to the same effect. While the Socialists of Ger- 
many and the other countries were denouncing Austria 
and her accomplice Germany for bringing Europe to the 
verge of war, Jaures said: 

I, who have never shrunk from bringing on my head the 
hatred of our jingoes by my stubborn and incessant efforts 
to bring Germany and France closer together, I am entitled to 
declare that at the present moment the French government de- 
sires peace and is laboring for its maintenance. 

The F^rench government is the best peace-ally of this ad- 
mirable English government, which has taken the initiative with 
a view to mediation. And it is influencing Russia by its coun- 
sels in the sense of wisdom and patience.^^ 

BRITAIN 

Great Britain's efforts to prevent the outbreak of the 
Great War have been touched upon. The British foreign 
secretary. Grey, led in devising plans for preserving the 
peace by delay, conciliation, conference, and mediation 
{e. g., B 36). He foresaw that an attack by Austria on 
Servia would threaten the peace of Europe, and, July 24, 
he proposed mediation between Austria and Servia by the 
disinterested powers (B 11) . When Germany blocked this, 
Grey asked her, July 29, to suggest any form of mediation 
that would be acceptable to her, and France, Italy, and 
Britain were ready to accept it (B 84). Germany did not 
suggest any plan. 

On July 31 Grey informed the German government that 
if it would make any reasonable proposal which would 
show that Germany and Austria desired peace, Britain 



^ArcMv f. Sozialw. u. Sozialp. XL (1915), p. 290. 



84 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

would support it in St. Petersburgh and Paris, and if Rus- 
sia and France did not accept it Britain would wash, her 
hands of the whole affair (B 111). Germany made no 
proposal. 

On August 1, when the time limit of Germany's ulti- 
matum to Russia was still running, Grey, through his am- 
bassador (B 131), urged Germany to hold back from war 
and work for peace, now that Austria was willing to diy- 
cuss matters with Russia. The appeal was in vain (B 138) . 

It is necessary now to examine Britain's own grievance 
against Germany. 

For over 200 years it has been a basic principle of British 
foreign policy, familiar to all Europe, not to allow the 
region now called Belgium to fall into the hands of a strong 
continental power. Britain fought Louis XIV and Na- 
poleon to protect this region. In the treaty of London, 
1839, the great powers established the independence and 
neutrality of Belgium and each of them promised to defend 
the same. Britain's interest and honor therefore required 
her to protect the neutrality of Belgium in 1914. 

Germany, however, planned to violate the neutrality she 
had promised to defend (treaties of 1839, 1870) in order 
to be able to strike France ' ' below the belt. ' ' On July 29 
Germany made her notorious bid for British neutrality, 
asking Britain to condone the proposed violation of Bel- 
gium (B 85). Grey.'s answer, July 30, was a firm refusal 
and an earnest appeal to Germany to work with Britain 
for the peace of Europe (B 101). The force of this ap- 
peal was strengthened the same day by a warning that 
Germany must not count on Britain's standing aside in 
all circumstances (B 102, B 111). 

On July 31 Britain asked France and Germany if they 
were prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium 
(B 114). France answered yes (B 125); Germany de- 



WHY THE ALLIES ENTERED THE WAR 85 

clined to answer (B 122). On August 1 Grey told the 
German Ambassador that if the neutrality of Belgium were 
violated '4t would be very difficult to restrain public 
opinion" in Britain (B 123). On August 4 Britain twice 
requested Germany to respect Belgian neutrality, asking, 
the second time, for an answer within twelve hours (B 153, 
B 159) . The conversation of the British Ambassador with 
von Jagow, August 4 (B 160) makes it clear that Britain 
would have declared her neutrality if Germany had agreed 
to abandon her treacherous attack on Belgium, although it 
is undoubted that Britain would have been compelled to 
enter later, when Germany's sinister purposes were fully 
revealed. The attack on Belgium was construed by Britain, 
a guarantor of Belgium, as an attack upon herself, and her 
declaration of a state of war with Germany, August 4, was 
only a recognition of the facts. 

The Triple Entente of Britain with France (1904) and 
Russia (1907) was not formed to ''hem in" Germany or 
''encircle" her. It was not an alliance, but a relation of 
cordial friendship, based upon the removal of concrete 
causes of friction, which had led to "a settled temper of 
confidence and good will." No doubt the wiping out of 
causes of friction with France and with Russia was in- 
spired, in part, by Britain's desire to make it impossible 
for Germany to induce either France or Russia to jom Ger- 
many in attacking her; no doubt, from this angle, the En- 
tente was an answer to Germany's threatening increase m 
her navy and German toasts to "The Day" when Britain s 
fleet would be destroyed. But the Entente did not imply 
British hostility to Germany, and Britain made repeated 
efforts, from 1906 on, to establish friendly relations with 

Germany. , . . i, i? 

The negotiations of July 24-August 4 show that the J^n- 
tente contained no threat a-ainst a peaceful Germany. 



86 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

From the very start Britain refused to take her stand by 
the side of France and Russia (B 6), and even President 
Poincare's touching appeal to King George to the same 
effect (July 31) was declined.^* Britain used her friendly 
relations with France and Eussia to impress upon them the 
urgency of doing everything to preserve the peace, and 
France's moving appeals to Britain for support are a com- 
plete proof that Britain was not bound by the Entente to 
support France in a war with Germany {e. g., F 127). 
Grey's offer to Germany on July 31 (above) is proof piled 
upon proof. 

The idea that in spite of her efforts for peace Britain 
really wanted the war as a means for striking down a 
trade rival is contrary to all the evidence. German trade 
was increasing before the war, but so was Britain's. 
Britain had never been so prosperous, and Germany was 
Britain's best customer. Some years before the war, when 
business was poor, Chamberlain had made a great political 
campaign to persuade the British people to hamper Ger- 
man competition by giving up free trade for a protective 
tariff. The people voted down his proposal decisively. Is 
it reasonable to believe that a shrewd commercial people 
like the British would refuse to employ a protective tariff, 
the well-known device for checking foreign com -petition. 
and would resort to the risky and expensive method of war? 

The idea that Britain was everlastingly blocking Ger- 
many's efforts toward colonial expansion can not bear ex- 
amination. In 1913 the two powers amicably agreed as to 
spheres of economic interest in Portuguese Africa and 
future division of it when Portugal should be ready to 
sell. In 1914 likewise the two powers were agreed (the 
papers being ready for final signature when the war came") 
that Germanv should control the Oonsta-ntinople-Basrdad 



^* (Tollected Diplomatic Documents, p. f)43. 



WHY THE ALLIES ENTERED THE WAR 87 

railway and have spheres of influence which, so far as 
Britain was concerned, would have given to Germany the 
commercial exploitation of the best parts of Asiatic Tur- 
key.^^ 

Since 1906 the government of Britain had been in the 
hands of the Liberals, latterly supported by the Laborites. 
They were absorbed in social reform, ''curbing the Lords", 
working out ''Home Rule", etc. They begrudged the 
money required for the navy, and repeatedly tried to get 
Germany to agree to reduce naval rivalry and expense. 
When Lord Roberts, the military idol, dinned into the ears 
of the British that Germany was planning to strike them 
down and that their only chance for salvation was universal 
military service, people and government paid no attention 
to his cries. When the Great War broke out the British 
army was a mere handful, — a "contemptible little army" 
the Kaiser dubbed it,— and Kitchener was at once called 
upon to train millions of recruits, for the country realized 
that war against Germany reouired such a force. Does 
that support the idea that the British had conspired with 
France and Russia to "encircle peace-loving Germany?" 

Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador to Britain, 
1912-14, wrote for the eyes of confidential friends a mem- 
orandum on the origins of the great war, which has re- 
cently been published. The Prince places the responsibil- 
ity for the war squarely on his own government, and ex- 
onerates the other powers.^^ Von Jagow, foreign secre- 
tary in 1914, was put forward by the German government 
to answer Lichnowsky 's damning indictment, but the ef- 
fect of his reply is to confirm Lichnowsky on all essential 
points. 



"McClure, S. S., Obstacles to Peace (Boston, 1917), pp. 40-43. 

MJVetu York Times, April 21, 1918; Chicago Tribune, April 20, 1918, 
and following. For the reply of von .Tagow see Neio York Times for 
April 28 and Chicago Tribune for April 28 and 29. 



88 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 



Four Books on the Origins of the War 

Beck, J. M. TJie Evidence in tJie Case. New York. Put- 
nam. 1915. 

Headlam, J. W. History of Twelve Days, July 24 to Au- 
gust 4, 1914. New York. Scribner. [1915]. 

J ^accuse! By a German. New York. Hodder. 1915. 

Seymour, Charles. Tlie Diplomatic Background of the 
War. New Haven. Yale Univ. Press. 1916. 



DID GERMANY WEONG BELGIUM? 

By 

G. C. FISKE 

Associate Professor of Latin 

BELGIUM A NEfUTRAIilZED STATE 

Germany's violation of the neutrality of Belgium was a 
crime against the civilized world. You have heard this 
statement a hundred times, but do you know the cold, 
brutal facts that prove it absolutely? 

A neutralized state is one which has been guaranteed 
freedom from invasion upon condition that it wage no wars 
beyond its borders. Switzerland, Luxemburg, and Belgium 
are such states. Belgium was created a neutralized nation 
on the 19th of April, 1839, by a treaty signed by the great 
powers. Great Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, Austria. 
These powers were tired of having this centrally located 
country used as ''the cockpit of Europe". Therefore, they 
agreed that Belgium should form an independent and per- 
petually neutral state, and bound themselves to intervene 
in the defense of Belgium against any power attempting 
to invade Belgian territory. On the other hand, Belgium 
was bound to defend her frontiers against invasion. In 
case Belgium was not strong enough to offer effective op- 
position to the violation of her neutrality, the guaranteeing 
states were in honor bound to intervene to maintain that 
neutrality, even without a request from Belgium.^ 



*Bluntschli, Droit international codifiS, livre VI, No. 432. 



90 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

This treaty was reaffirmed in 1870 in the Franco-Prussian 
war. At that time France and Prussia signed identical 
treaties by which each, with the aid of Great Britain, 
agreed to defend the neutrality of Belgium against viola- 
tion by the other. In the Franco-Prussian war, therefore 
both parties respected the neutrality of Belgium. This fact 
was of great aid to the Germans in annihilating the French 
army at Sedan. 

But besides these earlier contracts, Belgium, like every 
other neutral state, had the protection of the Hague Con- 
vention of 1907. That Convention, signed by the United 
States and all the other great powers, says that the terri- 
tory of neutral powers shall not be invaded; that troops 
or supplies of belligerents shall not move across it ; that if 
a foreign power invades a neutral country, the neutral 
country has the right to resist. 

AUGUST 2, 1914 

Thus protected by the Hague Convention and by the 
contract creating them independent and neutral states. 
Belgium and Luxemburg had every right to expect that, 
like Switzerland, their neutrality would be respected by 
all the belligerents. Nevertheless at 7 :00 p. m. on Sunday, 
August 2, 1914, Belgium received an ultimatum from Ger- 
many to which a reply was to be given in twelve hours. 

In this ultimatum, Germany charged that France was 
going to cross the Belgian frontiers against her, and de- 
manded the right to pass troops through Belgian territory. 
She promised at the conclusion of peace to guarantee the 
possession and independence of the Belgian kingdom in 
full. If Belgium resisted, Germany would consider her 
an enemy, in which case she made no promises about the 
future fate of Belgium. Arms would decide. 



DID GERMANY WRONG BELGIUM 91 

It is interesting to note that on tlie -itli of August, the 
very day on which her armies actually were crossing the 
borders of Belgium, Germany received from the govern- 
ment of the neutralized state of Switzerland a notification 
that Switzerland would maintain her neutrality. What 
did Germany reply? 

The Imperial Government has taken cognizance of this declara- 
tion with sincere satisfaction and is convinced that the Confed- 
eration with the support of its strong army, and the indomitable 
will of the entire Swiss people, will repel every attempt to 
violate its neutrality. 

Thus Germany counted upon Switzerland doing exactly 
what she was ashing Belgium not to do. Why? Military 
necessity! It is hard to invade France through Switzer- 
land, but easy through Belgium. 



BELGIUM FORCED INTO WAR 

It is evident that in view of the treaty of 1839 and of 
the Hague Convention, this brutal ultimatum forced an 
industrious, peace-loving, and absolutely innocent people 
into the war. Let me make this perfectly clear. Suppose 
that Belgium had accepted Germany 's proposal. Belgium 
would then have forfeited all right to be treated as a 
neutral and independent state by Great Britain and 
France. In the event of their final victory over Germany, 
they would have been justified in destroying her independ- 
ence. But if Germany should win, what guarantee would 
Belgium have had that a victorious Germany, after having 
ruthlessly broken the agreement to respect her neutrality, 
would keep the other agreement to restore her territory to 
her at the end of the war? Therefore, the determination 
to maintain her independence as well as regard for her 



92 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

honor as a nation inevitably forced Belgium to refuse the 
German demand. Belgium was forced into the war by 
Germany. 
Accordingly the Belgian government replied^ : 

If we accept the proposals submitted to us, we would sacrifice 
the honor of the nation, and betray our duty towards Europe. 
. The Belgian Government refuse to believe that the in- 
dependence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of the 
violation of her neutrality. The Belgian Government are firmly 
resolved to repel by all means in their power, every attack upon 
their rights. 



GERMANY'S CHARGES 

At first Germany made no charges against the loyalty 
of Belgium. Such charges came later when Germany faced 
the condemnation of the whole world. 

When Baron Beyens, the Belgian Minister in Berlin, on 
the morning of August 4, 1914, requested an interview with 
Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State, Herr von 
Jagow said: 

"What is it we are asking you? Simply to allow us a free 
passage . . ." 

"There is," replied the Belgian minister, "at once a very easy 
way of formulating the only reply which such a question admits, 
and that is to imagine that France had addressed to us the same 
invitation, and we had accepted it. Would not Germany have 
said that we had betrayed her in a cowardly manner?" 

As the Secretary of State gave no reply to this very direct 
question, Baron Beyens continued: 

"At least," he asked, "have you anything with which to re- 
proach us . . ." 

"Germany," said Herr von Jagow, "has nothing with which to 
reproach Belgium, and the attitude of Belgium has always been 
perfectly correct." 



2 Qrey Book No. 1, No. 22. 



DID GERMANY WRONG BELGIUM 93 

"You must recognize, then," said Baron Beyens, "that Belgium 
cannot give you any other reply than that which she has now 
given you, without losing her honor. It is with nations as with 
individuals." 

"As a private person I do recognize it, but as Secretary of 
State, I have nothing to say." 

On the same day Bethmann Hollweg, the German Chan- 
cellor, gave public recognition to the same effect in his 
famous speech to the German Reichstag. The doctrine of 
necessity figuring there is Military Necessity. Surely Beth- 
mann Hollweg is an authority upon the case of Germany. 
The Chancellor said : 

We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no 
law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and are perhaps al- 
ready on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, this is contrary to the dic- 
tates of international law. ... So we were compelled to 
override the just protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian Govern- 
ments, The wrong— I speak openly— that we are committing we 
will endeavor to make good as soon as our military goal has been 
reached. 

Out of the mouths of her two highest officials, von Jagow 
and Bethmann Hollweg, Germany thus condemns herself. 

But was Germany's fear justified that either France or 
Great Britain intended to violate Belgian neutrality, and 
attack her along the lower Rhine? 

There is not a shred of evidence that France intended to 
invade Belgium. The French government mobilized its 
army 10 kilometers from the frontier everywhere, and made 
its first offensive through Alsace and Lorraine, not through 
Belgium. When asked by Great Britain, July 31, 1914, 
France at once replied that she intended to respect the 
neutrality of Belgium and so informed the Belgian gov- 
ernment.3 Great Britain had told the Belgian govern- 



' British Blue Book No. 114; French Yellow Book, No. 122. 



94 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

ment as early as 1913, "that she (Great Britain) would not 
be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, nor would 
public opinion ever approve of it."* 

And what of Germany ? When asked by Great Britain, 
she declined to make any promised Why? Because she 
considered military advantage of more importance than 
her honor as a nation. 

Belgium herself, even when confronted with the immi- 
nent prospect of invasion, was still careful to maintain 
scrupulous neutrality. On August 3, noon, 17 hours after 
Belgium had received the German ultimatum and five hours 
after Belgium had dispatched her refusal to accept 
the dishonorable German proposal, Belgium declined 
France's offer of military assistance.*' Why? Because no 
overt act of war had at that time been committed and be- 
cause Germany's answer to Belgium's brave note was not 
received until 6 p. m., August 4.' So we see that like the 
United States, Belgium did not rest her case on her legal 
rights, but waited for the ''overt act." 

These facts prove that France, Great Britain, and Bel- 
gium have a clean slate. Germany is a self-confessed crim- 
inal in the court of civilization. 

THE BEIXJIAN "SECRET DOCUMENTS" 

The foregoing facts completely refute the absurd charges, 
made as an afterthought by the German government, that 
in the years before the war Belgium made a secret military 
convention with Great Britain against Germany. What 



* Letter of Sir Edward Grey of April 7, 1913, made pubUc Dec. 7, 
1914. 
'British Bine Book No. 122. 
« Grey Book I, No. 24. 
''Grey Book I, Nos. 27 and 38. 



DID GERMANY WRONG BELGIUM 95 

were the so-called secret documents on which Germany- 
based these charges? 

On October 13, 1914, the NorddeutscTie Allgemeine Zei- 
tung announced that there had been discovered in the 
archives of the Belgian war office at Brussels, a record of 
"a military convention between Belgium and Great 
Britain." This refers to conversations which were con- 
eluded in 1906 and 1912 between two successive military 
attaches and two successive Belgian Chiefs of StafP. The 
documents have since been published in this country under 
the title The Case of Belgium, with an introduction by 
Dr. Bernard Dernburg. What shall we say about these 
documents 1 

In the first place, the documents are not a treaty against 
Germany. Military attaches. Chiefs of Staff, and Secre- 
taries of War cannot make treaties. The documents ex- 
pressly state that they do not bind the governments. They 
are simply measures of military preparedness such as it is 
the duty of every military staff to prepare. Similar plans, 
of course, exist in the secret files of our war office at Wash- 
ington. But that fact does not mean we are plotting war. 

Great Britain consulted with Belgium because the Ger- 
man invasion of Belgium was a commonplace in such mili- 
tary writers as von Bernhardi, von Schliefenbach, and 
von der Goltz. As a guarantor, in fact the main guarantor 
of the neutrality of Belgium, Great Britain had to take 
these writings into consideration. But besides these, by 
the time of the second conversation the two governments 
had to face some very hard and menacing facts— for in- 
stance the growth of German strategic railways along the 
eastern frontier of Belgium. 

For five years prior to the war, Germany began in an 
area adjacent to the eastern frontier of Belgium and about 
half the size of New Jersey, a series, of strategic railways. 



96 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

At the beginning of this period there were in this little 
corner of Prussia 15.10 miles of railroad to every 100 
square miles of territory. New Jersey, twice as large, had 
30.23 miles. In the five-year period this little corner of 
Prussia had increased its* mileage to 28.30, while New 
Jersey had only increased from 30.23 to 30.25. The dis- 
trict is unimportant, and there was no commercial or eco- 
nomic reason for such an expansion. In the May before 
the war, three of these railroads led to blind terminals less 
than a day's march from the Belgian frontier. At many 
tiny stations they were provided with sidings and long 
platforms for troops^. 

But we do not need to fall back upon the menace of these 
strategic railways to defend the loyalty of Belgium, be- 
cause the conversations expressly provide that the entry of 
Great Britain into Belgium would take place only after tJie 
violation of the neutrality of Belgium hy Germany, that 
is, only at the time when Great Britain was in honor bound 
to interfere in the defense of Belgium, the ward of the 
guaranteeing nations. Why did not Belgium make a sim- 
ilar conversation with Germany in anticipation of a pos- 
sible invasion by France and Great Britain? "Well, we 
live in a practical world. You know the fable of the fox 
who wouldn 't go into the wolf 's cave, where all the tracks of 
the smaller animals pointed inward and none outward. 
Would you have gone into that cave if you had been Bel- 
gium and had seen those tracks, some large, some small, all 
leading into the German cave? What were those tracks? 
Silesia, German Poland, Schleswig-Holstein, Alsace-Lor- 
raine. 

The Belgians, themselves, have given a completely eon- 



*On the strategic railways, see the article by Mr. Walter Littlefleld 
in the New York Times Current History, Vol. I, pp. 1004 ff. 



DID GERMANY WRONG BELGIUM 97 

vincing refutation of these revelations in the letter of King 
Albert to the New York World on March 22, 1915. 
In this letter King Albert says: 

No honest man could have acted otherwise than I did. Bel- 
gium never departed for an instant nor in the slightest degree 
from the strictest neutrality. ... I was so desirous af 
avoiding even the semblance of anything unneutral that I had 
the matter [the fact of the conversations] communicated to the 
German military attache in Brussels. When the Germans went 
through our archives they knew exactly what they would find, 
and all their present surprise and indignation is assumed. 

It is evident, therefore, that Belgium was absolutely 
loyal and neutral as regards her relations with all the guar- 
anteeing powers, Germany included. 

This is precisely what we should expect. For quite 
apart from all considerations of honor and good faith, 
Belgium had not the slightest motive for plotting with 
Great Britain or France against Germany. Her sole in- 
terest was to maintain her neutrality and her good rela- 
tions with all the guaranteeing powers, for her remarkable 
industrial development was due to the freedom from war 
which she had enjoyed for seventy-five years. 

GERMANY'S DUPLICITY 

The attitude of Germany, on the other hand, was double- 
faced. On paper and by word of mouth she tried to spread 
the idea that she would observe the neutrality of Belgium. 
This Bernstorff-like attitude was maintained by the Ger- 
man ambassador at Brussels on August 2 up to the very 
minute he delivered the German ultimatum, not by excus- 
able reticence, but by assiduously circulating false state- 
ments. Also a few years before the war in 1911 and 1913 
the German government had twice asserted its intention 
7— W. B, 



98 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

to keep its word, and respect Belgian rights. On the first 
occasion Bethmann Hollweg gave the Belgian minister a 
semi-official assurance. The second was an announcement 
by von Jagow in open debate in the Reichstag on April 29, 
1913.^ Clearly then Germany wanted to gain the advan- 
tage of treacherous surprise by appearing to keep her word, 
while her military staff had the complete plans ready for 
the invasion of Belgium. 

WHAT THE ATTACK ON BELGIUM MEANS TO US 

What has the crime against Belgium to do with our en- 
trance into the war? In the first place Germany "put 
over'* the same mean and brutal attack on us. Just as 
Germany violated her solemn compact with Belgium to 
gain a military advantage against France so she violated 
the rights of the neutral United States and every other 
nation to trade and travel on the high seas, and killed our 
citizens in order to strike a foul blow at the military power 
of the Allies. On sea or land Germany is willing to shoot 
the innocent bystander ''full of holes," if she can thereby 
bring down her enemy. She must ''hack her way through" 
the prostrate rights of neutrals, through our highest rights, 
because it is a state of necessity for her to dominate the 
world. 

How about the rights of small nations ? Is not the very 
heart of the Monroe doctrine the policy that the smaller 
nations of the western hemisphere shall have the untram- 
meled right to life, liberty, and independence ? Do you sup- 
pose that if a victorious Germany keeps Belgium after the 
war she will respect the rights of any small nation in the 
western hemisphere! If the case of Belgium seems far 



•Belgian Grey Book, No. 12. 



DID GERMANY WRONG BELGIUM 99 

away, substitute one of these nations. Do you know the 
story of German intrigue in Mexico, Central and South 
America? Suppose Germany should have said to any one 
of these nations after a victorious European war: "You 
must give us naval bases. ' ' Count von Reventlow has said 
that was part of Germany's idea of the freedom of the seas. 
Could we afford to have the policy of Prussianization begin 
with these little nations ? Would not our own national in- 
terest and honor impel us in such a case to fight German 
aggression ? So many nations of Central and South Amer- 
ica would not give their material and moral support to the 
United States to-day if they did not fear the German men- 
ace. A victorious Germany is a danger to the prosperity, 
the moral rights, and the very existence of all nations, 
small and great, because Germany wishes by her might to 
destroy the right of the world. 

Finally, we Americans see in the violation of Belgium's 
neutrality and the whole course of Germany 's dealing with 
ravished Belgium, a concrete and bitter proof of just what 
the successful realization of the ideas of the German mili- 
tary autocracy means to the world, means to us. The 
German Government says that necessity knows no law, 
that might makes right, that a solemn contract is a scrap 
of paper. We Americans and our Allies mean to win this 
war, mean to establish before the bar of civilization the 
equality of big states and little, to help build up a higher, 
broader, and more effective international law, which shall 
make the necessity of national honor more binding than the 
necessity of military strategy. In the very center of our 
demands at the council table which shall settle the issues 
of the war must stand the restoration of Belgium with 
complete indemnification for all her losses. 



100 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 



Bibliography 

Belgian Grey Book. 

British Blue Book. 

French Yellow Book. 

German White Book. 

Beck, James M. The Evidence in the Case. Chapter 9. 
G. P. Putnam's Sons. New York. The best brief 
treatment of the subject. 

Modern Germany. Book III, Chapter 3; Book IV, 
Chapter 3. Mitchell Kennerley. New York. Repre- 
sents the German point of vicAV. 

Stowell, Ellery C. The Diplomacy of the ^yar of 1914. 
Chapter 9. Houghton Mifflin Co. Boston. The 
most convenient discussion of the subject of Belgian 
neutrality from the point of view of International 
I.aw and the history of diplomacy. 

The Case of Belginm.. With an introduction by Bern- 
ard Dernburg. 

Waxweiler, Emile. Belgium Neutral and Loyal. G. P. 
Putnam's Sons. New York. The best defense of 
Belgium by a Belgian. 



HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR 
By 

M. S. .SLAUGHTER 
Professor of Latin 

War is Jlcll, but men have sought to lessen the hor- 
rors of war by formulating from time to time certain 
laws and conventions to Ijc obsi'i-vcd by all Ix'llij^erents. 
The last of these amercements were the llaj^nic Conven- 
tions of 1801) and 11)07, adoi)ted l)y (Jcrmany as by all 
the other leading nations of the world. It was supposed 
this was done by all i)arties in good faith, but the world 
did not understand Germany. When the time came, in 
the summer of 1914, she had laid her i)lans and was 
ready to revive all the worst phases of warfare which 
men have sought to eliminate, especially those concern- 
ing the treatment of civilians and non-combatants in 
invaded countries. She chose to disregard her signed 
agreements and to substitute a system of terrorism on 
the pretext of the mercifulness of greater efficiency. 

For forty-five months we have had an exhibition of 
how soldiers, surrendered ''body and soul" to a war- 
lord and trained in the precepts of a war-lord's Manual, 
conduct w^ar. When the stories of German atrocities 
in Belgium first reached the United States many men 
rejected them as excited exaggerations of the ordinary 
happenings of war. Some men still profess unbelief, 
and brand as "English lies" all the evidence that is 
forthcoming. Unable to believe that civilized men of 
this dav could do the things the Germans are said to 



102 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN VVAR BOOK 

have done, they continue to affirm their total unbelief 
in the happenings. And they question the fairness and 
tolerance of those whose minds have been convinced and 
whose souls have revolted at practices that disgrace 
humankind. Yet we must face the facts in order to keep 
our minds alive to the real nature of the conflict into 
which we have entered. 

To rehearse the story of German war atrocities since 
August, 1914, would be a task as impossible as it is un- 
grateful. The evidence is accessible to all in the reports 
of numerous commissions, French, Belgian, English, and 
American, in the testimony of Cardinal Mercier and 
other foreigners of undisputed standing, and in the 
reports of our own accredited ministers and ambassadors 
to the countries affected by the war. This testimony is 
supported by diaries of captured German soldiers and 
ine proclamations of German high officials. These 
documents have Deen subjected to the closest scrutiny 
at the hands of experts trained to deal with testimony 
of this kind. There can be no doubt as to their truth 
and authenticity. The more the Germans have sought 
to justify themselves the more they have convicted 
themselves, by the acknowledgment of deeds which they 
excuse under the pretext of self-protection. This is 
notoriously true of the German White Book, The Bel- 
gian People's War. An occasional franctireur (sniper), 
or the fear of one, is no excuse for the total destruc- 
tion of a ^ town and the wholesale shooting of the in- 
habitants, men, women and children, practically all 
of whom must have been innocent. No, the publication 
of this pamphlet by the German Imperial Foreign 
Office was a blunder and a boomerang. 

The claim of the German government that the Ger- 
man soldiers in Belgium acted with humanity, restraint 



HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR 103 

and Christian fortitude is only an added offense in the 
face of the long and all too familiar list of her crimes 
against hiamanity, not only in Belgium but in Poland 
and Servia and Roumania and on the high seas. The sea 
raids and air raids on unfortified towns, from the butch- 
ery at Scarborough in December, 1914, to that of last 
week, the deliberate and premeditated attacks on hospi- 
tals and hospital ships, the sinking of neutral ships with- 
out warning and without leaving a trace, the use of poi- 
sonous gases, the poisoning of wells, the secret use of an- 
thrax and typhus germs to destroy Roumania, a nation 
still at peace with Germany, the recent arrest and im- 
prisonment of Professor Nicolai, the foremost physician 
of the German Empire, who refused to listen to the sin- 
ister suggestion that he use his scientific knowledge to fix 
shells with cholera germs and plague bacilli to be sent 
back of the front firing line, — this roll of dishonor is a 
sufficient refutation of any claim of the German govern- 
ment to have observed the precepts of humanity. 

The world has been subjected to a long continued 
and extremely successful propaganda in favor of Ger- 
man Kultur at the same time that all countries, ours as 
well as others, friendly and unfriendly, have been 
honeycombed with a merciless spy system before the war 
as well as during the war. Bernstorff's activities in 
Washington and German diplomatic conspiracies in 
other neutral countries prove conclusively that the 
dictum of Frederick the Great, ''No ministers abroad, 
only spies" is a working principle of the Kaiser's gov- 
ernment. This deserves to be classed among the atro- 
cities committed by Germany — a wholesale weaving of 
lies, a deliberate and well calculated plot for grasping 
world power by ruthlessly trampling upon human 
rights. Her hope to rewrite international law according 



104 UNIVERSITY OP WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

to a plan made in Germany and to dictate even the 
verdict of history shows how far she has gone on the 
road to national insanity. ''Whom fortune would 
destroy she first makes mad. ' ' 

How far this system of frightfulness in action is ac- 
cepted by the German people we can only surmise, but 
there seems to be no general and open protest, and no 
answer has yet come to the many overtures that our 
government has made to the German people seeking to 
lessen their confidence in the German government. Ger- 
many may have been transformed by the war, but years 
of training in the German philosophy of war and years 
of experience of the material comforts of an astonishing- 
ly efficient government would naturally make conviction 
difficult. The possession of the minds of an entire 
people by a system conceived in sin and born into dis- 
honor is of all atrocities the greatest atrocity, and the 
only kind interpretation of Germany is that she is mad. 

It will be enough now to consider specifically a few 
of the worst crimes of the Germans against civilians to 
show conclusively that the spirit of a German army of 
invasion is one of ruthless cruelty and intimidation. 

1. CIVILIANS AS SCREENS 

The use of civilians as screens to protect German 
soldiers is an undeniable fact and the evidence comes 
from all of the invaded countries. Cardinal Mercier 
testifies : 

At the time of the invasion of Belgium, civilians in twenty 
places were made to take part in the operations of war against 
their own country. At Termonde, Lebbeke, Dinant and else- 
where in many places peaceable citizens, women and chil- 
dren, were forced to march in front of German regiments to 
make a screen before them. (An Appeal to Truth, November 
24, 1915). 



HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR 105 

Lieutenant Eberlein, a Bavarian, describes the use of 
civilians as a screen to protect German soldiers in the 
occupation of St. Die: 

We had arrested three civilians and suddenly a good idea 
struck me. We placed them on chairs and made them sit on 
them in the middle of the street. On one side entreaties, on 
the other hlows from the butt end of a gun. At last they 
were seated outside in the street. I do not know how many 
prayers of anguish they said, but they kept their hands 
tightly clasped all the time. I pitied them, but the device 
worked immediately. {Muenchener Neuestc Nachrichten, 
October 7, 1914.) 

A recent visitor in Madison, Professor Baldensperger, 
whose home is in St. Die, told me that he knew this 
incident to be a fact and that one of the three civilians 
was an invalid. 

Always there are children, even little babies, and old 
men and priests in these screens. Prussians and Ba- 
varians and Austrians are all equally guilty of this 
cowardly cruelty. The tales are sickening : ' ' They (the 
Germans) were in close formation and had a line of 
women and children in front of their front rank" 
....'' The Germans had their bayonets fixed and 
pointed to the backs of the women and children to make 
them advance" . . . . ''One man was very old 
and bent" . . . . "In other cases the children 
were carried by the women, ' ' and so on page after page 
these descriptions run. The screens and the other brutal 
treatment of the civilian population, rape and pillage 
and burnings, are all of a pattern and it is the pattern 
of a government calling itself civilized and boasting of 
its Kultur. 

The burning and pillaging of towns and villages and 
the wholesale murder of the inhabitants because of the 
acts of individuals is a common occurrence in the invaded 



106 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

sections. To cite an instance from the diary of an 
officer in a Saxon regiment: 

The pretty little village of Gue d'Hossus was apparently- 
set on fire without cause. It is said that a cyclist fell off his 
machine and his rifle went off; and that he was immediately 
shot at. They just threw a lot of the male inhabitants into 
the flames. I hope there will he no more such horrors. 

That the responsibility belongs to the government is 
proved by this proclamation of General von Biilow: 

The population of Andenne after manifesting peaceful in- 
tentions toward our troops attacked them in the most treach- 
erous manner. With my authorization the general who com- 
manded these troops has reduced the town to ashes and has 
shot 110 persons I bring this fact to the knowl- 
edge of the city of Liege so that its people may understand 
the fate which awaits them if they assume a like attitude. 
(Gibson, A Journal of our Legation in Belgium, p. 324.) 

Compare this picture with the following. In the 
spring of 1914, American soldiers, treacherously at- 
tacked by snipers at Vera Cruz, Mexico, responded by 
hunting out the snipers and making them prisoners. 
They did not ^'reduce the town to ashes," nor shoot 
innocent persons. Such is the difference between the 
German and the American conduct of war. 

From a German soldier's diary: 

In the night the inhabitants of Liege became mutinous. 
Forty persons were shot and fifteen houses were demolished, 
ten soldiers shot. The sights here make you cry. 

On the 23rd of August everything quiet. The Inhabitants 
have so far given in. Seventy students were shot, 200 kept 
prisoners .... Our occupation, apart from bathing, is 
eating and drinking. We live like God in Belgium. (German 
War Practices, issued by the Committee on Public Informa- 
tion, Washington, D. C, p. 30.) 



HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR 107 

The Bishop of Namur testifies : 

One scene surpasses in horror all others; it is the fusillade 
of the Rock of Bayard, near Dinant. It appears to have heen 

ordered by Colonel Meister. This fusillade 

caused the death of nearly 90 persons, without distinction of 
age or sex. Among the victims were babies in arms, boys 
and girls, fathers and mothers of families, even old men. 
It was there that 12 children under the age of six perished 
from the fire of the executioners, six of them as they lay in 
their mother's arms. (German War Practices, p. 34.) 

2. HOSTAGES 

Germany claims and practices without mercy the 
right of the invading army to take hostages in order to 
protect itself against attack at the hands of the civilian 
population. Numerous proclamations of German high 
officials give proof of their method. 

In order to insure sufficiently the safety of our troops and 
the tranquillity of the population of Rheims the persons 
named below (81 in number) have been seized as hostages 
by the commander of the German army. These hostages will 
be shot if there is the least disorder. (Proclamation of the 
Commanding General, Rheims, Sept. 12, 1914). 

The following proclamation has been called ' 'typical " 
because it illustrates what the German officers consider 
a punishable offence. (Cited and photographically re- 
produced by Gibson, p. 266.) 

PROCLAMATION 

In future the villages situated near the places where there 
has been any destruction of railway or telegraph lines shall 
be punished without pity, whether they are guilty or not of 
these acts. To this end, hostages have been taken in all lo- 
calities near the railroads which are liable to such attacks; 



108 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

and at the first attempt to destroy the railroads or telephone 
or telegraph lines, these hostages shall be immediately shot. 

The Governor, 
Brussels, October 5, 1914. Von der Goltz. 

As a part of this system of terrorism hostages have 
been repeatedly maltreated by German officials. The 
fifth edition of Wheaton's International Law (p. 544), 
a standard American authority on the subject, referring 
to events of 1914—15 in the occupied territory of France 
and Belgium, says: 

Many hostages were shot, many were held in oppressive 
and humiliating confinement, many were carried off to Ger- 
many. They were treated far worse than prisoners of war. 
The Hague Rules do not include innocent citizens among 
the persons liable to be captured as prisoners of war. The 
Hague Regulations, it is true, have no specific provisions 
with regard to hostages, but their seizure and the presump- 
tion of vicarious responsibility as well as the principle of 
terrorism and application of psychological pressure are con- 
trary to the fundamental conceptions of humanity, conscience, 
fairness, and justice that are frequently appealed to in the 
international conventions of the Hague. The practice is akin 
to that of brigandage and blackmail, and is repugnant to all 
honorable men. International law does not sanction the ab- 
negation of honor even in the severest warfare. 

Priests and burgomasters, university professors and 
members of town councils are regularly in the number 
of the hostages, and their abuse at the hands of the sol- 
diers is frequently mentioned in the reports. It is thus 
that the Kaiser's men make merry, and their imcon- 
trolled humor leads to savagery and often to murder. 
Verily, in the creed of this army, ' ' A policy of sentiment 
is folly; enthusiasm for humanity is idiocy." (Von 
Tannenberg, in Greater Germany). 



HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR 109 

3. THE POLICY OF EXTERMINATION 

a) The Hague Conventions expressly stipulate that 
any fines or levies laid upon towns and cities and coun- 
tries invaded shall be in proportion to their ability to 
pay. Germany has repeatedly broken this stipulation 
in France, Belgium, and Poland, until it is obvious that 
her object is to impoverish the invaded country. The 
New York Times Current History for December, 1917, 
page 512, gives an estimate of Gerinany's total plunder 
in fines and levies from Belgium and sets it at more 
than one billion dollars. The sum is staggering and was 
paid only because Germany's ''knife was at their 
throats. ' ' 

b) The deliberate destruction of industry and 
agriculture is a part of the same plan of impoverish- 
ment and extermination. The cattle and swine of Bel- 
gium, her famous draft horses, have been systematically 
driven off to Germany. Farm machinery has been col- 
lected in great piles and burned in order to destroy the 
wooden parts and to warp and bend the metal parts. 
General von Bissing, late military governor of Belgium, 
in his ''Political Testament," points with pride to the 
annual theft of twenty-three million tons of coal from 
the Belgian mines (quoted in New York Times Current 
History, Dec, 1917, p. 512). From the factories not 
only all the goods have been taken, but the very machin- 
ery has been stripped and sent to Germany. The sugar 
mills have been burned. Nothing has been left undone 
to make it impossible for the devastated land to rise 
from her ashes. The pillage of Belgium is still going 
on for the benefit of German industry and German war- 
fare. The existence of a "German Industrial Bureau" 
for the exploitation and enslavement of Belgian labor 



110 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

and the sale of the mechanical equipment of Belgian 
factories is proved by advertisements in German news- 
papers (Ibid. p. 511). 

c) In spite' of isolated declarations to the contrary, 
Germany deliberately plans to impoverish Poland and 
Belgium and to starve the inhabitants in order that she 
may come in and occupy the lands and make her domina- 
tion easy. No method is too cruel if only Germany is 
aggrandized. 

"Starvation is here" (Poland), said General von Kries to F. 
C. Walcott, an American sent by our government to investi- 
gate conditions in Belgium and Poland, "so we set it to work 
for Germany. By starvation we can accomplish in two or 
three years in East Poland more than we have in West 
Poland in the last hundred years." (The Prussian System, 
issued by U. S. Food Administration, Sept., 1917). 

But how came starvation to Poland? The answer is 
to be found in When the Prussians Came to Poland 
(page 244), a book written by Laura (Blackwell) de 
Turezynowicz, an American woman resident in Poland. 

Notices were posted by the Commandant regarding the 
harvests "that anyone touching or using any grain, potatoes 
or vegetables from his own garden or fields would be punished 
to the full extent of the law" — military law! The Germans 
took the crops to the last bean and potato. 

The story of the evacuated regions of France and 
Belgium — the starved and diseased inhabitants, the 
devastated fields and burned villages, the mute testimony 
of ruined orchards and broken ploughs — about these 
atrocities we know from scores of Americans, Red Cross 
workers and others, who are now making heroic efforts 
to undo the work of the Germans — endeavoring in reality 
to ^' dress the wounds of stricken Belgium." All the 
''peculiar mental processes of the Prussian torturer" 



HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR 111 

and his "merciless ill usage of human beings" are 
illustrated a thousand times in the reports that come to 
us from the evacuated sections. 

There are no children in Poland. In Belgium it 
would be vastly better if there were none. 

All the inhumanities, all the bestialities that no paper can 
possibly publish — they are not only true but the worst of 
them cannot be told. I have been in a hospital in the Depart- 
ment of the Meuse where there are nearly a thousand girls. 
Not one is eighteen years of age and all will be mothers. 
Eleven percent in addition are stark mad. 

This is the statement of Dr. Le©n Dabo, member of an 
American Commission to France. {New York Times 
Current History, December, 1917, p. 515.) 

4. DEPORTATIONS 

The logic of the system of frightfulness, as well as 
its cruelty and mendacity, is seen most clearly in the 
deportations. In Poland and Belgium and northern 
France, after first wrecking factories and foundries and 
carrying off the machinery to Germany, where they had 
already carried the materials used in manufacture, the 
Germans made complaints of idleness against the work- 
men who had been thus forcibly deprived of employment. 
In need of workmen at home and wishing to free Ger- 
mans to fight the French and Belgians, the officials in 
control of the occupied territory announced that all of 
the unemployed would be deported to Germany. The 
offer of the Belgian government to find employment for 
the Belgians was refused. And in spite of promises to 
deport none but the unemployed, when the time came to 
make the choice of those to be deported, German cupidity 
refused to make distinctions between employed and un- 
employed. Men and women and young girls of all 



112 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

classes, promiscuously herded together, were carried off 
on a few hours' notice to unknown districts where they 
were compelled to perform all kinds of hard labor in 
mines and fields and factories, to undergo vile abuses, 
and to submit — especially the women — to the foulest 
treatment. Documentary evidence is abundant and 
easily accessible to prove these facts. Satan in Hell 
could think of no more refined cruelty than was prac- 
ticed in Lille and Bruges and a hundred other places 
when, on a few hours ' notice, in the middle of the night 
German officers went from house to house choosing 
arbitrarily daughters and fathers and servants and car- 
rying them off into slavery. The victims were usually 
denied any kind of help, even gifts of food or clothing, 
from their families, and they were not allowed to com- 
municate with them from Germany. ''As far as we 
can ascertain, ' ' said Brand Whitlock, American Minister 
to Belgium, ''100,000 Belgians were taken off and less 
than 2000 were returned," and these were worn out or 
diseased. In spite of protests from all sides, the de- 
portations still continue. Every week we hear of some 
new exploitation of Belgium's material resources and 
the enslavement of her people. 

Protesting against the deportations. Cardinal Mercier 
declared in October, 1916 : 

Two years ago it was death, pillage, fire, but it was war. 
To-day it is no longer war; it is cold calculation, intentional 
destruction, the victory of force over right, the debasement of 
human personality, a cry of defiance to humanity. 

In Poland General von Kries declared : 

We propose to remove the able-bodied working Poles from 
this country and leave it open for the inflow of German 
working people as fast as we can spare them ... By 
and by we shall give back freedom to Poland. When that 



HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR 113 

happens Poland will appear automatically as a German prov- 
ince. 

In Belgium, General von Bissing said the same thing. 

If the relief of Belgium breaks down, we can force the in- 
dustrial population into Germany through starvation and 
colonize other Belgians in Mesopotamia. . . . Germans 
will then overrun Belgium. Then when the war is over and 
freedom is given back to Belgium, it will be a German Bel- 
gium that is restored. (P. C. Walcott, The Prussian Sys- 
tem, page 6, issued by U. S. Food Administration). 

In September, 1917, Herbert Hoover, resident in Bel- 
gium for two years and a half with the Belgian Relief 
Commission, thus characterizes the German rule in Bel- 
gium and Northern France {German War Practices, p. 
81) : 

The sight of the destroyed homes and cities, the widowed 
and fatherless, the destitute, the physical misery of a people 
but partially nourished at best, the deportation of men by 
tens of thousands to slavery in German mines and factories, 
the execution of men and women for paltry effusions of their 
loyalty to their country, the sacking of every resource through 
financial robbery, the battening of armies on the slender pro- 
duce of the country, the denudation of the country of cattle, 
horses, and textiles; all these things we had to witness, dumb 
to help other than by protest and sympathy, during this long 
and terrible time — and still these are not the events of battle 
heat, but the effects of a grinding heel of a race demanding 
the mastership of the world. 

All these things are well known to the world — but what 
can never be known is the dumb agony of the people, the ex- 
pressionless faces of millions whose souls have passed the 
whole gamut of emotions. And why? Because these, a free 
and democratic people, dared plunge their bodies before the 
march of autocracy. 

8— W. B. 



114 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 



SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE 

THE ACCUSED ADVERTISES HIS CRIMES 

The point of view adopted in this paper, that the 
German atrocities are a part of the system of ''Fright- 
fulness", directly ordered by the German High Com- 
mand, is strikingly confirmed by the publication by pur 
Department of State, under date of May 9, 1918, of a 
document now being circulated in Spain by the agents 
of the German government. 

The purpose of this document, as is frankly stated, is 
to deter, neutral Spain from joining America and her al- 
lies in the war. The document is a brazen recital of the 
accomplishments of the German armies in their illegal 
warfare against non-combatant civilians, and against all 
the economic and spiritual resources of the enemy coun- 
tries. With the characteristic thoroughness of the mil- 
itarized German official, it summarizes the booty taken 
from private citizens in France and Belgium as follows : 

High grade watches 147 

Average watches 5 , 016 

Underwear 18 , 073 

Embroideries and women's handkerchiefs... 15,312 

Umbrellas and parasols 3, 705 

Silver spoons 1 , 876 

Bottles of champagne 523 , 000 

What does civilized Christendom think of the announce- 
ment that in Belgium, besides many art treasures, the 
Germans have confiscated old paintings valued at 
$600,000; that *'as a result of the treachery of Cardinal 
Mercier and other priests ... the good-hearted 
German soldiers were forced to teach a severe lesson to 



HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR 115 

the Belgian and French Catholics." This statement is 
illustrated by a list of forty-two cathedrals and churches 
rendered unserviceable and thirty-one destroyed. Then 
follows a list of fines, securities, reprisals and forced 
contributions, amounting to approximately $32,000,000. 
''These statistics," we are blandly informed — the Ger- 
man government is a past master in winning friends — 
"are a most useful tvarning to neutral countries. If 
there are any still thinking of siding with the allies let 
them take warning from the fate of others. ' ' 

But the sum of all these villainies is reached in the 
frank avowal of systematic severity towards British 
prisoners . . . "it must be remembered that the 
English treat their prisoners with notable kindness, 
while the regime imposed on the English prisoners by 
the Germans is one of extreme rigor; so that tJie Ger- 
mans with a smaller number of prisoners have secured a 
much superior moral effect.'^ 



116 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 



Bibliography 

THE BE/LiGMiUM ATRjO'OITiriES 

Bedier, Joseph, professor at the College de France. Ger- 
man Atrocities from German Evidence. Translated 
by Bernhard Harrison. Paris, Armand Colin. 1915. 
Contains photographic facsimiles of the accounts of 
German atrocities as recorded in the letters of Ger- 
man soldiers, accompanied by translations. 

How Germany Seeks to Justify Her Atrocities. 
Translated by J. S. Same publishers. 1915. A 
complete refutation of the German effort to dis- 
credit these diaries. 

German War Practices, Part I. The Treatment of Civil- 
ians. Edited by Dana C. Munro, G. C. Sellery, and 
August C. Krey. Issued by the Committee on Pub- 
lic Information. Washington, D. C. 1918. States 
the facts on the basis of German and American evi- 
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Gibson, Hugh, Secretary of the American Legation in 
Brussels. A Journal from our Legation in Belgium. 
New York. Doubleday Page and Company. 1918. 
(First published serially in the World's Work), 

Morgan, J. H. German Atrocities, An Official Investi- 
gation. New York. E. P. Button & Company. 
1916. Contains a critical analysis of the German 
White Book, Germany's official defense against the 
charge of atrocities, a discussion of the method of 



HOW GERMANY MAKES WAR 117 

the British enquiry in Belgium and France, and 
new documentary evidence. 

Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages, 
appointed by the British government and presided 
over by the Right Hon. Viscount Bryce, formerly 
British Ambassador at Washington. Part I, Sum- 
mary of Findings; Part II, Evidence and Docu- 
ments. New York. The Maemillan Co. 1915. 
This, the so-called Bryce Report, is the fullest and 
most authoritative presentation of the Belgian atro- 
cities. The investigation was made by a commis- 
sion of legal and historical experts. 

Stiirmer, Harry. Two War Years in Constantinople; 
SketcJies of German and Young-Turkish EtJiics and 
Politics. Translated from the German by E. Allen 
and the author. New York. George H. Doran 
Company. 1917. Dr. Stiirmer was the Constanti- 
nople correspondent of one of the leading German 
papers. The Cologne Gazette. Describing what he 
himself saw, he lays the responsibility for the atroci- 
ties in Armenia squarely upon the shoulders of the 
German government. 

The Belgian People's War, A Violation of International 
Law. Translation from the official German White 
Book, published by the Imperial Foreign Office. 
American Edition, New York, 1915. An unsuc- 
cessful effort to show that the Belgians waged war 
as *' snipers" on the German armies. 

The Voice of Belgium. Being the war utterances of 
Cardinal Mercier, with a preface by Cardinal 
Bourne. London. 1917. The case of Belgium by 
the most eloquent of her champions, who speaks to 
the civilized world. 



118 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

Toynbee, Arnold J. Tlie German Terror in Belgium. 
An Historical Record. New York. George H. 
Doran Company. 1917. A running narrative, well- 
documented, of the spread of /' Frightf ulness " as 
the German armies advanced. Perhaps the most 
compact reference book on the subject. 

The Murder of a Nation. New York. Hodder & 
Stoughton. 1915. The Armenian atrocities. 

Whitlock, Brand, United States Minister to Belgium. 
Now in course of publication in Everybody's Maga- 
zine. The chapter on the Reign of Terror pub- 
lished in May, 1918, deals specifically with the 
atrocities. 



WHAT FRIGHTFULNESS MEANS 

By 

E. B. MoGILVARY 

Professor of Philosophy 

The German army is bound by oath to the Kaiser and 
to the Kaiser alone. The Kaiser's addresses to his troops 
show the extent of this obligation. ' ' You have given your- 
selves to me, body and soul. In view of the present Social- 
istic agitations it may come to pass that I shall command 
you to shoot your own relatives, brothers, yes, even par- 
ents, — which God forbid! but even then you must follow 
my command without a murmur." 

When young men have given themselves thus to a war- 
lord, they will hardly balk at other commands that run 
counter to their natural feelings. To know what sort of 
war they will wage in Poland, Belgium, and northern 
France, it will be sufficient to discover what sort of war 
they were taught to wage. 

The German soldier reads his orders for his treatment 
of the enemy in the War Manual (Kriegsbrauch) published 
by the German General Staff in 1902. Their essence is 
frightfulness. The German soldier, like the soldier of 
every country represented at the Hague Conference of 
1899, is supposed to receive his orders for his treatment of 
the enemy from the regulations adopted at this conference. 
The essence of these regulations is humanity, in so far as 
this is possible in the conduct of war, 



120 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

Germany accepted in their entirety the '^ Regulations 
respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land", 
adopted at the Hague. She bound herself, in common with 
all the nations there represented, ''to issue instructions 
which shall be in conformity with the regulations." The 
United States, England and France have published war 
manuals in which the texts of this treaty appear as the basis 
of the law which their armed forces are to observe. Ger- 
many in her manual scarcely refers to these texts, and 
in her instructions to her army constantly violates both 
their spirit and their letter. 

The spirit of the Hague agreement concerning ^'the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land" is clearly expressed 
in its own declaration of purpose : 

His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia (and 
other rulers whose titles follow) . . . thinking it Important 
. . . to revise the laws and general customs of war, either 
with a view of defining them more precisely, or of laying down 
certain limits for the purpose of modifying their severity as far 
as possible . . . have, in this spirit, adopted a great number 
of provisions, the object of which is to define and govern the 
usages of war on land. . . . These provisions, the wording 
of which has been inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of 
war so far as military necessities permit, are destined to serve 
as general rules of conduct for belligerents in their relations 
with each other and with populations. . . . Until a more com- 
plete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting 
Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the 
Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents re- 
main under the protection and empire of the principles of inter- 
national law, as they result from the usages established between 
civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the require- 
ments of the public conscience. 

In 1902, three years later, the general staff of the German 
army published a manual for its officers entitled Cus~ 



WHAT FRIGHTFULNESS MEANS 121 

toms of War on Land (KriegshraucJi im Landkriege)} 
The spirit of this book will appear as we proceed, but the 
key-note is struck in the "Introduction". There the of- 
ficer is warned against the "humanitarian views" of the 
nineteenth century, "which not infrequently degenerated 
into sentimentality and mawkish emotionalism", and 
against ' ' attempts to influence the customs of war in a way 
which was in fundamental contradiction with the nature 
of war and its object. Such attempts will not be lacking 
in the future, the more so as these efforts have found a 
moral recognition in some provisions of the Geneva Con- 
vention and of the Brussels and Hague Conferences". 
The officer is also warned that he is "a child of his time, 
and thus subject to all the moral tendencies which influence 
his nation. The more educated he is, the more will this 
be the case. The danger that in this way he will arrive 
at false views as to the proper nature of war must not be 
lost sight of. It can be met only by a thorough study of 
war itself. " He is therefore urged to make himself famil- 
iar with military history which will teach him "whether 
the prevailing customs of war are justified or not, whether 
they are to be changed or to be observed" — as if it had 
not been just the previous practices in the history of war 
which such agreements as those of the Hague had been 
designed to correct ! 

With a few exceptions to be noted below, the general 
staff's manual denies that there are any such things as 



1 Translated into English under the title The War Book of the 
German General Staff, by J. H. Morgan, New York, McBride, Nast 
& Company, 1915. I have used this translation only after having 
compared it with the original and corrected it where necessary. The 
italics in all my quotations from this work and from the Hague Texts 
are my own. In citing the Hague Texts I have used the language of 
1899 rather than that of 1907, because the former represents the 
precise agreements which by treaty were in force when the War Book 
appeared. 



12'2 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

''laws of war". It says there have indeed been attempts 
"to develop the current customs of war, to extend them 
and to elevate them to the level of a universally authorita- 
tive law, binding all peoples and armies. All these at- 
tempts have hitherto completely failed, with some few ex- 
ceptions to be mentioned later. Hence if in the following 
work the expression 'law of war' is used, it must be 
borne in mind that by this is meant not a written law 
brought into existence hy international treaties, but only 
a mutual agreement, a restraint upon arbitrariness which 
custom and tradition, human friendliness and calculating 
selfishness have erected, but for the ♦ observance of which 
there is no external sanction; only the 'fear of reprisals' 
decides". 

In the Hague agreement there are "laws of war", and a 
"code" of these laws, which take "populations and bel- 
ligerents under their protection and empire". Sixty such 
laws are carefully written out. In the War Manual there 
are, with some few exceptions, no such laws. In the Hague 
agreement "His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, King 
of Prussia" was "animated by a desire to serve the in- 
terests of humanity"; in the Manual His Majesty's gen- 
eral staff was animated by a desire to prevent "excessive 
humanitarianism, " and cynically referred to the Hague 
Regulations as affording examples of what it meant thereby. 
The Hague agreement was a treaty, ratified by Germany, 
and thus made as internationally binding as any treaty 
could be, that rested on good faith. It indeed had no 
"external sanction"; that is, no revenue was mortgaged 
and no territory was pledged to secure its execution. 
Would the imperial pride of Germany permit her to put 
up any guarantee for the performance of her plighted 
word, such ' ' guarantee ' ' as she now speaks of in the event 
of the evacuation of Belgium ? There was not even an arti- 



WHAT FRIGHTFULNESS MEANS i2§ 

cle making any party which should violate the agreement 
''liable to pay compensation" — though such an article 
was inserted in the revised agreement of 1907. On its 
face the agreement, of 1899 was just a plain outright 
treaty. In the Manual ''only the fear of reprisals de- 
cides" any High Contracting Party to observe the Hague 
agreement, which is declared to be not a treaty. Of course 
any High Contracting Party which says that it is bound 
by its treaties only when there is an "external sanction", 
or a penalty attached for disobedience, proclaims that it 
does not respect its own pledged word — pledged openly 
and solemnly in a conference of nations. 

We are now prepared to examine a few of the specific 
instructions given by the general staff to its officers, com- 
paring these instructions with those Germany had agreed 
at the Hague to give to its armed forces. The Hague Regu- 
lations provide that requisitions levied in occupied enemy 
territory shall ' ' bear a direct relation to the capacity and 
resources of the country." The War Manual teaches that 
while "in theory the justification for this demand will be 
freely recognized by everyone, in most cases, however, it 
can hardly be observed in practice. ... In cases of 
necessity the needs of the army alone decide". 

The Hague Regulations provide that "private property 
. . . must be respected". The War Manual teaches that 
"every damage, even the greatest, may be done, which the 
conduct of the war demands or involves in its natural 
course. Whether the justifying necessity exists or not 
must be determined in each individual case. The answer 
to this question lies in the power of the commanding officer 
alone". 

The Hague regulations declare that even when there is 
no written provision, the decision as to what ought to be 
done must not be left to the arbitrary judgment of the 



124 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOIC 

commanding officer alone. It must be decided by a refer- 
ence to first principles. The "War Manual, as we have just 
seen, even where written provisions exist, leaves it to the 
discretion of the commanding officer to obey them or not, 
just as he thinks best. 

In treating the subject of private property the War 
Manual gives the officer a lesson in military history. It 
justifies all the large-scale destruction and devastation- 
wrought by the German armies in 1870 as ''in no case 
overstepping the necessity prescribed by the military situa- 
tion". 

The Hague Regulations provide: ''No general penalty, 
pecuniary or otherwise, can be inflicted on the population 
on account of the acts of individuals for which it can not 
be regarded as collectively responsible. ' ' The War Manual 
teaches differently: "A new application of hostage-law 
was practiced by the German military command in the 
war of 1870-71, when it compelled leading citizens in 
French towns and villages to accompany trains on the loco- 
motives in order to protect the railway communications 
which were threatened by the population. Since the lives 
of peaceable inhabitants were thereby without fault on their 
part exposed to grave danger, every writer outside Germany 
has characterized this measure as not in accord with the law 
of nations and as unjustified towards the inhabitants of 
the enemy country. As against these unfavorable criti- 
cisms it must be emphasized that this measure, regarded 
on tlie German side also as harsli and cruel, was only re- 
sorted to after declarations and instructions to the inhab- 
itants had proved ineffective, and that under the given 
conditions it was the only method that promised to be ef- 
fective against the undoubtedlj^ unjustified and indeed 
criminal behavior of a fanatical population. Herein lies 
its justification under tlie laws of war, hut still more in tlie 



WHAT FRIGHTFULNESS MEANS 125 

fact that this means proved completely successful. . . . 
To protect oneself against attack and injuries from the in- 
habitants and to employ ruthlessly the necessary means of 
defense and intimidation is obviously not only a right but 
indeed the duty of every military command." A popula- 
tion acting in self-defense against the German army is 
criminal and fanatical! The German army, in making 
use of a novel expedient condemned even by the civilian 
conscience of Germany itself as harsh and cruel, is only 
doing its duty! 

The Hague Regulations require that ''The Commander 
of an attacking force, before commencing a bombardment, 
except in the case of an assault, should do all he can to 
warn the authorities". The War Manual teaches ''A pre- 
liminary notification of bombardment is as little to be re- 
quired as in the case of a sudden assault". 

The Hague Convention singles out for exceptionally hu- 
mane interpretation two of its regulations, which "espe- 
cially must be understood in this sense", i. e. that ''popula- 
tions and belligerents remain under the protection and em- 
pire of the principles of international law, as they result 
from the customs established between civilized nations, 
from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the 
public conscience." One of these two regulations, em- 
phasized, demands that "The population of a territory 
which has not been occupied who, on the enemy's approach, 
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops 
without having time to organize themselves . . . shall 
be regarded as belligerent if they respect the laws and 
customs of war. ' ' The War Manual declines absolutely to 
recognize the belligerent status of such unorganized com- 
batants. It appeals from the authority of the treaty Ger- 
many had ratified to the authority of a German writer, 
who, eleven years before the Hague Conference, had said: 



126 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

''Subordination to responsible leadership, military organ- 
ization, and external recognizability as combatants, cannot 
be left out of account without giving up the whole founda- 
tion recognized as necessary for the admission of irregu- 
lars." Unorganized and ununiformed defenders of their 
country against sudden invasion like the embattled farmers 
of Concord and Lexington in 1775, were thus classed by 
the Manual as outlaws; they are the " f rancs-tireurs " 
whom the German armies occupying Belgium avowedly 
treated with such appalling severity. 

But there are some regulations which the War Manual 
does recognize as binding. Curiously enough most of 
these are to be found in the provisions of the Geneva Con- 
ference of 1864. Why did the General Staff abide by the 
provisions of the Geneva Conference and discard those of 
the Hague Conference? 

This question becomes all the more interesting when we 
learn that whereas the Hague Conference binds the powers 
' ' to issue instructions to their armed forces which shall be 
in conformity with the regulations", the Geneva Confer- 
ence has nothing to say about such instructions. They are 
merely implied. 

The question can have but one answer. The provisions 
of the Geneva Conference relate to the treatment of pris- 
oners, and of the sick and wounded. These provisions af- 
fect an invading power as much as they do one suffering 
invasion. The provisions of the Hague Conference, on the 
other hand, affect primarily the treatment of invaded ter- 
ritory. Germany had the strongest army in the world, 
and the only one that was almost instantly mobilizable. 
She did not expect to be invaded; her own population 
would not be likely to be exposed to the harsh and cruel 
treatment she justified in occupied territory. Therefore 
in her War Manual she conformed to the Geneva Confer- 



WHAT FRIGHTFULNESS MEANS 127 

ence and refused to conform to the treaty she made at the 
Hague. 

Let us see how this explanation is borne out by quota- 
tions from the War Manual. Prisoners ' ' are to be treated 
like one's own soldiers, neither worse nor better"; they 
should not be made to ''contribute directly or indirectly 
to the military operations". "Prisoners should only be 
killed in the event of extreme necessity", and ''only the 
duty of self-preservation and the security of one's own 
state can justify such a proceeding". 

These last rules are especially illuminating. Even those 
Hague regulations which are accepted by the War Manual 
are always subordinated to ordinary "military necessity". 
But this Geneva regulation with regard to prisoners is to 
be disregarded only in case of "extreme necessity". For 
it must be remembered that the best-laid plans may go 
astray, and what was planned as a brief offensive war may 
turn into a protracted one ; one 's soldiers are certain to be 
lost as prisoners ; and if Germany ill-treated the prisoners 
she took, she could be repaid in her own coin. 

We have seen that the War Manual refuses to recognize 
the Hague regulations as "laws of war". "Only the fear 
of reprisals " is to determine their observance. But in sup- 
porting the Geneva agreements with regard to the treat- 
ment of the sick and wounded the Manual talks in a 
very different language. "With the elevation of the Ge- 
neva agreements to the level of laws binding peoples and 
armies, the question of the treatment of wounded and sick 
combatants ... is removed from the sphere of the 
' customs of war '. The soldier has the duty of contributing 
as far as he can to the observance of the whole law." Why 
this scrupulousness? Why regard the Geneva agreements 
as on the level of laws binding armies and peoples, and not 
regard the Hague agreements as on th^ sg,mQ kvell The 



128 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

Geneva agreement of 1864 was no more and no less a treaty 
than the Hague agreement of 1899. There was no '' ex- 
ternal sanction". It was an international agreement, rati- 
fied by many powers, and so was the Hague agreement. 
The terms of the binding clauses in the two agreements are 
almost exactly the same. The conclusion of the whole mat- 
ter is that Germany supports only such laws of war as are 
likely to turn to her own advantage. 

There is one other scrupulous insistence on international 
law in the War Manual which demands our attention. This 
concerns the duty of belligerents toward a neutral state. 
''The belligerent state must respect the inviolability of 
the territory of a neutral state and its undisturbed exercise 
of all sovereign rights therein, and refrain from every en- 
croachment thereupon, even tJiougJi tJie necessity of war 
sJiould demand such encroacJiment". Why this scrupu- 
lousness here? Germany has not respected the neutrality 
of Belgium. Had she intended in 1902 to respect it in 
the event of war with France ? This is possible. But it is 
also possible that the general staff reckoned on the credu- 
lity of the neighbors of Germany. If, in an official work 
in which international law is reduced to a minimum, the 
inviolability of a neutral state is retained in that minimum, 
would it not be believed that whatever else Germany might 
do, she would not do what she had instructed her officers 
not to do even in case of military necessity? If this be- 
lief could be secured, France might, when war came, be 
led to mobilize on the German frontier, and thus a few 
precious days could be gained by the general staff of Ger- 
many to steal a march through Belgium. This is what 
actually happened in 1914. And when it did happen, the 
German Chancellor appealed from international law to the 
military necessity which the general staff had declared to 
have no jurisdiction in the premises. 



WHAT FRIGHTFULNESS MEANS 129 

We have heard the general staff speak; we have heard 
the German Chancellor; but what says the Kaiser? Less 
than a year after he had ratified the Hague agreement in 
whose regulations ''it is especially forbidden ... to de- 
clare that no quarter will be given ' ', he made an address to 
his armed forces as they were about to set forth to join in 
the suppression of the Boxer rebellion in China : ' ' No mercy 
will be shown ! No prisoners will be taken ! As the Huns 
under Attila made a name for themselves, which is still 
mighty in traditions and legends to-day, may the name of 
Germany be so fixed in China by your deeds that no 
Chinaman shall ever again even dare to look at a German 
askance. . . . Open the way for Kultur once for all". 
These orders so shocked the public conscience of Germany 
that they were later edited down; but the German press 
of the time declared that they were followed out to the 
letter. The ''military necessity" of ruthlessness was, to 
say the least, not very great at that time. Or is German 
"military necessity" only another name for an excuse to 
adopt the practices of Huns? 

In 1914 Germany was engaged in a far more serious 
enterprise than a petty campaign in China. She was at 
war with nearly all the great powers. Her war-lord was 
still His Majesty of the Hun- Address, and his military 
necessity was indeed overwhelming. His officers had been 
trained for twelve years in the lawlessness and the ruth- 
lessness and the terrorism of the War Manual, his armies 
were no less well-disciplined and obedient. The civilian 
press was completely gagged so that "the requirements of 
the public conscience" could find no public expression. 
This public conscience itself had been schooled for years, 
and was now assured by the Kaiser's government that 
Germany was the victim of a gigantic conspiracy. The 
German chancellor 's office admitted that it had no influence 

9— W. B. 



130 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

with the military. Under these conditions, who, knowing 
the perfidious policy, advocated in cold blood in time of 
peace by the Kaiser and his general staff, of trampling 
international law under foot, can believe that this policy 
had been humanely changed under the exigencies of war? 
Who can believe the Kaiser and his staff and his government 
and his partisans, when they deny that German armies 
have committed the atrocities the official War Manual and 
Hun-Address had demanded of these armies? Who in 
this country, now brought into this war by German ruth- 
lessness, can fail to devote himself and all he has to the 
protection of his country and of the world from the planned 
world-domination of the military power that goes back 
for its customs of war to Attila and his Huns? 



GERMANY'S WAR ON NEUTRALS 

By 

W. H. PAGE 

Professor of Law 

In a united effort to lessen the horrors of war, a general 
set of rules has been agreed upon by the common consent of 
civilized nations as a standard of international decency. 
This mass of rules and principles is known as international 
law. One of the great objects of this set of rules is to 
prevent a war between hostile nations from injuring na- 
tions who have not taken part in the war and who are 
known as neutrals. The rights of neutrals have been se- 
cured, as far as guarantees can secure them, by every pos- 
sible rule of international law ; and they have been pledged 
by many treaties and by the Hague Conferences to which 
Germany has been a party. On this point at least, Ger- 
many's internal military policy apparently agreed with her 
promises and pledges to other nations. While Germany's 
military manual for her officers laid down many rules of 
conduct in other matters which flatly contradicted her 
pledges in the Hague Conferences and in treaties, still her 
international military orders pledged her to most solemn 
observance of the rights of neutrals. Nevertheless, when 
the great war broke out, Germany began to make war on 
all the neutral countries of the world, as well as declaring 
war on Russia, France, and England. 

Her first military movement was the invasion of Belgium, 
a country which had strictly maintained its neutrality, as 
German officials themselves admitted. As for her war 



132 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

against the United States, Germany actually did more dam- 
age to us before we declared war than she has done since. 
Germany's war upon Belgium and upon the United States 
are her most flagrant examples of her war on neutrals, but 
no further reference to them will be made here since they 
are discussed elsewhere in this series of pamphlets; and 
this article will deal only with Germany's war on neutral 
nations other than Belgium and the United States. 

ORGANIZED PLRAGY 

The high seas, that is the open ocean outside of a line 
drawn a marine league from the coast of each nation, are 
the great highway of the world. The right to use the high 
seas in war is one of the rights which the common consent 
of civilized nations has secured to neutrals. Vessels which 
attempt to break an effective blockade may be seized on the 
high seas; and contraband of war, that is material which 
may aid the enemy in conducting the war, may be confis- 
cated. Ships of neutrals may be examined to see if they 
contain contraband of war, or in case they should attempt 
to break blockade. The right to interfere with neutrals on 
the high seas ends here. Neither attempting to break 
blockade nor transporting contraband of war is a matter 
justifying the detention, far less the death, of those who are 
engaged in such transactions; and apart from breaking 
blockade and transporting contraband of war, neutral com- 
merce has the right to go on the high seas free from all 
interference of the warring powers. 

Germany's decree of unlimited and unrestricted marine 
warfare is a decree which a sovereign power could make to 
vassal states, but as a declaration by one independent state 
to another, it amounts to a declaration of war. Of course 
the state against which the declaration is made can recog- 



GERMANY'S WAR ON NEUTRALS 133 

nize the fact that war exists, or it can close its eyes to that 
fact deliberately. The United States did the first ; Norway 
and Holland did the second, and endeavored to comply 
with Germany 's demands as far as it could be done without 
stopping their foreign commerce. But Germany made war 
on all alike! 

This warfare on the high seas has not been limited to 
vessels carrying munitions of war. Merchantmen which 
carried the ordinary products of peace not suitable for use 
in war, and even fishing boats of neutral powers have been 
sunk. 

The territorial waters include that part of the ocean 
which lies between low water mark and a line which is 
drawn three marine miles outside of such low water mark. 
These territorial waters constitute just as much a part of 
the adjoining country as the dry land; and it is just as 
much making war upon a neutral country to invade the 
territorial waters and to wage war there or to attack 
ships, even war vessels of a hostile nation, within its ter- 
ritorial waters as it would be to fight battles upon the land 
of the neutral country. In violation of these rules Ger- 
many has attacked both neutral vessels and vessels of an 
enemy country within territorial waters. In the early 
part of May, 1917, two Norwegian vessels were stopped by 
a German submarine two miles from the Spanish coast. 
The crew of the submarine boarded the Norwegian vessels, 
took away such supplies as they wished, towed the Nor- 
wegian vessels outside of the territorial limit and then sunk 
them deliberately. In comparison with this, the sinking 
of a French steamship in Spanish territorial waters seems 
mild, although a violation of international law and an 
attack upon Spanish territory. Doubly aggravated, how- 
ever, is the act of Germany in sinking Spanish vessels in 



134 UNIVERSITY OP WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

Spanish territorial waters, in raiding Spanish fishing boats, 
and in seizing a Norwegian vessel in Norwegian territorial 
waters. 

PICKING A QUARREL WITH DENMARK 

In the case of the Igotz Mendi Germany is apparently 
deliberately trying to pick a quarrel with Denmark. The 
Igotz Mendi was a Spanish steamship which had been cap- 
tured on the high seas by the German raider Wolf, in viola- 
tion of Spanish rights, and loaded with rubber, copper, and 
other articles plundered from neutral and allied shipping 
which had been sunk by the Wolf. The Spanish vessel was 
wrecked upon the coast of Denmark and in accordance with 
the rules of the Hague Conference to which Denmark was a 
party, Denmark interned the crew and took possession of 
as much of the cargo as was saved, so as to render no aid to 
either belligerent. In defiance of all rights, Germany noAV 
demands the release of the interned crew, the surrender of 
the goods which were saved, and — here is the crowning in- 
solence — payment for all goods lost in the wreck. 

"NO MINISTERS ABROAD— ONLY SPIES" 

To invade the land of a neutral country is in reality no 
greater wrong than to invade its territorial waters; but 
most of us can more easily understand that it is an open 
act of war. Furthermore, everyone can understand that 
an ambassador, because of the unusual rights and privi- 
leges given him, is especially obliged to take no part in 
hostilities against the country to which he is sent. Ger- 
many has violated each of these rights ; and frequently has 
violated both of them at the same time. The crews of 
Peruvian submarines have been bribed to attack vessels of 
the countries with which Germany is at war; sub-stations 
for submarines have been maintained off the coast of Spain ; 



GERMANY'S WAR ON NEUTRALS 135 

in Mexico and Brazil wireless stations for military and 
naval operations have been established; and the German 
organization in southern Brazil was practically an inde- 
pendent army threatening civil war at a time when Ger- 
many was professedly at peace with Brazil. Each of these 
violations of the rights of a neutral country was aided by 
German diplomatic agents, who plotted against the country 
whose guests they were. 

In Spain also, the office of the German embassy has been 
little more than the headquarters of an elaborate spy sys- 
tem. The aim of this system has been precisely the same 
as that of German intrigues in the United States prior to 
our entrance into the war,— to destroy the economic and 
political unity of the Spanish people by all the familiar 
methods of the ''Potsdam system". The motives are also 
the same as in America, to induce an important neutral 
state under the compulsion of the fear of internal dis- 
orders of German manufacture to disregard its interna- 
tional duties; and to deter it from joining Germany's ene- 
mies. The first step was commercial and newspaper propa- 
ganda following the same course as that carried on by 
Messrs. Dernburg, Bernstorff, Dumba and Company m the 
United States. Then followed a series of unneutral, ille- 
gal and criminal acts against the peace of Spain. 

Just as von Bernstorff in Washington worked through 
Boy-Ed and von Papen, so the German ambassador at 
Madrid worked through his two attaches, Captain von 
Krohn and Dr. von Stohrer. Two fields were open for 
their activities, the military juntas or reform committees 
in the Spanish army, and the socialistic labor unions of 
Barcelona and other industrial centres. The army com- 
mittees were stirred up to present a virtual ultimatum to 
the Spanish government, threatening a rebellion if its 
demands were not complied with. The Socialists were lead 



136 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

into an attempt to force the government to grant local self- 
government to Catalonia through a general strike in the 
great industrial centres. The Spanish government, how- 
ever, by a judicious mixture of firmness and liberality suc- 
ceeded in meeting the just complaints of the soldiers and 
workers, and in restoring normal conditions. 

Recently the independent newspaper El Sol has come out 
with a new series of amazing revelations. It has pub- 
lished a letter of the German ambassador to a well-known 
anarchist. The ambassador in this letter openly expressed 
Germany's desire to stir up trouble within Spain so that 
the government could not act with promptness in impor- 
tant matters connected with the war. Further, the letter 
showed that the German embassy had guided vast con- 
spiracies and had encouraged other anarchists to create 
violent disturbances throughout the country. 

DISEASE GERMS FOR ROUMANIA 

While Germany was still at peace with Roumania the 
German diplomatic agents had received boxes of explosives 
and germs of anthrax and glanders for use against Rou- 
mania. The sudden outbreak of war between Germany and 
Roumania compelled Germany to place her interests in the 
hands of the United States with which she was then at 
peace. These boxes of explosives and anthrax germs were 
found in the premises of the German legation. The box 
of disease germs bore the seal of the German consulate at 
Kronstadt and it was addressed to the German diplomatic 
agent at Bucharest, the capital of Roumania. It contained 
directions for the use of the disease germs to cause epi- 
demics among animals, which would of course spread to 
human beings. In this dastardly act, Germany first al- 



GERMANY'S WAR ON NEUTRALS 137 

lowed her ambassador to Roumania to plot against the coun- 
try to which he was sent ; and then made the United States 
a party to the crime. 

BOMBS FOR NORWEGIAN SHIPS 

Eepeated explosions on Norwegian vessels finally led to 
an investigation which resulted in discovering, in the latter 
part of June, 1917, that German couriers to the German 
legation had been bringing in explosives which were subse- 
quently to be placed by German agents in the coal with 
which the Norwegian vessels were supplied. Many of such 
vessels were destroyed at sea by explosives placed on board 
through the action of the German diplomat who repre- 
sented Germany in Norway. Germany's first act was to 
protest against Norway's act in arresting the courier who 
was caught importing such explosives ; and Germany urged 
that Norway was violating her duty toward a foreign am- 
bassador by seizing an agent who was bringing into Nor- 
way the means of destroying Norwegian vessels. Subse- 
quently Germany apologized to Norway for this transac- 
tion ; but she continued to place explosives in coal intended 
for Norwegian vessels, and was caught in the act. The 
final statement of the Norwegian government shows that up 
to October, 1917, Norwegian vessels of a total tonnage of a 
million tons had been destroyed by German submarines or 
by explosives placed on board; that the lives of seven 
hundred Norwegian sailors had been lost in this way ; that 
most of these vessels were sunk without warning and that 
in some cases the entire crew had been murdered ; and that 
in making such attacks, notice was given regularly by Ger- 
many 's organized spy system of the time and place at 
which Norwegian vessels would sail. 



138 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 



"SPURLOS VERSEXKT" 

The infamous ''spnrlos Tersenkt" telegram of Count 
Luxburg has given special notoriety to Germany's treat- 
ment of Argentina, though that treatment is probably no 
worse than her conduct toward other neutrals. Germany 
had been sinking vessels belonging to Argentina on the 
high seas without notice, and Argentina had protested 
vigorously. At last, when the Monte Protegido was sunk, 
public feeling was greatly aroused. Germany finally apol- 
ogized and made offer of compensation, Avhereupon the 
popular anger subsided to a considerable degree. But 
Germany's representatiA^e at Buenos Aires, Count Luxburg, 
continued to notify his government of the sailing of Ar- 
gentinian ships, calloush^ suggesting that, in order not to 
excite popular rage a second time, either the ships be 
spared, or their crews be murdered to the last man, that 
none might escape to bear evidence of German perfidy and 
crime. The following telegram he sent, among others, 
through the Swedish Legation as the official message of that 
legation, addressed to Stockholm and thence forwarded to 
Germany. 

May 19, 1917, Number 32. 
This Government has now released German and Austrian ships 
on which liitherto a guard has been placed. In consequence of 
the settlement of the Monte (Protegido) case there has been a 
great change of public feeling. Government will in future only- 
clear Argentine ships as far as Las Palmas. I beg that the 
small steamers Oran and Guazo, 31st of January (meaning which 
sailed 31st), 300 tons, which are (now) nearing Bordeaux with 
a view to change the flag, may be spared if possible or else sunk 
without a trace being left ("spurlos versenkt"). 

Luxburg. 



GERMANY'S WAR ON NEUTRALS 139 

The Secret Service Department of the United States 
Government secured these dispatches; and they were pub- 
lished by Mr. Lansing, Secretary of State, for the United 
States. When these dispatches were published the German 
newspapers criticised Count Luxburg as being foolish; 
and they attacked with great vigor the act of the United 
States Secret Service in intercepting these dispatches. 
But no one in Germany criticised the diplomatic agent who 
defiled his office by suggesting the wholesale murder of the 
citizens of the country to which he had been sent by his 
government, and with whom Germany w^as officially at 
peace. 

RUNNING A3IUCK 

The foregoing illustrations are only a few out of a great 
number that could be presented. They show that from 
the outbreak of the war, Germany has made war on friend 
and foe alike. Some of the cruelty towards neutral sea- 
men and some of the sinking of neutral vessels may have 
been caused by Germany's desire to gain some unfair ad- 
vantage in war. Much of it seems, at first glance, to be the 
result of sheer love for destruction and murder. How can 
Germany hope to advance her cause by sinking a Danish 
vessel bound to Iceland, or a Spanish vessel carrying food 
for neutral Switzerland? Yet there is probably a delib- 
erately adopted policy back of Germany's most extreme 
violation of neutral rights. If she could destroy every 
neutral vessel, her position in the competition for the com- 
merce of the world after the war would be greatly strength- 
ened. To gain this strong position Germany is now sinking 
neutral vessels even when out of the war zone and when 
engaged in purely neutral commerce. Many of these sink- 
ings are discovered and reported. Many other vessels are 
undoubtedly sunk without trace. While dead men tell no 



140 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

tales, the enormous increase in the number of vessels of 
neutrals which are missing and unaccounted for can have 
but one explanation, and that is that they are sunk by Ger- 
man submarines and their crews are murdered. 

One by one the countries which attempted to remain 
neutral have been driven to recognize the fact that a state 
of war existed between themselves and Germany. Those 
which have not made official recognition of this fact, do so by 
suffering Germany 's attacks without attempting to retaliate 
or even to defend themselves. The activities of von Bern- 
storff and von Papen in this country, before the United 
States sent them home, in plotting against the United 
States, in establishing a system of spies, and in planning 
the destruction of the vessels and other property of the 
United States, are matched by similar exploits of German 
diplomatic agents in other neutral countries, such as Nor- 
way, Spain, Roumania, Mexico, and Argentina. Neutrality 
in fact was not possible. The question was not one of war 
or peace. It was a question between war on one side with 
resistance by the other, or war by one without resistance 
by the other. Escape from war was not permitted to neu- 
tral countries. Their only choice was whether they would 
be attacked without defending themselves ; or whether they 
would defend themselves against attack. When we finally 
declared that a state of war existed between us and Ger- 
many, we did so almost three years after Germany had be- 
gun war on us. 



HOW GERMANY OVERTHREW INTERNATIONAL 

LAW 

By 

JOHN BRADLEY WINSLOW 

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 

We hear a great deal about Germany's deliberate viola- 
tion of the law of nations during the present war. But 
probably there are few persons who have any adequate ap- 
preciation of the profound shock to civilization which would 
necessarily result if a great world war could be conducted 
to final victory in insolent and admitted violation of the 
basic principles of international law and largely by means 
of that violation. 

The subject will bear reflection, but, first, there should 
be a clear conception of what international law is. 

DEFINITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 

International law has been defined as ''the aggregate of 
the rules to which nations have agreed to conform in their 
conduct towards one another.'' 

It includes within its sphere international relations in 
time of peace as well as in time of war, but it is most im- 
portant and meets its supremest test in times of war. 

The definition just given is quite accurate, but some- 
thing less technical, even if less accurate, may be more 
illuminating. International law is in truth the voice of 
the world's conscience; it is the world's conception of civil- 
ized morality applied to the relations between states, just 
as the law of a single state is that state's conception of 



142 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

civilized morality applied to the relations between its citi- 
zens. 

There is as yet no court to declare it, no ex- 
ecutive to administer it, and no sword to enforce it. But 
there is behind it the moral sense of the civilized world, a 
sense which for centuries has been growing stronger with 
every passing year. 

BARBARIAN WARFARE KNEW NO LAW 

The horrors which attended barbarian warfare are well 
known; such warfare knew no law and recognized no re- 
strictions upon frightfulness. Every person, young or old, 
male or female, strong or feeble, armed or unarmed, resi- 
dent in the enemy's country, was regarded as a combatant 
and subject to torture, bondage, or death. Every means 
of warfare, however brutal. or foul, could be freely used; 
all property was subject to plunder and destruction; ra- 
pine, murder, pillage, and bestial rioting reigned supreme 
after every victory ; only heaps of smoking ashes told where 
villages had stood ; deserts took the place of blooming fields, 
and whole populations disappeared from the face of the 
earth. 

The Thirty Years War which raged in Europe during the 
first half of the seventeenth century was attended by the 
most atrocious and systematic ravaging of whole provinces 
which modern history records, and left central Europe a 
desolate waste, with its population decimated and reduced 
to a state of misery which can hardly be described. 

GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 

Since that time the growth of the world sentiment in 
favor of what may be called civilized warfare has been 



HOW GERMANY OVERTHREW INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 

steady, though marked by occasional lapses. Gradually 
there have come to be recognized certain fundamental prin- 
ciples which may be truly called the very foundation stones 
of international law as applicable to a state of war. They 
are as follows: (1) independent states have equal rights re- 
gardless of size, position, or resources; (2) treaties between 
states are to be faithfully observed until properly abro- 
gated; (3) war is to be waged only by armed forces of the 
state, not by or against civilians ; and (4) only such destruc- 
tion of life and property as is necessary to accomplish the 
purposes of the war can be justified. 

These principles have become sanctioned by the general 
usage of civilized nations, have been declared by many 
treaties, and expounded by philosophers and statesmen. 
Within the last quarter century they have been analyzed, 
codified, and specifically applied to many of the concrete 
situations and conditions resulting from war, by world con- 
ferences held at the Hague in 1899 and 1907, in which the 
civilized nations of the world, including Germany, actively 
participated. To all of the important rules for the con- 
duct of warfare laid down by these conferences Germany 
gave her assent. It will be worth while to state some of 
the more significant of the rules promulgated by the Hague 
Conference of 1907. Among the articles of the chapter 
regulating warfare upon land are the following: 

Article 22. The right of belligerents to adopt means of injur- 
ing the enemy is not unlimited. 

Article 23. In addition to the prohibitions provided by special 
conventions it is especially forbidden (a) to employ poison or 
poisoned weapons; . . . (e) to employ arms, projectiles, 
or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering. 

Article 25. The attack or bombardment by whatever means of 
towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended, is 
prohibited. 



144 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

Article 27. In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps 
must be taken to spare as far as possible buildings dedicated to 
religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, 
hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected,' 
provided they are not being used at the time for military pur- 
poses. 

Article 50. No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall 
be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individ- 
uals for which they can not be regarded as jointly and severally 
resp€nsible. 

Article 6. The state may utilize the labor of prisoners of war 
. . . the tasks shall not be excessive and shall have no con- 
nection with the operations of the war. 

Article 56. The property of municipalities, that of institu- 
tions dedicated to religion, charity, and education, the arts and 
sciences, even when state property, shall be treated as private 
property. All seizure of, destruction, or wilful damage done to 
institutions of this character, historic monuments, works of art 
and science is forbidden, and should be made the subject of legal 
proceedings. 

Among the articles of the chapter relating to the rights 
and duties of neutrals are the following: 

Article 1. The territory of neutral powers is inviolable. 

Article 2. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or con- 
voys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory 
of a neutral power. 

GERMANY'S VIOLATIONS 

That all of these rules have been grossly and repeatedlj^ 
violated by Germany during the present war there can be 
no doubt. Let us set down the gravest of these violations 
without malice or exaggeration, passing by, however, the 
revolting stories of murder, rape, and indefensible cruelty 
toward civilians about which there may perhaps be honest 
controversy, although the proof seems very convincing. 
Let us rather take the violations which are admitted or 
proven by impregnable evidence. 



HOW GERMANY OVERTHREW INTERNATIONAL LAW 145 

First, and foremost, stands the violation of the neutrality 
of Belgium which Prussia and the other great powers of 
Europe had solemnly guaranteed by treaty in 1831 and 
1839. This was a two-fold violation of international law. 
Not only did it violate Articles 1 and 2 of that chapter of 
the Hague code relating to the rights and duties of neutrals, 
but it broke the plighted faith of the nation, given in the 
most solemn form. In this instance we have no need of 
proof or argument. The plea of Guilty has already been 
entered and it only needs now to pronounce sentence. 

Bethmann Hollweg, the German Chancellor, said in a 
speech to the Reichstag, August 4, 1914, ' ' Our troops have 
occupied Luxemburg and perhaps have already entered 
Belgian territory. Gentlemen, this is a breach of interna- 
tional law. " In view of the known facts it can not be said 
that this was an improvident admission. A burglar in 
possession of stolen property has small chance of convinc- 
ing any one of his innocence. 

Second, the bombardment by ships, Zeppelins, and aero- 
planes, of unfortified and undefended towns and even hos- 
pitals. The proof of these acts comes with almost every 
newspaper, and the sickening details of the slaughter of 
babes and women at night by bombs from the skies have be- 
come so frequent that we have become almost callous to 
them. Reference to Article 25 of the Hague rules already 
quoted shows at once what gross violations of international 
law these acts are. Comment upon them seems unneces- 
sary. 

Third, the employment of poisonous gases and liquid 
fire in direct violation of those articles of the Hague rules 
which prohibit the use of poison or material calculated to 
produce unnecessary suffering. Poison has ever been the 
weapon of cowards, torture the favorite device of despotic 
power. 



146 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

Fourth, the levying of vast fines and penalties upon cities 
and towns and villages, amounting in many instances to 
millions of dollars, in punishment for the acts of individ- 
uals. This is a clear violation of Article 50 of the Hague 
rules. In many cases the penalties were merely a pretended 
punishment for trivial acts. This is not to be understood 
as referring to the enormous war contributions which have 
been levied upon Belgium as a whole and upon occupied 
cities and towns in both Belgium and France for the sup- 
port of the German army. It is very difficult to ascertain 
the amount of these latter contributions, though they amount 
to many millions of dollars wrung from a ruined people. 
These, however, may receive some justification in Articles 
48 and 49 of the Hague rules, which authorize the levy of 
money contributions in occupied territories sufficient for 
the support of the army and the administration of the ter- 
ritory ; therefore I leave them out. But I refer to the fines 
and other penalties which have been imposed upon com- 
munities on account of the acts of individuals. As examples 
of such punishments may be cited the levy of 5,000,000 
francs upon Brussels for the individual act of a police con- 
stable ; the levy of 500,000 francs on the same city because 
of a murder committed by an unknown person in a suburb 
of the city ; the levy of the same sum on the city of Lille be- 
cause some inhabitants made demonstrations of sympathy 
for some French prisoners being escorted through the 
streets ; and the levy of 100,000 francs on the town of Arlon 
for the cutting of a telephone wire by an unknown person. 
The list of well-authenticated cases where such enormous 
fines have been levied for trifling and even ridiculous of- 
fences by individuals is very great, and seems to prove a 
deliberate intention to extract great sums of money from in- 
nocent people on the most flimsy pretext. The whole mat- 
ter is discussed and very many instances given in an article 



HOW GERMANY OVERTHREW INTERNATIONAL, LAW 147 

by James W. Garner, in the American Journal of Interna- 
tional Law for July, 1917, at page 511. 

Fifth, the destruction by fire of villages, towns, and cities 
and the killing of their inhabitants, young and old, men 
and women alike, on the alleged ground that some of their 
inhabitants had fired upon German soldiers. The best 
known case of this kind is the destruction of Louvain, ex- 
tending from the 25th to the 30th of August, 1914, and the 
murder of hundreds of its inhabitants. But Louvain was 
only one of a series of towns and cities in Belgium and 
northern France which were the victims of these outrages. 
Even if there were any real evidence for these alleged 
acts of hostility against German soldiers, the German gov- 
ernment would still be without adequate excuse. For the 
punishing of an entire city by fire and sword for the acts 
of individuals is contrary to the rules which that govern- 
ment had solemnly agreed to obey. 

SixtJi, the removal of millions of dollars worth of factory 
machinery, metals, and supplies from Belgium to Germany, 
in violation of Article 46 of the Hague Code which de- 
clares that private property must be respected in time of 
war and cannot be confiscated. 

Seventh, the taking prisoner of a quarter of a million of 
civilians, both men and women, and transporting them from 
Belgium and France to Germany and compelling them to 
work in factories and in labor camps, some near the front, 
and some elsewhere, but all doing work of direct or indirect 

military value. 

Concerning this deportation the American minister, Mr. 
Brand Whitlock, officially reported to the Secretary of 
State in January, 1917, as follows: 

The rage, the terror, and despair, excited by this measure 
all over Belgium was beyond anything we had witnessed since 
the day the Germans poured into Brussels.- . . . I am con- 



148 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

stantly in receipt of reports from all over Belgium that tend to 
bear out the stories of brutality and cruelty. In tearing away 
from nearly every humble home in the land a husband and father, 
or a son and a brother they (the Germans) have lighted a fire of 
hatred that will never go out. . . . (It is) one of those 
deeds that make one despair of the future of the human race; a 
deed coldly planned, studiously matured, and deliberately and 
systematically executed, a deed so cruel that German soldiers are 
said to have wept in its execution and so monstrous that even 
German officers are now said to be ashamed. 

EigJitJi, the wholesale sinking of neutral freight and pas- 
senger ships on the high seas without warning, visit, or 
search, and regardless of the question whether they are 
carrying contraband of war or not. 

NintJi, the cold-blooded murder (for such it is) of 
civilian neutrals rightfully travelling upon the high seas 
in commercial ships. Whether the ships be enemy or 
neutral, all the laws of God and man require that the lives 
of passengers and crews be protected before the ships are 
sunk. The doctrine of ''spurlos versenkt" has no place 
in the policy of any nation which claims to be civilized. 

TentJi, the destruction of fruit trees and all private pro- 
perty of every kind in the evacuated portions of France, 
rendering the territory a desert of death, with no gain of 
military advantage. 

Eleventh, the ruthless destruction of the most beautiful 
cathedrals and other public buildings, the choicest treas- 
ures of medieval architecture, in violation of Article 56 
of the Hague rules. 

Twelfth, the wholesale looting of the funds and property 
of banks, business houses, and private persons, in violation 
of Article 53 of the Hague rules. It may be said in passing 
that these acts also violate Article 47 which declares that 
"Pillage is formally forbidden." 



HOW GERMANY OVERTHREW INTERNATIONAL. LAW 149 

Thirteenth, the carrying on of plots and conspiracies by 
their diplomatic and consular agents in this country while 
Germany was still at peace with us; such conspiracies and 
plots being directed not merely against foreign countries 
but against our own country as well. 

This list of violations of international law is by no means 
complete, but it seems ample for present purposes. They 
are all explained when we fully understand the one under- 
lying and unchangeable principle upon which Prussian mil- 
itary autocracy makes war and has made war since the 
days of Frederick the Great. 

THE PRUSSIAN PHILOSOPHY OF WAR 

Article 13 of the Hague Code regulating land warfare 
expressly declares that "the right of belligerents to adopt 
means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited." To this 
statement the German War Manual^ answers thus : 

What is permissible includes every means of war without 
which the object of the war can not be obtained. . . . All 
means which modern invention affords, including the most danger- 
ous and most massive means of destruction, may be utilized. 

This is brutally frank but very illuminating. It clears 
away all the clouds and makes it very plain that Germany's 
violations of international law are the deliberate and pre- 
meditated acts of the Prussian war oligarchy which rules 
her. Along the same general lines, General Carl von 
Clausewitz says^: 

War is an act of violence intended to compel our enemy to 

fulfil our will In such dangerous things as war the 

errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the 



* Morgan's translation, Vol. 2, p. 85. 
2 0it War, 1832. 



150 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

worst He who uses force unsparingly .... must 

obtain a superiority if his adversary uses less vigor in its ap- 
plication To introduce into the philosophy of war 

itself a principle of moderation would be an absurdity. 

Another German military authority writing in 1877, 
Gen. Julius von Hartmann, says: 

Military action must be determined solely in accordance with 
those conditions which usually prevail in war; in this sense it is 
completely ruthless. ... It would be yielding to voluntary 
self-deception not to recognize that at the present time war must 
be conducted much more ruthlessly and much more violently, 
and that it must come much nearer to affecting the entire 
population than has hitherto been the case. 



In these extracts we have the explanation of Germany's 
wholesale violation of international law in a nutshell. Her 
philosophy of war is absolutely at variance with all inter- 
national law and she does not hesitate to proclaim the fact 
and glory in it. Elihu Root, in an address delivered in 
1916, sums up the matter thus: 

The principles of action upon which this war was begun in- 
volve a repudiation of every element of fundamental right upon 
which the law of nations rests. The right of every nation to con- 
tinued existence, to independence, to exclusive jurisdiction over 
its own territory, and equality with other nations is denied. The 
right of any strong nation to destroy all these alleged rights of 
other nations in pursuit of what it deems useful for its own pro- 
tection or preservation is asserted. 



WHAT VICTORY FOR PRUSSIANISM MEANS 

Had these infractions of international law been com- 
mitted by a small state, the effect on international bv/ 
might be slight and temporary. The offending state would 



HOW GERMANY OVERTHREW INTERNATIONAL LAW 151 

doubtless receive its punishment at the hands of other 
states at no distant day, and international law would re- 
main secure. But the violations have been committed by 
the state which is the strongest, in a military sense, of any 
state in the world and which is convinced of its mission to 
rule the world. If it is victorious, international law 
necessarily ceases to exist, except perhaps in books. 

Why? Because faith and honor will disappear as far 
as national relations are concerned. No nation can ever 
again trust another ; treaties will become in very truth mere 
scraps of paper. If one nation plays the game of di- 
plomacy with loaded dice and without regard to honor or 
good faith, others must do the same if they would survive. 
This means world-wide militarism; every state must be- 
come a military camp and every people an organized army. 
It means that the little states have no rights and cannot 
long survive, especially if they be agricultural states. Only 
manufacturing states which possess the necessary mineral 
wealth and can furnish themselves with armaments and 
war material from their own resources have any chance to 
live. It means that the mad race in armaments, both on 
sea and land, will go on with greatly increased speed. It 
means a world in which perpetual fear of one's neighbor 
reigns supreme, and revenge becomes the engrossing 
thought of the nations. It means that the vision of a 
world in which justice and democracy reign, and coopera- 
tion between friendly states takes the place of relentless 
military and commercial competition, becomes nothing 
more than a vision. It means, in all likelihood, a succession 
of wars ultimately resulting in the triumph of a great 
military autocratic state of which all other states, including 
this United States, shall be submissive slaves. 



152 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

Bibliography 

Hall, W. E. International Law. 

Halleck. International Law. Fourth Edition. Edited by 
Sir Sherston Baker. 

Scott, James Brown. Texts of the Peace Conferences at 
the Hague, 1899 and 1907. Ginn. Boston. 1908. 

Wheaton. International Law. Fifth Edition. Edited by 
Phillipson. 

American Journal of International Law. 

Volume II. P. 74. Article by J. W. Garner. 
Volume II. P. 511. Article by J. W. Garner. 
Volume II. Supplement. P. 99. 

Tlie War Book of the German General Staff. Translated 
by J. H. Morgan. New York. 1915. 

United States War Dictionary. Published by the Com- 
mittee on Public Information, Washington. 

German War Practices. Published by the Committee on 
Public Information, Washington. 

Zitelman. The War and International Law, in Modern 
G err' any. This book is a collection of papers by vari- 
ous German writers. Kennerley. New York. 1916. 

Hill, David Jayne. International Ideals. Century Maga- 
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Smith, Munroe. German Theory of Warfare. North 
American Review. September, 1917. 

Zeppelin Raids and Eights of Neutrals. Review of Re- 
views. Vol. 52. P. 590. 

International Law on the Sea. World's Work. Vol. 29. 
April, 1915. 



GERMAN AUTOCRACY AND MILITARISM 

By 

W. F. GIESE 

Professor of Romance Languages 

The two most outstanding characteristics of the Ger- 
man government are Absolutism, the centralization of 
all the powers and functions of the state in the hands of 
the Kaiser, and Militarism, the subordination of all the 
more humane and civilizing functions of the state to the 
demands and the ideals of the military establishment. 
The German spirit, as represented by the Kaiser, is the 
child of Absolutism and Militarism; we cannot have it 
without having them also. Germany generously offers 
us all three. In case of refusal, she is ready to impose 
them upon us for our own good — and for hers. 

The most popular quotation — under government pat- 
ronage — in Germany today . is a couplet from the poet 
Geibel proclaiming that the world is to be lighted by the 
German spirit. The Kaiser has set out on this mission, 
with the sword in one hand — and the torch in the other. 
We who prefer the American conception of Liberty en- 
lightening the World must parry the sword-thrust and 
keep our houses well insured. 

The ambition of the house of Hohenzollern is to 
achieve world-power; its pretext is the holy desire to 
spread the German spirit over the face of the earth. 
It offers us at the point of the sword, not German Kul- 
tur, as it was represented by Goethe and Schiller and 
Kant, but a Kultur cast in the iron mould of the Hohen- 



154 UNIVERSITY OP WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

zollerns. We feel that the spread of this kind of Ger- 
manism among us would be, as it has been for Germany, 
a national calamity. As for genuine German culture, on 
the other hand, we have hitherto warmly welcomed it. 
The philosophy, the literature, the science, the music of 
Germany, all these products of the finer and deeper 
qualities of the German spirit, we have highly valued in 
the past, and assuredly, when the excitement of war is 
over, we shall again see clearly that they form a very 
large and very precious portion of the spiritual treasures 
of mankind. We shall welcome them again. 

These higher things are not the products of absolut- 
ism. It has wrenched them to its own base uses when it 
could; it has reviled and persecuted them when it could 
not. The number of German writers and thinkers who 
have been imprisoned or exiled during the last hundred 
years is an astounding one. Russia alone can parallel 
it. 

''It is as if the very pressure from without had helped 
to strengthen and enrich the inner life," says Kuno 
Francke, professor of German at Harvard University, 
in speaking of the restrictions of personal liberty suf- 
fered in Germany, which, he adds, are such as no Eng- 
lishman would tolerate. 

''The state," says Treitschke, ''is not an Academy of 
Art. When it abdicates its power in favor of the ideal 
aspirations of humanity it belies its own nature and 
perishes." The state, in Germany, stands for a per- 
verted Kultur, not for culture. 

This compound of absolutism and militarism, the 
best and most free-spirited Germans do not want in their 
own country. We assuredly do not want it in ours. 

The Kaiser says : "It is the soldier and the army, not 



GERMAN AUTOCRACY AND MILITARISM 155 

parliamentary majorities and votes that have welded the 
German Empire." 

He says : ' ' The soldier should have no will of his own ; 
you should all have but one will and that is my will; 
there is but one law for you, and that is mine. ' ' 

He says to his recruits: ''Should the necessity arise, 
you must even shoot down your fathers and mothers at 
my order." 

He says further: ''Only one is master in the land. 
That am I! Whoever opposes me I will smash in 
pieces ! ' ' 

The Kaiser refers here to the Social Democrats, the 
only influential party in Germany that stands for lib- 
erty and the rights of the common man. The Kaiser 
calls them ' ' a gang unworthy of the name of Germans, ' ' 
"traitors to the fatherland!" 

The Kaiser and the government are intensely mili- 
taristic. Wilhelm's first speech as Emperor was addressed 
to the army and navy, not to parliament and the peo- 
ple. These are the idols worshipped by the Hohenzol- 
lerns. 

' ' German militarism is the best thing we have achieved 
in the course of our development as a state and a peo- 
ple," says ex-Chancellor von Biilow. 

A chorus of professors and politicians joins in. Pro- 
fessor Sombart proclaims war the holiest thing on earth, 
and all reecho von Moltke's sinister words that perpetual 
peace is only a dream and not even a beautiful dream. 

From the combined pressure of despotism and militar- 
ism, and thanks to the narrow range to which it has 
been confined by them, the German spirit has contracted 
certain grave defects. In the first place it is the victim 
of a superstitious worship of war, of a blind faith that 
the great problems of national life must be solved by 



156 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

force, that blood and iron are the only final arbiters, 
that might, and not right, rules the world. No civiliza- 
tion built on this corner-stone has prospered in the end ; 
it has always died amid the curses of its victims. 

^'But for German militarism German Kultur would 
long since have been wiped off the face of the earth," 
boldly assert the ninety-three representative Germans 
in the famous manifesto which they sent out from Ger- 
many 'Ho the civilized world." 

Such a conception of Kultur readily leads to the be- 
lief that Germany must flourish not through peace but 
war. 

''Nothing is more immoral than to consider and talk 
of war as an immoral thing. War is the mother of all 
good things, ' ' says Professor Haase. 

''If we are beaten," says the great scholar Harnack, 
**all the higher Kultur of our hemisphere, which it was 
our mission to guard, sinks into its grave with us. ' ' 

To dwell much on such ideas leads to a dangerous 
national self-conceit, to a state of mind which makes rela- 
tions with neighboring peoples difficult and hazardous. 
A German pastor, preaching a sermon (evidently some- 
what needed) on the humility of the Germans, says that 
when Germany compares herself with other nations, 
the comparison is always in her favor. Everybody that 
is familiar with the utterances of representative Ger- 
mans during the last few decades is painfully aware 
how common this arrogant tone has become. 

"The German should feel," says Professor Sombart, 
"that he is raised high above all the other nations who 
surround him and whom he sees in measureless depth 
beneath him." 

"One highly cultivated German," says the great 
scientist Haeckel, "represents a higher intellectual and 



GERMAN AUTOCRACY AND MILITARISM 157 

moral life- value than hundreds of the raw children of 
nature whom England and France, Russia and Italy op- 
pose to him." 

How can we hope for international good-will and 
peace on earth, if the greatest leaders of German thought 
thus not only preach to a deluded people the horrible doc- 
trine that war is the highest moral influence, the great 
school of virtue, the real fountain-head of national great- 
ness, but also the hardly less pernicious doctrine that the 
German is entitled to look down upon all his European 
neighbors with utter contempt? 

The intellectual outcome of such teachings is shown 
in the manifesto of the 3500 teachers in the higher edu- 
cational institutions of Germany who naively assert: 
''Our belief is that the salvation of the whole civiliza- 
tion of Europe depends upon the victory which German 
militarism is about to achieve." 

The moral fruit may be seen in such utterances as 
these astounding words of the Reverend Doctor Fritz 
Philippe in a sermon preached in Berlin: ''The divine 
mission of Germany is to crucify humanity." 

It is plain that even religion itself is in Germany per- 
verted to serve the personal interests of the Hohenzol- 
lerns and their bureaucratic retainers. The Kaiser 
showed no special interest in religion — until he mounted 
the throne. Then, all of a sudden, he seemed to have 
been taken into partnership by God (not as a silent 
partner) . 

"Remember," he says in a proclamation to the army, 
"that the German people are the chosen of God. On 
me, as German Emperor, the spirit of God has descended. 
I am His weapon. His sword, and His vice-regent." 

"In our country," says the great chemist Ostwald, 



158 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

* ' God the Father is reserved for the personal use of the 
Emperor. ' ' 

Even those who, like the Lokal-Anzeiger, stand less 
for the royal prerogative, claim him for the whole em- 
pire as ''a God who belongs to us alone, and who is not 
ashamed to belong to us. ' ' 

After such prostitution of what is most sacred, such 
mad claims to the possession of a tribal German deity, 
such insolent subordination of God and His church to 
the greater glory of a despotic dynasty, we may well 
agree with the words of Doctor Paul Rohrbach: *'In 
the name of no other Christian church has religion been 
so entirely subordinated to the principle of authority in 
the interest of the ruling classes." 

This militant and arrogant spirit leads to a new and 
barbarous conception of war, to a veritable brutalization 
of manners and morals. 

''Every ascent to a higher mental culture," says the 
great journalist Maximilian Harden, ''impairs the bar- 
baric energy of warriors and encumbers them Avith 
scruples which damp their joyous courage." 

Marshall von der Goltz consequently asserts that there 
is no place for pity in the German soldier's heart, and 
he adds : ' ' It is better to let a hundred women and chil- 
dren belonging to the enemy die of hunger than to let a 
single German soldier suffer." 

The military leaders seem to have felt that the Ger- 
man soldier might not straightway, and, as it were, by 
God's- grace, achieve this ideal degree of barbarity. The 
official German War Manual says : " By steeping himself 
in military history an officer will be able to guard himself 
against excessive humanitarian notions : it will teach him 
that certain severities are indispensable in war, nay, 



GERMAN AUTOCRACY AND MILITARISM 159 

more, that the true humanity very often lies in a ruth- 
less application of them. ' ' 

Let us view this military spirit as reflected in German 
war-poetry. Here are a few stanzas from the Song of 
the Sword: 

It is no duty of mine to be either just or compassionate; 
it suffices that I blind the eyes of my enemies with such 
streams of tears as shall make the proudest of them cringe in 
terror under the vault of Heaven. 

I have slaughtered the old and the sorrowful; I have struck 
off the breasts of women, and I have pierced the bodies of 
children. 

It is meet and right that I should cry out aloud in my 
pride, for am I not the flaming minister of God Almighty? 

Germany is so far above and beyond all other nations that 
all the rest of them, be they who they may, should feel them- 
selves well cared for when they are allowed to fight with the 
dogs for the crumbs that fall from her table. 

But such son^s are, perhaps, misleading, if taken with 
a flat literalness. There are those who can give them a 
subtle interpretation which may even infuse them with 
a highly religious spirit. Doctor Seeberg, professor of 
theology at Marburg, says: ''We do not hate our ene- 
mies. No, we obey the divine command to love them. 
When we kill them, when we burn their homes, and over- 
run their territories, we are performing a labor of love." 

This military coloring has been felt to be a most de- 
sirable, in fact, an almost indispensable element in the 
training of character. Treitschke insisted that univer- 
sity professors had such inferior opportunities for ideal 
development, that the army officers must be chosen in- 
stead as the models for German youth to pattern after. 
Lange, the celebrated educational writer, says likewise 
that Germany must look to the army and the corps of 



160 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

officers to endow it with and educate it in these higher 
values of Kultur. 

To a great extent this wish has been fulfilled. German 
education is largely imbued with the militaristic spirit. 
Men are preferred as teachers because they are mo7'e 
warlike than women. The very games of the children 
are given a military turn. Their reading books are of 
the propagandist order, celebrating the heroic exploits 
of German generals and the valor and virtue of the 
HohenzoUern monarchs, while anti-French poetry and 
prose are liberally strewn in. Even the famous Hymn 
of Hate, it is said, has passed into the school anthologies. 
History is taught from the most biassed national point 
of view, and all the great German historians are direct- 
ly or indirectly, defenders and whitewashers of the 
ruling house. The present Kaiser even threatened to 
close the state archives to Treitschke because he praised 
Bismarck more highly than the royal family — just as the 
Crown Prince recently brought about the suppression of 
Hauptmann's Breslau Festspiel because it glorified the 
people rather than royalty. 

Evidently German education is not disinterested. 
The people are not educated for their own good, but to 
serve the purpose of the ruling classes. The Kaiser says : 
' ' The school is for the purpose of teaching how the Em- 
pire may be maintained. ' ' 

Of the common school teacher and of the university 
professor alike he says: ''According to his rights and 
duties, he is, in the first place, a state official. In this 
position of his, he should do what is demanded of him. 
He should teach the young and prepare them for resist- 
ing all revolutionary aims." 

Thus we see, by the Kaiser 's own words, that two con- 
stant features of German education are militarism and 



GERMAN AUTOCRACY AND MILITARISM 161 

absolutism. ' ' I want soldiers, ' ' said the Kaiser angrily, 
when he complained that the schools made their pupils 
near-sighted. 

The complete subordination of the lower classes, of the 
poor who do the world's work, is the indispensable con- 
dition of German imperialism. They are educated to 
think only as their masters wish them to and thus to 
become docile and unquestioning upholders of the ex- 
isting order of things, contented with their humble lot 
and without aspirations toward democratic liberty and 
equality. 

The effort to achieve this medieval ideal has been at- 
tended with considerable success. Germany is in many 
ways strangely unmodern. Harnack is quite right in 
deploring the prevalence of the spirit of caste. In no 
country is there less of social equality, of genial contact 
between the upper and the lower classes. 

''Nowhere are the lines between employer and em- 
ployed more sharply drawn than in Germany, nowhere 
is there more of class feeling," says Professor Kuno 
Francke. 

In truth the humbler classes are looked down on with 
contempt and are usually treated with corresponding 
insolence and brutality. 

In many country districts, the laborer is treated as if 
he were still a serf. Women are worked harder than 
the cattle — the latter are the property of the owner and 
must be handled with consideration. In East Prussia, 
the use of the whip and of the fist and foot of the slave- 
driver are not uncommon, with language to correspond. 
Such are social conditions among the Junkers. 

When a workman or peasant becomes a soldier he is 
not unlikely to be treated in the same fashion. He is 
taken away for two years from his own work and his 
11— W. B, 



162 UNIVERSITY OF AVISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

own interests, to be submitted to an iron discipline. His 
drill-masters do not treat him very humanely. In 1902 
the Reichstag protested. It was even listened to. Some 
600 officers were condemned for cruelty to soldiers — 
one lieutenant for 600 cases of maltreatment, aiid one 
petty officer for not less than 1520. 

These pernicious practices were never remedied. ''We 
have submitted," said Vorivdrts June 30, 1914, ''hun- 
dreds of decisions of courts-martial from 1907 to 1913, 
in which alone tens of thousands of cases of maltreat- 
ment of soldiers have been judicially established." In 
connection with the Eosa Luxembourg trial, [1913] evi- 
dence was forthcoming to prove something like 30,000 
separate instances of brutal treatment of soldiers. The 
trial was adjourned — doubtless with no intention of fur- 
ther ventilating the scandalous brutality disclosed. 

It is only too evident that the drill-master can carry 
his cruelty very far with safety. As Liebknecht says: 
**They try to tame men as they try to tame beasts." 

The civilian, when he has to deal with an officer is in 
even worse plight than the recruit. At Zabern, a colonel 
arrested at random and locked up thirty civilians, in- 
cluding a judge, for a whole day and night, in a cellar, 
in order to teach them proper respect for his uniform! 
"You wear the Kaiser's coat, therefore you are above 
other men." said Wilhelm, in addressing his recruits. 
It is true the colonel was brought to trial for this out- 
rage, but he was acquitted, in spite of an overwhelming 
protest from the powerless Reichstag. The Crown 
Prince sent him his congratulations, and he received 
15,000 telegrams approving of his conduct. 

Many similar examples of military abuses might be 
cited, of civilians run through by officers whom they 
happened to jostle in the street, of ladies forced to sur- 



GERMAN AUTOCRACY AND MILITARISM 163 

render their seats in street-cars to officers, or pushed off 
the sidewalk into the mud by uniformed '^ gentlemen. " 

When the workman has finished his army-service, and 
is back at his daily work, he will again find the atmos- 
phere in which he lives somewhat oppressive. He will 
have longer hours and poorer pay than he would in al- 
most any other country. It is said, too, that 55 per 
cent of the workmen's families in Berlin live in a sin- 
gle room. 

Even in his single room he is not absolute master. 
The police will visit and inspect him and it whenever it 
is deemed necessary. They will ask him all sorts of 
questions about his wife, children, visitors and servants 
(if any), about his religion and his wages. Unless he 
has the courage to profess himself an outright atheist, 
they will assess him for church-rates, and if he lives in 
Polish Prussia they may force him to sell his property, 
or may throw his wife into prison for teaching her chil- 
dren to pray to the Kaiser's God in the uncultured dia- 
lect of these annexed provinces. 

As a laborer, if he does not like his wages he can, of 
course, strike. But he must not forget that the Kaiser 
once proposed, on his own initiative, a law making 
strikes punishable by three to five years of penal servi- 
tude. Against sickness, non-employment, and destitu- 
tion in old age, the government shrewdly protects him, 
in part, naturally, at his own expense. The scheme has 
its advantages, of course, but he will have to pay a large 
share of his slender savings into the government's in- 
surance fund — and, if he should ever leave the country, 
he will lose all he has paid in ! Why this crying injus- 
tice? There's a reason! It is an indirect method of 
restoring serfdom and of imprisoning the German within 
the bounds of his own country, lo that he and his ehil- 



164 UNIVERSITY OP WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

dren may furnish the Kaiser with a generous supply of 
cannon-fodder ! 

If he seeks to remedy these ills by political action, he 
will have to join the Social-Democrats, and as such will 
even have a vote, although his representatives in the 
Reichstag have no real poAver. They can only talk in 
this famous ''Hall of Echoes". As for himself, if he 
talks a little boldly, or even indiscreetly, he may be se- 
cretly tried for lese-majcsfe and sent to prison to learn 
respect for the Kaiser. A Hamburg editor was impri- 
soned six months for debating the question whether the 
Kaiser's grandfather was quite gi-eat enough to deserve 
the title of the Great. As a votci' one is also privileged 
to attend political meetings, provided tliey be duly an- 
nounced in advance to the police, who will be present, 
and who will close up the meeting if it becomes too polit- 
ical. Also our worker in a small town, for example, is 
in danger of losing his work, if his employer learns that 
he holds social-democratic doctrines. And if he is a 
shopkeeper, the privileged class will boycott him, and 
give their custom to some loyal furnisher to the court. 

The political rights of the workman have been happily 
summed up by Liebknecht: 

*'We Germans in Prussia have three cardinal rights: 
to be soldiers, to pay taxes, and to hold our tongues be- 
tween our teeth." 

The German who has long lived in America, and who 
loves freedom and the blessings of peace, can not there- 
fore love institutions which are the deadly foe of both. 
That he should love his fatherland, the sweetness of his 
native air, and the people to whom he belongs by ties 
of blood and speech is natural and human and neither 
could nor should be otherwise. But he can not love the 
military and autocratic institutions under which they 



GERMAN AUTOCRACY AND MILITARISM 165 

lan-guish, and the hopeless inequality of their lot under a 
government efficient and order-loving, no doubt, but ar- 
rogant and despotic— a government on which he himself 
has turned his back. That despotism he is bound to 
hate even more profoundly than we do, for we have suf- 
fered its insolence only remotely and recently, he has 
suffered its silent and relentless pressure through long 
generations of ancestry. He will read in the same spirit 
as we do the praises of Kultur as sounded by a celebrated 
German writer, Thomas Mann: ^^ Kultur is a spiritual 
organization of the world, which does not exclude bloody 
savagery. It raises the demonic to sublimity. It is 
above morality, reason, and science." 

Is it astonishing that such a picture is profoundly 
abhorrent to every American? And is it astonishing 
that many a German, who has left America to go back 
and pass his old age in the fatherland which he had left 
as a youth, has in the imperial and militaristic Germany 
of to-day found life so narrow and freedom so restricted 
that after a short time he has gladly come back again 
to a land where the common man enjoys full political 
liberty and finds every business and social opportunity 
open to him and his children? 



166 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 



Bibliography 

Barker, J. Ellis. How Education has Degraded the Ger- 
man Character, in 19th Century. September. 1917. 

Modern Germany. London. 1915. Smith, Elder. 
A very valuable work in many ways; Chapter 20 
deals with education. 

Dawson, W. H. What is Wrong with Germany? New 
York. 1915. Longmans, Green and Co. Mr. 
Dawson has long been recognized as one of the lead- 
ing authorities on contemporary Germany. 

Gems of German Thought. Collected by W. Archer. 
New York. 1917. Doubleday, Page. 

Out of Their Own Mouths. New York. 1917. Appleton. 

Conquest and Kultur. Committee on Public Informa- 
tion. Washington, D. C. 1917. These three vol- 
umes give brief typical extracts from original 
sources revealing the German spirit. 

Gerard, J. W. My Four Years in Germany. New York. 
1917. Doran. Germany seen from the inside, by 
the American Ambassador to Germany. 

German Kultur, in Quarterly Review . April, 1915. 

German Thought and French Thought, in Educational 
Review. December, 1915. 



SOME MORAL AND RELIGIOUS IDEAS OF 
MODERN GERMANY 



By 



F. C. SHARP 

Professor of Philosophy 

The moral and religious ideas of the Germany of today 
have been shaped to a remarkable extent by two Germans 
of the last generation — Friedrich Nietzsche and Heinrich 
von Treitschke. A powerful influence along parallel lines 
has been exerted by certain German writers on evolution. 
To know what seed these men have sowed is to understand 
much of the spirit which has produced this war. 

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE 

Friedrich Nietzsche was a poet who wrote prose, some 
of it in the manner of the Old Testament — ^but in a very 
different spirit. He starts by assuming that belief in God 
and in a future life is as absurd for a grown man as a belief 
in Santa Glaus. The Christian religion, he thinks, is not 
merely false, it is demoralizing and dangerous. ''The 
Christian conception of God is one of the most corrupt 
that has ever been preached on earth." The moral ideas 
of the New Testament are equally false and vicious. The 
founder of Christianity, as portrayed in the Gospels, was a 
weak creature who did not have the backbone to stand up 
and stand out against opposition and enmity ; he was essen- 
tially a morbid personality. Paul was a fakir, whose ruling 
motive was envy of those above him in social station. The 



168 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

only cliaiacter in the entire JSew Testament worthy of re- 
spect is Pilate, — this because he thought the death of one 
Jew more or less was a matter of not the slightest impor- 
tance. The New Testament is a book which, to avoid soiling 
his hands, a man should read with his gloves on.^ 

Why this wild hatred of Christianity ? Christianity, 
Nietzsche answers, is a religion of slaves. Invented by the 
lowest classes and for the benefit of the lowest classes, it 
had its origin in envy and hatred of the glorious members 
of the upper class in the Roman Empire and in the crav- 
ing for sympathy and help under the crushing burden of 
their despotic rule. It preaches sympathy and the equality 
of man. It sees something of value, something worth 
saving, in every human soul. It commands us to help and 
save the lowly, the weak, the fallen in body, mind, and 
character. It is the religion of the under dog; and the 
under dog v^as, as he is today, a mangy and spiritless cur. 
The only persons that really count, according to Nietzsche, 
are the born masters of men, created to rule the rest of man- 
kind, who in turn form the ''slave caste" or ''the herd". 
The masters may or may not be identical with the members 
of any actual aristocracy. In any event they are those who 
ought to rule. Their essential characteristic is strength, — 
in particular, strength of intellect and strength of will. 
They must be willing to sacrifice pleasure, comfort, ease, 
safety, friendship, and whatever else may block their way — 
and their way must lead to power over their fellow-men. At 
bottom every motive of human nature, in slave and master 
alike, is reducible to one, the will for power, in the sense of 
power over others (Wille zur Macht). The herd may partly 
conceal this fact from themselves by throwing dust into 
their eyes in the form of high-sounding words. A similar 



iSee The Antichrist, Sees. 18. 80. 42. 4« 



SOME MORAL AND RELIGIOUS IDEAS OF GERMANY 169 

blindness on the part of the master-class would be fatal to 
civilization. Nietzsche regards it as his mission to reveal 
to the fit few their own deepest cravings in order that they 
may know precisely what they want and see that they get it. 

In the pursuit of their ends these higher beings must 
recognize moral scruples as being nothing but childish 
prejudices, which a man worthy of membership in the 
master class will have thrown overboard by the time he has 
reached man's estate. Such a one should be able to say 
with St. Paul: ''When I became a man, I put away 
childish things." The masters are above and beyond or- 
dinary standards of right and wrong. What use they are 
to make of this discovery will of course depend upon their 
precise tastes and aims. A man may seek to impress his 
personality upon the race by his writings, as Nietzsche him- 
self did. And Nietzsche considers the life of the philosopher 
as the highest (because the most effective) form of the will 
for power. Such a man in his ordinary relations with his 
fellows may be harmless enough. Indeed he may exhibit a 
kind of love for a few kindred spirits, if by ' ' love ' ' is meant 
the desire to control the lives of others by impressing upon 
them one's own ideals. But if the master mind prefers to 
dominate others through political activity or the sword, he 
will not and he must not hesitate to make use of any means 
whatever that promise success. Treachery, breach of faith, 
cruelty, injustice and oppression, all these are perfectly 
proper means by which to gain and keep control over the 
herd. For the superior man, engaged in bringing his in- 
feriors under the whip of his will "everything is allowed". 

The French writer, Voltaire, declared that if there were 
no God it would be necessary to invent one. Nietzsche's 
God is the Superman. Somehow, in a way never cleared 
up, but apparently through the ruthless conflicts of the 
members of the master class with the herd and with each 



170 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

other, there is to evolve a new species. It will be few in 
number, beyond doubt, but extremely select. These exalted 
creatures are the Supermen. What they will be like we, 
with our purblind eyes, can not see. But they will be splen- 
did- in their beauty and strength of body, mind, and will, 
and consistently masterful and ruthless in their control of 
the herd, as becomes their high endowment. The Superman 
will be his own God, a God who will not hesitate to worship 
himself, and will compel the herd to worship him whether 
they will or not. The production of this new species is 
the one event of real significance in the history of the 
human race. 

These views on God and man and life are set forth with 
all necessary clearness and consistency in Nietzsche 's later 
works, written in the years 1885 to 1888. On the other hand 
his great prose-poem. Thus Spake Zarathustra (1882-4) 
breathes in many respects a different spirit. Its principal 
character, Zarathustra the sage (who of course represents 
Nietzsche himself), burns with genuine love for his imme- 
diate disciples, and with zeal for a better world than this 
sorry, disgusting fragment of chaos in which he finds him- 
self imprisoned. Zarathustra preaches hardness and the 
crushing of the sympathies, but this is only because in his 
eyes the path leading to perfection of character is steep 
and dizzy and strewn with thorns. He professes to deny 
all moral distinctions, but he lashes without mercy the sins 
of hypocrisy, cowardice, envy, and the greed that cries 
''Everything for me." The goal of life is sinking one's 
personal interests in the great work of hastening the com- 
ing of the Superman. These things represent real differ- 
ences in attitude between the teachings of the two periods 
in Nietzsche's life. In agreement with his later writings, 
however, are the denial of moral responsibility, the asser- 
tion of the necessity of a totally new and revolutionary 



SOME MORAL AND RELIGIOUS IDEAS OF GERMANY 171 

standard of right and wrong for the higher members of the 
race, the claim that the sole motive of human action is the 
will for power over others, the one-sided insistence upon 
strength of will as the one thing needful, the measureless 
contempt for the ''herd." The distinctly original ideas, 
as the necessity for a new moral standard and the coming 
of the superman, are so thin in content and so hazy in out- 
line that the reader is at liberty to interpret them as he 
wills. If he interprets them in the light of the systematic, 
clearly phrased and clean cut statements of the prose works 
of the following years he will see in Thus Spake Zara- 
thustra a work which, with all its contradictions, marks the 
writer as well on the road to his most dangerous and re- 
pulsive paradoxes. 

The popularity of Nietzsche's writings in Germany has 
for many years been very great. It is doubtful if any Eng- 
lish author has influenced in equal measure the beliefs of 
the English-speaking world. Kuno Francke, professor of 
German in Harvard University, wrote a number of years 
ago: ''In moral theory the average German of today is 
consciously or not a follower of Nietzsche. ' ' His teachings, 
as we can easily see, would appeal to two kinds of persons. 
The vague yearnings of Zarathustra for a better race and 
the call to work for its creation may well have given life a 
new meaning to more than one generous and high-minded 
soul. On the other hand, the doctrine of one standard for 
the "master" class and another for the "herd", with its 
demand for the ruthless trampling under foot of the weak 
by the strong — this doctrine would obviously play into the 
hands of the governing classes, each member of which can 
think of himself as by right a "master", and as such re- 
lieved of all moral obligations to the "herd" beneath him. 
Nietzsche has unquestionably appealed to both types of 
mind. In so far as he has awakened or strengthened in 



172 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

the latter the lust for power and has destroyed or helped to 
destroy the inhibitions which in the normal man confine 
this impulse within its proper limits, he can not escape the 
responsibility for a share in that brutalizing of charactei- 
which, since the beginning of this century, has undoubtedly 
been taking place in certain classes of the German people. 



HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 

The second prophet of modern Germany has a very dif- 
ferent message. Nietzsche is interested only in the indi- 
vidual, the exceptionally gifted individual, of course. On 
the other hand Treitschke, his rival for favor in modern 
Germany, cares chiefly and supremely for the state. The 
individual, however gifted, is not free to choose his own 
path regardless of any consideration except his own per- 
sonal aims. On the contrary his highest obligation is to 
serve the state. 

The duty of the individual to subordinate his will to that 
of his country is no new doctrine. But the form which it 
takes in the writings of Treitschke will appear novel to most 
American readers. He accepts, apparently quite unques- 
tioningly, a certain view of the state made in Germany in 
the early part of the nineteenth century. According to 
this somewhat astonishing doctrine, the state is not a mere 
name for all the persons living within certain boundaries 
and organized to secure certain common ends by common 
action. No, this view is entirely too flat and commonplace. 
The state is, in reality, a Person, a single being in the 
literal sense in which you and I are single beings. As the 
individual mind is a network of sensations, thoughts, feel- 
ings, and desires, so the state is a being composed of you 
and me and all our fellow-citizens, all rolled into one. This 
Person is ineffably higher than any of the units which make 



SOME MORAL AND RELIGIOUS IDEAS OF GERMANY 173 

it up. In comparison with its interests the interests of the 
individual are negligible. 

How this doctrine, so different in its foundations from 
Nietzsche's, may, in its turn, be made to play into the 
hands of aristocracy, is easy to imagine. In Germany the 
aristocracy is the mind and will of the state. And accord- 
ing to Treitschke it must alwaj^s remain this. For democ- 
racy as a form of government he has nothing but supreme 
contempt. Treitschke 's doctrine of the state, then, says (in 
effect) to the masses : Your personal interests count for 
nothing where they come into competition with those of the 
state ; the only thing that counts under such circumstances 
is the state, and the aristocracy exists to determine what 
the state shall do. At bottom, therefore, you have but one 
political duty, to obey, and to obey in silence. 

If this were all there is to Treitschke 's theory of the 
state it might perhaps pass as a mere curiosity. For a 
curiosity it is, born, like Nietzsche's doctrine of the Super- 
man, of man 's determination to have one kind of God if he 
can not have another. But Treitschke 's doctrines have an- 
other aspect which concerns us vitally. 

What is the relation of one of these gigantic Persons to 
another ? Have they any moral obligations to each other ? 
Treitschke answers distinctly in the negative. * The essence 
of the state, he says, is power; and everthing is allowed 
the state which is necessary for the maintenance and in- 
crease of its power. At bottom, then, states have no more 
obligations to each other than do wild beasts. They will 
indeed often find their interests in keeping their treaties, 
and may even spare the enemy's country in order to turn 
him into an ally, as Bismarck did with Austria. But 
whether to do this or not is a pure matter of policy — the 
only question is, Will it pay? ''If a state," says 
Treitschke, "is not in a position to maintain its neutrality 



174 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

[by force of arms, of course] , it is empty words to talk of 
its neutrality. " In a similar spirit lie laughs with scorn at 
the simplicity of Frederick William IV of Prussia, who 
marched into Saxony and Bavaria to help his fellow kings 
crush the Revolution of 1848, and then, when he had these 
states at his mercy, quietly marched out again without 
seizing possession of them. The Saxons and Bavarians, he 
thinks, must have put their fingers to their noses as this 
army marched ingloriously out across their boundary lines. 

A higher form of human existence than the state, is, ac- 
cording to Treitschke, unthinkable. A "League of Na- 
tions" is nonsense. There will be separate states till the 
end of time ; and since their interests will clash and there 
never can be a supreme judge to compose or stop their 
quarrels, there will always be war. All talk about a war 
to end war is mere moonshine. More than that, it is im- 
moral. War is not a horrible necessity which fate will not 
let us evade. War is a glorious thing, arousing all that is 
best in man, strength, self-sacrifice, patriotism. "Any one 
with a knowledge of history realizes that to expel war from 
the world would be to mutilate human nature." The in- 
timation is perfectly clear that in the future, as in the past, 
Prussia will see to it that human nature is not "mutilated". 

There is nothing particularly original in Treitschke 's doc- 
trine of the relation of states to each other. Savages usually 
act upon it without a scruple. There are men in every 
country still professing it today. But a Christian civiliza- 
tion was gradually outgrowing it, in Germany as well as 
elsewhere. Treitschke has the unfortunate distinction of 
having done more than any other man to make it prevail in 
his native land. For twenty years or more he defended it, 
along with all the other features of his theory of the state, 
with great eloquence, in crowded classrooms, at the Univer- 
sity of Berlin, becoming the favorite of the aristocratic 



SOME MORAL AND RELIGIOUS IDEAS OF GERMANY 175 

world as were none of his colleagues. The writer was a 
student at the University of Berlin during this period and 
can vouch from his own observation for the extent and 
depth of Treitschke's influence upon the student body, that 
student body whose members are now taking a large part in 
ruling Germany. 

Nietzsche and Treitschke differ widely, as we see, in many 
of their views. The former preaches, at least in his later 
works, the ruthless pursuit of power unchecked by any con- 
sideration for the interests of others. Treitschke teaches, 
on the other hand, that the individual 's highest obligation is 
to submit his own will to the will of the state. But as far 
as the relation of state to state is concerned the followers of 
both men come out at exactly the same place. If, as 
Nietzsche claims, life is a struggle for power, to be pursued, 
where necessary, without any reference to considerations of 
morality, then of course that group of individuals called a 
state may use any means whatever to increase its power over 
other peoples. "Any society," he writes, ''that instinct- 
ively rejects war and conquest is on the decline and ready 
for democracy and a government by shopkeepers." And 
again: ''The state (is) organized immorality; 
externally, as the will for power, for war, for conquest, for 
revenge." On either theory, then, in the relations between 
states, might makes right. 

THE EVOLUTIONISTS 

There are, of course, many thoughtful men in Ger- 
many who have escaped the nets spread by the views we 
have been describing. Some of these have had this good 
fortune, only to be caught in the meshes of another fashion- 
able theory, at bottom identical with the others in certain 
of its ultimate consequences. Life, in this view, is a con- 



176 UNIVERSITY .OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

tinuous struggle for existence in which only the fittest can 
survive. The upward march of animal life from the lowest 
forms to man has taken place in accordance with this prin- 
ciple. And since the evolution of man is ruled by this 
same principle human progress has depended and always 
will depend upon conflict and victory. Since the Ger- 
mans of today believe themselves by all odds the fittest, 
they conceive they have a mandate from nature to go 
forth and crush any nation that may possess anything 
they can use and that refuses to give it up. These ideas 
permeate General von Bernhardi's notorious book, Ger- 
many and the Next War, as well as many other writ- 
ings less widely known but equally vicious. They pervade 
the higher army circles in Germany, as is testified in the 
Atlantic Monthly for August, 1917, by the eminent zo- 
ologist Professor Vernon Kellogg, Mr. Hoover's second in 
command in Northern France. Imbued with these com- 
forting and stimulating doctrines the leaders of the German 
army have directed, often, apparently, with a perfectly 
good conscience, the ravaging of Belgium, Northern France, 
and Poland, and are preparing these unhappy countries 
for the uses of Germany ; in a similar spirit the Austrians 
are following their example with zeal and genuine Prussian 
efficiency in Servia; while the Turk has been allowed — if 
'* allowed" is not too weak a term — to go and do likewise 
in Armenia. In cleaning out the inhabitants of these coun- 
tries whether by fire and sword, by famine and disease, or 
by deportations, and preparing to move in themselves- they 
are (in their own opinion) simply repeating for the thou- 
sandth time the beneficent process whereby superior strains - 
supplant the inferior, to their own great profit and the 
glory of the human race. 



2 See Wolcott, The Prussian System. Loyalty Leaflet 202, published 
by the Committee on Public Information, Washington. 



SOME MORAL AND RELIGIOUS IDEAS OF GERMANY 177 

I do not propose to criticize this view at any length. 
However plausible it may appear at first glance its founda- 
tions were thoroughly undermined in The Descent of Man, 
by Charles Darwin, a gentleman who is quite properly sup- 
posed to have known something about the theory of evolu- 
tion, and who turned his powerful mind to the careful con- 
sideration of this problem. It has no standing among men 
of science in the English speaking world. The twist which 
the Germans are giving the theory of natural selection ig- 
nores the fact that (in the words of Professor Huxley) 
''the man best fitted to survive a prize-fight is a prize- 
fighter". A nation that specializes in war, like the ancient 
Spartans or the modern Prussians, is likely to be more 
successful at the job than its neighbors whose interests run 
in other directions than the art of wholesale murder. But 
it need not be higher on the whole ; and may indeed be, as 
was Sparta, distinctly inferior in every other respect to 
those it conquers. It has moreover happened time and 
again (unfortunately) that civilizations that were higher, 
judged by any standard you like, have been overwhelmed 
and destroyed by mere numbers. In short the conditions 
of victory in war and the conditions of fitness for a satis- 
factory life in a civilized world are both extremely com- 
plex; and the two are identical only in part, and tend to 
grow farther away from each other with every genuine ad- 
vance in civilization. 

Whatever may be the facts about the laws of progress, 
however, it remains true that the Germans have become 
infatuated with their theories on the subject and are at- 
tempting to put them into practice ''for the p^reater good 
of humanity". If so, we have no alternative but to accept 
their challenge and show them that judged by their own 
standard, we, not they, are the better men. 

The will for power, — this, under a variety of forms, is 



178 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

the God of modern Germany. There can be no trust be- 
tween nations and no permanent peace on earth till the 
people of Germany learn — and probably they will learn it 
only through disaster and defeat — that the God of their 
new prophets is nothing but a hideous idol. 



SOME MORAL AND RELIGIOUS IDEAS OF GERMANY 179 



Bibliography 

Nietzsche. Authorized translation of his Works into Eng- 
lish by Dr. Oscar Levy. The most important are the 
following: TJius Spake Zarathustra; Beyond Good 
and Evil; TJie Genealogy of Morals; The Antichrist; 
The Will to Power. 

Stewart, H. L. Nietzsche and the Ideals of Modern Ger- 
many. London. 1915. 

Davis, H. W. C. The Political Thought of Heinrich von 
Treitschke. London. 1914, An excellent presenta- 
tion within moderate limits ; largely a translation into 
English of Treitschke 's own words. 

Dewey, John. German Philosophy and Politics. New 
York. Holt. 1915. This book deals largely with the 
general point of view represented by Treitschke. 

Kellogg, Vernon. Headquarters Nights, in Atlantic 
Monthly, August, 1917. 



OUR RIGHT TO SHIP MUNITION^ 



By 

EDWARD B. VAN VLECK 

Professor of Mathematics 

History repeats itself. In each. s-Qcceeding war some 
one of the warring nations is sure to protest to some neu- 
tral country against shipment of arms to its enemy. The 
reason for the complaint is at bottom always the same : — 
the shipment helps the other fellow. 

In the present war the facts relating to the exportation 
of arms from the United States are too plain and well- 
known to need more than the briefest restatement. Great 
Britain needed munitions and she imported them from the 
United States. On the other hand, Germany received from 
us directly no compensating benefits in trade since she 
was either unable or not sufficiently venturesome to dispute 
England's control of the seas. Consequently our foreign 
trade became altogether one-sided and, like the war, un- 
precedented in magnitude. 

Protests began to shower upon us. On April 4, 1915, 
Ambassador von Bernstorff presented a rather weak official 
note on behalf of Germany. This was followed June 29th 
by a stronger remonstrance from her ally, Austria-Hun- 
gary. 

The discussion which arose abroad and at home may be 
centered in four great questions. Was the sale of muni- 
tions legal ? Was the sale neutral ? Was it moral ? Was 
it wise? 



OUR RIGHT TO SHIP MUNITIONS 181 



1 — WAS THE SALE OF MUNITIONS LEGAL? 

The right to buy arms is absolutely vital to the safety 
of a peace-loving people. The less a nation thinks and 
plans for war, the greater necessity it has to import arms 
in time of sudden trouble. The smaller its army and 
stores of munitions, the more dependent it becomes upon 
the available war supplies of neutral countries. For this 
reason shipment of arms to warring nations by the citizens 
of a neutral country has been universal usage and has be- 
come an accepted principle of international law. Even 
the handful of writers on international law who are op- 
posed to it admit that it is firmly buttressed by usage 
and convention. Numberless declarations and precedents 
cover the case. 

A recent re-affirmation is found in article 7 of the Sec- 
ond Hague Convention of nations in 1907, which states: 

A neutral power is not called upon to prevent the export or 
transport, in behalf of one or other of the belligerents, of arms, 
munitions of war, or, in general, of anything which can be of use 
to an army or fleet. 

This article involved nothing in any way new, being 
merely a statement of accepted international law. As 
such, it was ratified later not only by the United States 
but by Germany, Austria and 22 other countries. Even 
Austria in her note of June, 1915, had to acknowledge that 
this article ''affords a formal pretext for the toleration of 
the traffic in munitions of war as carried on at present by 
the United States." 

The United States has both practised and preached this 
doctrine, beginning with Jefferson in 1793. It ''has al- 
ways depended upon the right and power to purchase arms 



182 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

and anununition from neutral countries in case of foreign 
attack". As our Secretary of State, Lansing, said in reply 
to the Austrian note of protest: "This right which it 
claims for itself, it can not deny, to others." 

Tn a frantic effort to find precedent for our placing an 
embargo on arms von Bernstorff in his April note cited the 
fact that the United States had recently forbidden its citi- 
zens to export arms into Mexico. The conditions in Mexico 
were, however, exceptional. Neither the followers of Car- 
ranza nor of Huerta could be treated as a nation or even 
recognized as belligerents. Mexico was plunged in civil 
strife and bathed in murder and brigandage. Our prob- 
lem was that of policing and protecting our frontier from 
troops of bandits. Even then the embargo on the exporta- 
tion of arms into Mexico was imposed only after special 
authorization by Congress. As soon as a legal state of 
war in Mexico was recognized, the embargo was removed, 
and upon its removal our President called attention to 
Mexico's emergence from a state of anarchy to a condition 
governed by the ''accepted practice of neutrality". 

Up to the time of Germany's protest against our sale of 
munitions her legal position had been identical with our 
own. Dernburg, while on a special mission of propaganda 
in our country, spoke with truth when he said : 

I want to state that Germany has at no time disputed the right 
to sell or ship arms. The statement that she has is absolutely 
false. (April 30, 1915.) 

Indeed, it was only on the preceding 15th of December that 
the German ambassador by order of his government pre- 
sented a copy of a memorandum, in which it was asserted 
that "no exception can be taken to letting war material 
go to Germany's enemies." In the opinion of the German 



OUR RIGHT TO SHIP MUNITIONS 183 

Imperial Government her enemies were authorized to 
''draw from the United States contraband of war, espe- 
cially arms, worth several billions of marks '\ 

Germany's practice also had been like ours. Her fac- 
tories sold enormous quantities of munitions in the Russo- 
Japanese and Balkan wars. German factories even sup- 
plied Turkey in its war against Italy, although Germany, 
Austria, and Italy were then bound in a triple alliance. 
In the Spanish- American war they shipped to our enemy, 
Spain, without protest from our national government. 

Our one-sided sale of arms to England in the present 
war is exactly matched by Germany's sale to England in 
the Boer war. The Boers were shut off from the seas even 
more completely than the Germans are to-day. Who ever 
discovered that the Germans on account of their one-sided 
sale of arms had the slightest hesitation in helping Eng- 
land win the war? Did their devout wish for the defeat of 
the British to whom they sold make their sale more neutral 
than ours? 

With this record behind her it is no wonder that Ger- 
many found it advisable to use Austria as a cats-paw in her 
second effort to secure an embargo on our sale of arms. 
Austria politely did not question ''the intention to main- 
tain the strictest neutrality" on our part but pointed out 
how circumstances had so developed as to defeat our in- 
tention. Since the Central Powers were shut off from the 
seas and we could sell only to the Allies she suggested 
that it might be advisable for us to equalize conditions by 
laying an embargo upon munitions. The effort was thus 
made to shift the issue from the question of legality to 
neutrality. 



184 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 



2 — WAS THE SALE OF MUNITIONS NEUTRAL? 

Much popular confusion exi«ts as to what neutrality is. 
Neutrality is an attitude taken by a government toward 
warring nations. It does not mean that the people living 
under the government should have no opinion and suspend 
judgment on the righteousness of a conflict. Before our 
entrance into the war neither the dyed-in-the-wool Pro- 
German nor the noisy rooter for the Allies violated his 
country's neutrality because he expressed convictions. 
Neutrality is not such pathetic silence regarding the issues 
of the war as we have seen in the senior senator of our state. 
Neutrality is correct procedure hy a government in accord- 
ance with recognized usage and principles of international 
law. 

This standardized idea of neutrality was now adroitly 
disputed. In order to get a ground for objecting to our 
use of our rights as a neutral the Central Powers were 
forced to take a novel position. It was claimed by von 
Bernstorff that neiv conditions created by the Avar gave ''the 
concept of neutrality" a "new purport". By this new 
purport neutrality was made to hinge, directly or indi- 
rectly, upon the extent to which a nation made use of its 
rights as a neutral. 

Von Bernstorff assailed the neutrality of our munitions 
trade because its rapid development, he asserted, made it an 
essentially new and therefore unneutral industry. Many 
pacifists in our country also argued that it is one thing 
to sell a small amount of ammunition, and another and un- 
neutral thing to sell it in great quantities. This claim is 
extraordinaiy. For clearl}^ the mere exercise of the right 
possessed by a neutral can not render it unneutral, nor 
even the repeated exercise of that right. The munition 



OUR RIGHT TO SHIP MUNITIONS 185 

question would never have become an important topic of 
international law, had the sale of only a thimbleful of 
munitions been at stake. It attained importance precisely 
because on it might hinge the fate of a nation. 

It has been little realized how small a part of our total 
increase in exports has been due to our sale of munitions. 
Tables comparing our exports in the nine months follow- 
ing the war with those in the nine months preceding show 
that the increase in the exportation of munitions, war 
supplies, and the materials entering into their construc- 
tion was less than $200,000,000. Though this is an im- 
mense sum, it is less than one-half the corresponding in- 
crease in exported foodstuffs, not to mention textiles, 
leather, etc. 

Great emphasis was laid by the Central Powers upon 
the one-sidedness of our munition trade. ''If it is the 
will of the American people," it was stated, ''that there 
shall be a true neutrality, the United States will find the 
means of preventing this one-sided supply of arms to the 
Allies." They will at least see that corresponding bene- 
fits are secured by the other side. The casuistry of this 
new conception of neutrality is astounding. It puts upon 
the neutral the juggler's task of teetering this way or that 
according to the outcome of the struggle for sea-control. 
The weight must be thrown upon the weaker side in oi'der 
to balance the game. This intervention for the express 
purpose of championing the loser is an obvious act of un- 
neutrality. Such neutrality would cease to be a clear-cut 
principle to guide action and would become a delicate ad- 
justment of the interests of both belligerents by an outsider. 
This would lead to no end of disputes and wrangling over 
the proper balance. 

Nobody can claim that we did not sell to Germany as 



186 UNiVERSiTY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

long as we could. Copper she exported in enormous and 
unprecedented quantities from the United States in the 
period just preceding the war, taking one quarter of our 
entire production and one-half of the amount exported. 
We now see why. About a year ago the submarine Deutsch- 
land made its famous trip to New London and sailed away 
from our harbor loaded with a cargo of nickel which Ger- 
many sorely lacked. 

But Germany had little need of war material. The coal 
fields of Belgium had been already grabbed. From Sweden 
she was constantly importing iron. Germany did not want 
ammunition : what she did want was to have food witJiheld 
from England. She therefore sought to manipulate the 
munition difficulty with the United States so as to stop our 
commerce with Great Britain. The kind of neutrality 
she wanted appeared in this naive suggestion of the Aus- 
trian note : 

If American industry is perfectly willing to supply Austria- 
Hungary and Germany as well as Great Britain and her allies, 
. . . it would be entirely sufficient to confront the opponents 
of Austria-Hungary and Germany with the possibility of the pro- 
hibition of the exportation of foodstuffs. (June, 1915.) 

The suggestion is astonishing. The position of the 
United States regarding the sale of munitions had been 
officially announced as early as August and October, 1914. 
Not only was that position strictly in accordance with in- 
ternational law, but the proposed alteration to effect Ger- 
many's aim would have been a distinct breach of neutral- 
ity. This was argued with unanswerable force in Lan- 
sing's reply to Austria. He could not agree to ''modify 
the rules of international law on account of special condi- 
tions". He pointed out the amazing character of the 



OUR RIGHT TO SHIP MUNITIONS 187 

Austrian claim that ''advantages gained to a belligerent 
by its superiority on the sea should be equalized by a 
. . . system of non-intercourse with the victor." In 
fact, Germany, having entered the war under well-known 
rules, made at the start what the world regarded as a foul 
slug at Belgium, with no umpire to call her down, and 
then wanted the rules changed during the course of the 
game. With cheek characteristic of recent German di- 
plomacy she asked it in the iiaiiie of neutrality ! 

3 — WAS THE SAL.E OF MUNITIONS MORAL? 

An extreme position is taken by some pacifists who 
are opposed to war in any form. They abhor the munition 
trade. In their minds it is classed with the sale of liquor 
to drunkards. They push the doctrine of non-resistance 
to the limit, making it the cure-all for every evil. In a 
world of lambs and wolves they would stand by and see 
the wolves eat the lambs rather than interfere. The Amer- 
ican or French revolution could never have taken place 
among a people animated by such pacifism, and slavery, 
once established, would have become eternal. A pacific 
Christendom would never have resisted the inquisition. 
Nay rather, Christendom itself would have perished while 
the Turk established his harem over Europe. 

This pacifism answers itself. For who could sit still 
and see his wife and children deported when resistance 
might avail ? We scorn to answer a man who can never be 
stirred by moral indignation to forcible action — who prays 
and never gets off his knees. 

A second and less extreme class of objectors to our sale 
of munitions admit the occasional righteousness of war 
for the purpose of repelling aggression and preventing 
the advance of a perverse civilization. But they find it 



188 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

''hardly consistent that we should pray for peace and at 
the same time supply ammunition to continue the war". 
They argue that ' ' every rifle we ship may cause the death 
of a German soldier ' ' and ignore the fact that ' ' every rifle 
withheld from shipment may just as truly cause the death 
of a British soldier". 

Upon examination this objection to the sale of death- 
bringing weapons loses its apparent simplicity. Where 
shall one draw the moral line between the sale of ready- 
made firearms and the exportation of copper, nickel, cot- 
ton, and other materials wherewith to make them? In 
modern warfare petroleum, clothing, food, are all ammuni- 
tion, and a loan of money may be more helpful than all 
possible importations of arms. In short, modern scientific 
warfare is a coordination of so many different fields of in- 
dustry that it is impossible to define the term ''war 
supplies". 

A third class of objectors have seen nothing in our war 
trade but the sad and immoral spectacle of a set of greedy 
gluttons gorging themselves upon the profits of the muni- 
tion trade. Agitators like La FoUette, and men blind to 
all war except industrial fights, have spoken heatedly of a 
capitalist war into which we were being drawn. It is 
probable that at bottom most of these men were pro-Ger- 
man. They were altogether silent regarding the deeper 
moral issues of the war and its brutal conduct under Ger- 
man military autocracy. We now know that the embargo 
agitation was in large degree engineered and subsidized by 
German^ propaganda. Dumba, the ambassador who de- 
livered the Austrian note, had to be recalled on account of 
his connection with plots for the instigation of strikes in 
munition plants. Neither factories nor workmen have been 
safe from torch and explosives. 



OUR RIGHT TO SHIP MUNITIONS 189 

If the war is to be considered solely from a selfish indus- 
trial standpoint, it must be remembered that the money 
bags of employer and workingman are in the same boat, 
even though they quarrel over the steering. The war crip- 
pled or closed many of our factories, but fortunately for 
the laboring classes this was offset in large degree by the 
transfer of workmen to the manufacture of war supplies. 
Prohibition of such manufacture Avould have created an 
economic disturbance of enormous magnitude and brought 
distressing disaster to the laboring man. It is not without 
economic reason that the sanctions of international law have 
been framed for the protection of neutral nations in their 
commerce. 

But the moral challenge of our legal and neutral posi- 
tion can not stop here. The whole moral horizon must be 
scanned. Reluctant as many are to own it, we yet must 
admit that the American people have been shocked to the 
core at the conduct of the Avar by the Potsdam gang ; by 
their shameless intrigues in our own country, by their 
systematic and merciless raids on British cities, by their 
sinking of Norwegian and other neutral ships "spurlos'\ 
by their enormous levies on helpless Belgian cities, by their 
deportation and enslavement of Belgian and French wo- 
men, by the unrepressed butchery of the Armenian people. 
Slowly and surely we have been forced to see an irresistible 
conflict between German Kultur and a true democracy 
whose fruits are liberty, mercy, and human brotherhood. 
Confronted by such issues, we would have been cowardly 
and deaf to the cries of humanity if we had forbidden the 
sale of arms to the Allies. 



190 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 



4 — WAS THE SALE OF MUNITIONS WISE? 

Finally, beyond controversy, the sale of munitions was 
wise. The whole world was afire. There was grave dan- 
ger that at any moment some unforeseen circumstance — if 
not the sinking of the Lusitania, then some other lawless or 
brutal event — would drag us into the caldron. Our army 
was puny, our congress inactive, our peace-loving president 
opposed to preparedness. We already had a very delicate 
situation on our Mexican border. The increase of our mu- 
nition factories was our only preparation for black emer- 
gencies. To have suppressed them would have been suicidal. 

In dealing with the munition problem instinct and past 
policy have not failed us. For a peaceful nation the main- 
tenance and reliability of international law are absolutely 
indispensable. It codifies the moral progress of nations 
in their relations with one another. As already stated, 
the right to trade in munitions is a principle guaranteed 
by international law for the protection of weaker or un- 
armed nations. To seek to maintain it was the only pos- 
sible wisdom for us. 

For no form of government is the ability to obtain arms 
from abroad more important than for a democracy. By 
its very nature an autocracy is a centralized force. It can 
both plan and execute a consistent, undeviating policy 
throughout its career. A democracy, on the other hand, 
is a medley of cross currents. It relies upon the conflict 
of interests to reach a social and political equilibrium. 
Because of this complexity of interests it is at a disadvan- 
tage in time of external stress, and the ability then to im- 
port arms may be for it a matter of life or death. 

If the right to trade in arms with neutrals is abandoned, 
each nation must depend upon its own internal resources 



OUR RIGHT TO SHIP MUNITIONS 191 

and hoard of arms. Victory will go to that side which 
makes concealed preparations and springs unexpectedly 
at the throat of its foe. The small nation, no matter how 
civilized, will lie helpless before a big one, and all nations 
will be forced to keep armed to the teeth. Military service 
will become universal and the organization of the world 
will be based upon might. 

Such militarism is an abomination to our people. It 
is a recession from principles of mercy and forbearance, 
and reverts to the law of the jungle. In the New World 
we have lived in peace for a century with no military line 
between us and Canada. In the Old World European 
politics have bordered each country with a military fence. 
Driven reluctantly to take part, we find ourselves fighting 
for that for which we have always stood, the right of free 
peoples to live for themselves and in security. Shall we 
allow the military lines of Germany to reach our shores? 



192 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

Bibliography 

The most complete discussion of the munition question 
is found in the American Journal of InternatioTml Law. 
See 

Vol. 9. Editorial Comments: 687-694 and 927-935. 
Vol. 9. Supplementary Documents. 

Circular of the Department of State with ref- 
erence to neutrality and the trade in con- 
traband: Part II, 124-126. 
Vol. 10. Morey, W. C. TJie Sale of Munitions. 467-491. 
Gregory, C. N. Neutrality and tJie Sale of 

Arms. 543-555. 
Garner, J. W. TJie Sale and Exportation of 
Arms and Munitions to Belligerents. 749- 
797. 
Additional references are: 

Rogers, L. American Congress and the Ex- 
portation of War Munitions in Contem- 
porary Review. Vol. 108, p. 718. 
Lovejoy, A. 0. As to an Embargo on Arms (a 
reply to Fran eke) , in Neiv Republic. Vol. 4, 
156-157. 
Rogers, L. America's Case against Germany, 

Chap. 6. 
Scott, J. B. A Survey of International Rela- 
tions between tJie United States and Gev- 
maniy. Chap. 7. 

Dates of publication of diplomatic correspondence: 

1915. Jan. 24. Bryan's reply to Stone's letter of in- 
quiry regarding neutrality. 
April 11. Bernstorff 's note. 
April 22. Bryan's reply. 
Aug. 12. The Austrian note of -protest. 
Aug. 15. Lansing's reply. 



GERMANY'S WAR ON US IN TIME OF PEACE 

By 

WILLIAM A. SCOTT 

Director- of the Course in Commerce 

Within the short period of three years, Germany trans- 
formed the United States from a friend and genuine ad- 
mirer into an enemy at war. As evidence of our former 
friendship and admiration "may be cited our high apprecia- 
tion of her governmental, industrial and commercial effici- 
ency, her attainments in science and art, and her educa- 
tional institutions; the large number of our students who 
attended her institutions of learning; the important place 
we gave in our schools to the teaching of the German ' 
language; our cordial and enthusiastic reception of her 
educational leaders in our colleges and universities; the 
sending of commissions and individual investigators to 
study her institutions and methods and report the results 
as a basis for domestic reforms ; and our readiness to wel- 
come and even to promote organizations which purported 
to have for their object the spread of German ideas, ideals 
and friendship. 

Our transformation into an enemy at war was the result, 
among other things, of a gradual revelation of the facts, 
which we were very slow to comprehend, that Germany had 
not only not reciprocated, but had abused, our friendship, 
that she had always been hostile to our national ideas and 
policies, that for years she had been secretly plotting 
against us and attempting to thwart our purposes, and 
finally that she was actually committing almost daily acts 
of war against us. 

13— W. B, 



194 • UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

GERMANY THE FOE OF DEMOCRACY 

The attitude of the ruling classes of Germany towards 
democracy appeared clearly in 1848 in their rejection of 
the constitution based on democratic principles, which was 
prepared and urged by a representative congress. This 
rejection started the stream of emigration to the United 
States which brought us Carl Schurz, General Siegel, and 
the very best of our German-American citizens. It showed 
itself unmistakably again in the statement of Bismarck — 
when he assumed leadership in Prussia — that thereafter 
great questions would be settled in Germany by blood and 
iron instead of by talk and discussion in congresses and 
about council tables. It was embodied in the constitution 
of the German Empire in 1870 which made autocratic and 
aristocratic Prussia the dominating and controlling state 
and the organs of government responsible to the Emperor 
instead of the Eeichstag. The clearest possible revelation 
of it has been made in Germany's treatment of us, the 
leading exponent of democracy in the modern world. 

TWENTY YEARS OF mTRIGUE 

In order to show how consistently and persistently hostile 
that treatment has been it is necessary only to review some 
of the leading events of our recent history. Germany ';» 
attitude towards our Monroe doctrine was correctly ex- 
pressed by Bismarck when he pronounced it ' ' an incredible 
impertinence"; and it showed itself in action in 1902 when 
she induced England and Italy to join her in intervention 
in Venezuela. 

During our war with Spain the hostility of the German 
people was expressed in their press and in their conversa- 
tion with and attitude towards Americans. Speaking of 
this, our Ambassador, Andrew D. White, said, in his auto- 
biography": ''Men who stood high in the Universities, men 



GERMANY'S WAR ON US IN TIME OF PEACE 195 

of the greatest amiability, who in former days had 
been the warmest friends of America, had now become our 
bitter opponents, and some of their expressions seemed 
to point to eventual war." The Kaiser was reported to 
have said to an Englishman regarding this war: ''If I 
had had a larger fleet I would have taken Uncle Sam by 
the scruff of the neck." 

After the destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay 
and the establishment of a blockade of the port by Admiral 
Dewey, a German fleet commanded by Admiral von Died- 
richs, in size greatly in excess of that of other nations whose 
commercial interests in Manila were much greater than 
those of Germany, appeared and conducted itself in such 
a manner as to create the conviction that its intentions 
were hostile. It did not observe the usual naval courtesies 
due to the commander of a blockading squadron, in vio- 
lation of international law and the usages of war it took pos- 
session of a portion of an island commanding the harbor, 
and it interfered with the insurgents in their operations 
against the Spaniards. The German foreign office, while 
formally maintaining an attitude of neutrality, secretly 
attempted to form a European combination against us. 

Repeatedly and persistently Germany has attempted to 
embroil us with England. The Venezuela intervention al- 
ready mentioned is a case in point. During the Boer war 
she endeavored to induce us to intervene against England, 
using for that purpose an organization formed in Phila- 
delphia entitled the German-American League of the 
United States. In 1913 General von Bernhardi Avas sent 
on a mission to this country for the purpose, among other 
things, of inciting German Americans against England and 
of preparing them for assistance in the war with her which 
he predicted. When the war broke out, through her diplo- 
matic and consular agents in this country, she organized 



196 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

and subsidized plots on our soil to incite revolutions in 
India and Ireland. 

Germany has also tried to stir up bad blood between us 
and Canada. Before the present war she persisted in cir- 
culating in Canada the false insinuation that we had de- 
signs upon Canadian independence and wished to incorpor- 
ate her into the United States. Evidence has appeared 
which implicates the German diplomatic agents of this 
country in attempts to induce the Province of Quebec to 
make itself independent of the rest of Canada. Since the 
war began, in violation of our neutrality and our laws, she 
has fought Canada from our soil. Among other things, she 
has sent people from here to blow up the international 
bridge at Vanceboro, Me., a factory at Walkerville, Can- 
ada, an armory at Windsor, and has plotted for the de- 
struction of the Welland Canal. 

That she has been actively hostile to us throughout our 
difficulties with Mexico cannot now be questioned. It is 
now known that she spent a large sum of money in assist- 
ing Huerta to stir up a revolution in Mexico, that she 
placed a warship at his disposal, that she supplied him with 
arms. Her crowning act of hostility in this territory, how- 
ever, was the plan revealed in the famous Zimmermann 
letter of January, 1917. In this communication, as will be 
remembered, she offered Mexico a liberal slice of our ter- 
ritory if in alliance with Japan she would attack us. 

SOWING THE SEEDS OF DOMESTIC DISSENSION 

If acts of hostility may be classified as of greater or less 
degrees of malignity, we would place above those already 
enumerated another group in which Germany has at- 
tempted to stir up dissension in the United States itself and 
to thwart the accomplishment of our domestic purposes. 
Recent revelations have made it quite clear that for years 



GERMANY'S WAR ON US IN TIME OF PEACE 197 

certain organizations of German- American citizens and 
of German citizens living in this country, though ostensibly 
formed for innocent and even laudable purposes, were per- 
haps designed, and certainly used by Germany to work 
her own purposes in this country. Her plan, apparently, 
has been to prevent the real assimilation of citizens of Ger- 
man extraction and to form them into a compact group to 
be used for her own schemes, even though these should run 
counter to the-plans, the policies, and the interests of this 
country. She has done this in an underhanded, insidious 
manner, under cover of the pretense of cultivating our 
friendship and of strengthening the bonds that tie us to- 
gether. 

Germany has not only attempted to sow the seeds of dis- 
sension between our German-American and other citizens, 
but she has endeavored to widen the gap between our labor- 
ing and capitalist classes and thus to aggravate the most 
difficult and dangerous of our social problems. This she did 
by attempting to foment strikes in munitions factories. To 
this end she financed an organization known as Labor's 
National Peace Council, one of the primary purposes of 
which was to bring about such strikes through every pos- 
sible means, including the corruption of legislators and 
labor leaders. 

A CAMPAIGN OF CORRUPTION 

The official representatives of the German Empire in 
this country have attempted to influence legislation in Con- 
gress and have violated our laws after they were passed. 
Noteworthy examples of these classes of activities are Am- 
bassador von Bernstorff's attempts to induce Congress to 
pass a law to put an embargo upon the exportation of mu- 
nitions to the Allies, and the evasion of our customs regu- 



198 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

lations and the violation of onr laws by Captain Boy-ed, 
the naval attache of the German Embassy at Washington, 
Dr. Buenz, Ex-German Minister to Mexico, Consul- General 
Bopp of San Francisco, prominent officials of the Ham- 
burg-American and the North German Lloyd Steamship 
lines and many others, in the sending of coal and food sup- 
plies from our ports to German raiders at sea. German 
agents have forged American passports on a wholesale 
scale and have violated our internment regulations and 
those pertaining to the return of German reservists. 

The corruption of our people and of our press has also 
been attempted on a large scale. Newspapers have been 
established, old ones subsidized, and lecturers hired, to 
give the American people the kind of impressions the Ger- 
man government Avanted them to have, and to prevent their 
getting any other kind. Checks, letters, and telegrams are 
in possession of the Government incriminating Ambassador 
von Bernstorff and other German officials in this work of 
corruption. Among these especially noteworthy is von 
Bernstorff 's telegram to his government asking for author- 
ity to expend $50,000 ''in order, as on former occasions, 
to influence Congress through the organization you know 
of." 

THE RESORT TO VIOLENCE 

From attempts to get us into trouble with our neighbors 
and friends, to form alliances against us, and to create dis- 
sension and rebellion and false impressions among our 
people, to acts of violence was a short step which Germany 
did not hesitate to take when in her judgment the oppor- 
tune moment came. 

When it became evident that through an embargo act in 
Congress and the fomentation of strikes in factories she 
was not going to succeed in preventing our manufacture of 



GERMANY'S WAR ON US IN TIME OP PEACE 



199 



munitions and their shipment to the Allies, she resorted to 
bombs and submarines. The depths of viUany to which she 
sank have been revealed in the conspiracy case against Fay, 
Scholz and Daechi, tools of hers in the bomb plots, and m 
the so-called von Igcl papers seized by secret service men 
in New York in April, 1916. It was nothing less than the 
manufacture of bombs disguised in various ways and their 
placement in coal bunkers and holds, and on the rudder 
posts of merchant ships clearing from our ports. 

The submarine outrages are so well known that a detailed 
account of them is unnecessary. Suffice it to say in bold out- 
line that they consisted in sinking without warning and 
without any effort to save the lives of either enemies or 
neutrals the ships of any and all nations, our own included. 
By means of these outrages millions of dollars of our pro- 
perty were destroyed and over two hundred of our citizens 
were foully murdered in cold blood. 

If anytliing further were needed to reveal to the gov- 
ernment and people of the United States the true character 
of the German government and the menace to which its 
victory in this war would expose us, it was supplied by 
the defense made of these outrageous acts and by the policy 
of deception and falsehood persistently followed in deal- 
ings with us. , 
Of most of the hostile acts which have been enumerated 
no defense was possible or was attempted. They were done 
secretly and underhandedly in the hope and expectation 
that the responsibility of the German government for them 
would never be disclosed. For the submarine outrages, 
however, its responsibility could not be concealed and the 
defense of necessity was set up-a defense which sets aside 
international law and justifies the commission of any act 
against the peace and prosperity of a neutral nation pro- 
vided a hard pressed belligerent believes it to promise a 



200 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

military advantage. Sucli a defense, if we assume that it 
was presented in good faith, reveals the mediaeval state of 
mind and morals which makes a powerful nation like Ger- 
many a menace to modern civilization. 

HIDING BEHIND UES 

Throughout our negotiations with the German govern- 
ment concerning the submarine campaign and many other 
matters, she has practiced deception to such an extent as 
to create the conviction that no reliance whatever can be 
placed upon her promises or agreements. In a memorial 
accompanying a proclamation of February 4, 1915, it de- 
clared that ' ' the German Navy has received instructions to 
abstain from all violence against neutral vessels recogniz- 
able as such ' ' and that ' ' it is very far indeed from the in- 
tention of the German government ever to destroy neutral 
lives and neutral property." In spite of these statements 
the torpedoing of neutral as well as enemy ships carrying 
American citizens and those of other neutral countries was 
begun almost immediately and hundreds of lives were lost, 
including many Americans. The Lusitania tragedy in 
which 114 American lives were sacrificed occurred on May 
7, only three months after this declaration. 

On July 8, 1915, in a note to Ambassador Gerard arguing 
in defense of the sinking of the Lusitania, the German gov- 
ernment again assured the United States that American 
ships would not be hindered in the prosecution of legiti- 
mate shipping and that the lives of American citizens on 
neutral vessels would not be placed in jeopardy. Never- 
theless between the date of that promise and September 4, 
1915, six steamships carrying American citizens were at- 
tacked and twenty-three American lives taken. 

Subsequently, a promise was made to the effect that 
liners would not be sunk by submarines without warning 



GERMANY'S WAR ON US IN TIME OF PEACE 201 

and without safeguarding the lives of noncombatants, and 
our government was assured that the German government 
was quite in accord with it regarding the matter of security 
of crews and passengers of ships to be sunk. Nevertheless, 
no substantial change was made in the practices of the 
submarines, ships continuing to be sunk indiscriminately 
and the lives of passengers and crews ruthlessly and brut- 
ally sacrificed- Many other similar promises and agree- 
ments were made and broken, no one of them in fact having 
been kept in good faith. 

When confronted with these broken promises and vio- 
lated statements, quibbles and subterfuges were resorted to 
which strengthened the conviction of insincerity and un- 
reliability which the events themselves had created. Among 
these may be mentioned the claim made in defense of the 
sinking of the Lusitania that she was armed, a claim based 
upon a false affidavit which German agents bribed a man 
to make. In other cases she denied sinkings by submarines 
which were afterwards proved. In others trivial and al- 
most absurd excuses were offered. 



AMERICA'S RESPONSE 

The revelation of these acts of hostility and actual war- 
fare against us in times of peace, attested by documents 
now in the possession of the federal government, is grad- 
ually making clear to the American people the true mean- 
ing and significance of President Wilson's statement that 
our purpose in entering this war was to make the world 
safe for democracy. More specifically he might have said 
that we entered it to secure our own safety. The danger 
from Germany was not remote, problematical, merely 
threatened. It was at hand. She was actually making war 
upon us. 



:02 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 



SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE 

Germany's war on lis between the autumn of 1914 and 
April, 1917, is being described in a striking series of articles 
now in course of publication in the World's Work, entitled 
Fighting Germany's Spies. It began in March, 1918, and is 
written by French Strothers. 



GERMAN SUBMAEINES AND THE BRITISH 
BLOCKADE 

By 

CARL RUSSELL FISH 

Professor of History 

WHAT FREEDOM OF THE SEAS MEANS 

In a commercial nation, such as the United States, the 
wages of every laborer, the price of every bushel of wheat, 
everything that we mean by prosperity or depression, de- 
pends on the free use of the sea. ''Freedom of the seas," 
however, is no more a simple term than freedom on land. 
If one person or nation is allowed to interfere with others 
as he sees fit, freedom disappears. Freedom must consist 
of equality of rights protected by known and accepted law. 
Law, neither national nor international, has as yet secured 
perfect equality, but as long as it exists it may be im- 
proved. If it is abolished, Ave return to barbarism. The 
United States has always stood for the equality of all 
nations in the use of the seas, protected by international 
law. In 1812, we fought Great Britain because Ave be- 
lieved that she Avas restricting the just rights of neutrals. 
Before and after that date, aa^c fought the Barbary poAvers, 
to restrict their interference Avith the vessels of other na- 
tions. 

In time of war, there is ahvays a conflict of interest be- 
tAveen the Avarring nations, Avho Avish to exercise the fullest 
poAvers of interfering AAdth each other's trade, and the 



204 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

neutral nations, who wish to trade freely with both. A 
great portion of international law applies to this state of 
affairs. The United States has had experiences on both 
sides, and has contributed a great deal to the formation of 
this law. Some points are universally accepted, some dis- 
puted, some new and yet unsettled. This war will deter- 
mine whether the progress of the past is to be continued, or 
whether what the world has built up so far will be over- 
thrown. 

At present Great Britain and Germany are trying to 
starve each other. This is a perfectly legal war object. It 
is the siege method, which has been employed since civil- 
ized war began. The greatest previous instance was the 
siege of Paris, in 1870. No whole great nation has ever be- 
fore been besieged, because the mechanical means for doing 
it never before existed. When a nation is conducting a siege 
it has always been allowed to stop all trade of neutrals 
with the besieged area, on condition that it meets certain 
recognized legal requirements. The action of Great Britain 
and Germany, therefore, is to be judged by the means they 
employ to accomplish their purpose. The instrument of 
Great Britain is the blockade, of Germany, the submarine. 

BRITISH BLOCKADE METHODS 

Great Britain has laid out certain ''zones" on the sea, 
near to Germany, and blocking the entrance to German 
ports, from all seas, except from the Baltic, which her ves- 
sels cannot reach. Her warships meet all vessels passing 
through these "zones," and bring them into a nearby 
British port, where they can be examined or "searched" 
in safety. Vessels on the way to Germany are held, or 
rather Avould be if there Avere any, but none attempt the 
direct voyage. Vessels on the way to other countries are 



GERMAN SUBMARINES AND THE BRITISH BLOCKADE 205 

allowed to pass on, unless they contain goods of use to 
Germany. 

Goods of use to Germany are, in the first place, those 
which it is intended to ship overland from the ports of 
Holland and Denmark, and those to be shipped across the 
Baltic from Norway and Sweden. Secondly, are goods 
imported into Sweden, Norway, Holland, and Denmark, in- 
tended to take the place of their own goods sent to Ger- 
many. If, for instance, Holland sends all the lard she pro- 
duces to Germany, and then imports enough to supply her 
own needs from the United States, Great Britain holds that 
the extra lard, that is, the amount over and above her usual 
imports, is really for the use of Germany, and seizes it. In 
carrying out this policy, she has examined the mail bags, 
for at times large amounts of goods have been sent to Ger- 
many in the mail through Sweden. 

In carrying out these practices, no lives are imperilled. 
Vessels are somewhat delayed by being brought into port 
to be searched, but these delays have been much reduced. 
All doubtful cases are brought to speedy trial in regular 
courts. These courts apply the rules of international law, 
and Great Britain has offered to submit cases in which the 
decision is questioned to arbitration. Not only does the 
policy endanger no American lives, but it is probable that 
all losses of American merchants will be made good, ex- 
cept in cases where they tried to send to Germany articles 
universally recognized as contraband of war, which are 
always liable to the risk of legal capture, for Great Britain 
has not exercised her legal right to confiscate goods in- 
tended to pass the blockade, but has restored them, or 
paid for them. Her war policy has been simply to pre- 
vent their reaching Germany. 



206 UNIVERSITY OP WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

GERMAN SUBMARINE METHODS 

Germany has laid out certain ' ' zones ' ' blocking off Great 
Britain, France, and Italy, from access to all countries by 
sea. She has announced that all vessels belonging to any 
nation, bound for any port, found in these zones, would be 
liable to destruction by her submarines. 

It is sometimes said that her rules applied to armed 
vessels and vessels carrying munitions only. This was not 
the case with the orders which finally provoked the United 
States to war. The munition controversy and the armed 
ship controversy are not involved. As a matter of fact, 
from the beginning of the submarine controversy, she sank 
unarmed vessels, like the Lusitania, vessels without muni- 
tions, like the Sussex, and American vessels, like the Gul- 
fiiglit. 

In the earlier part of the war, it is true that submarines 
were not ordered to sink all vessels, and the attack on the 
GulftigJit was excused as an accident. It was, however, the 
kind of accident that was sure to happen. The submarine 
cannot tell the innocent from the guilty. It cannot and 
does not attempt to '^search"; it sinks. In case of an 
accident, moreover, the case cannot be examined by a court, 
for the evidence is destroyed with the vessel. In the case 
of the Lusitania, the United States was able, by good luck, 
to prove that she was not armed; but the German govern- 
ment circulated the lie that she was armed, trusting that 
all the evidence was sunk, with hundreds of women and 
children, in the Atlantic. The essence of law is that dis- 
puted facts shall be reviewed in court. The submarine, in 
destroying the evidence, is an outlaw. 

Perhaps the earliest rule of international law, relating 
to maritime warfare, is that a war vessel, if it finds it neces- 
sary to destroy a merchant vessel at sea, which under 



GERMAN SUBMARINES AND THE BRITISH BLOCKADE 207 

certain circumstances is allowed by international law, is 
bound to provide for the safety of passengers and crew. 
This the submarine cannot do. Its use for such purposes, 
therefore, means the violation of the fundamental prin- 
ciples of humanity itself, upon which international law is 
based. 

In practice the German submarines have gone still 
farther. In the case of the Faldbra, a submarine fired on 
the passengers and crew after they had taken to the ship 's 
boats, which offered them a precarious chance of safety. 
In the case of the Belgian Pnnce, the submarine crew de- 
stroyed the ship's boats, took the passengers on its deck, 
took away their life belts, and then submerged, leaving 
them to drown. Such cases, even if not part of the general 
policy, are a natural result of it, for the captain of the 
submarine is judge, jury, and executioner, and if his work 
is successful, there can be no judicial review of the case, 
for the evidence has perished. 

This is the policy directly advocated by Count Luxburg, 
the German minister to Argentina, in order to avoid diplo- 
matic controversies. His idea was that if the ship disap- 
peared ''without leaving a trace," it could be attributed to 
the accidents of the sea. The disappearance of 120 vessels 
since the present German policy began is an indication that 
Count Luxburg did not stand alone. 

THE ITNITED STATES AND THE BRITISH BLOCKADE 

The United States recognized the British blockade as a 
legal measure. In international law the legality of a 
blockade depends on three main points. First, proper 
notice and warning of it must be given ; and this was done. 
Secondly, the blockade must be ''effective," not merely an 
excuse for capturing now and then vessels sailing for a 



208 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

certain port. The British blockade is almost 100 per cent 
effective. Thirdly, it must be enforced by measures recog- 
nized as legal. For the most part the measures employed 
by the British are those we ourselves used in our blockade 
of the South during the Civil War. On certain points we 
protested, and they were taken up for discussion. 

The question of contraband does not really belong to this 
subject, for it disappeared when Great Britain declared a 
blockade. A blockade, if legal, applies to all goods whether 
contraband or not. Her right to stop goods going through 
other neutral countries may be a little stronger if they are 
contraband, but her main case rests upon blockade. 

One point we protested was the blockade of the Baltic, 
on the ground that a blockade must be equal as against 
all neutrals, and here American vessels were excluded, but 
not Scandinavian. Great Britain replied that this in- 
equality was not the result of unfair discrimination on her 
part, but because of the geographical situation. The law 
on this point has yet to be determined. 

We protested also the laying down of "zones" and tJie 
bringing of vessels into port for search. Great Britain re- 
plied that these were but slight modifications of recognized 
rules, caused by the change of conditions of modern war- 
fare, and that they really served to increase the safety of 
neutrals. On the whole her position seems reasonable. 

The mail controversy was more difficult. The sanctity of 
mail is a well-established principle, while there is no doubt 
that United States mail was being used for purposes uni- 
versally recognized as illegal. This created a difficult 
problem that had not been solved when we went to war 
with Germany and undertook the control of our own mail. 

The most important principles of British policy were the 
doctrine of "continuous voyage" and "enemy destina- 



GERMAN SUBMARINES AND THE BRITISH BLOCKADE 209 

tion." That is, that if goods be sent from Pittsburgh to 
Berlin, the whole voyage is one and continuous, and they 
can be seized at any point in it, not merely on the last lap ; 
and that goods being of enemy destination can be stopped 
even between two neutral ports. On these we were not 
in a position to protest seriously, for, with slight differ- 
ences, they were our doctrines in the Civil War and con- 
firmed by our Supreme Court. Even the British position 
that unusually large imports by a neutral were evidence 
that they were intended to be of use to the enemy found 
support in our diplomatic correspondence at that time. 

None of the controversies with Great Britain involve or 
involved loss of life. Whenever they involved property, 
they will, in all probability, be finally tried in the Hague 
Court, and the property delivered to whichever has the best 
case. The disputes have, for the most part, been on new 
points, upon which the law will not be certain until it is de- 
cided by that court. 

THE UNITED STATES AND THE GERMAN SUBMARINES 

The United States denied the legality of the German 
blockade because it had only one element of legality; it 
was formally announced. On the point of efficiency, it has 
seldom, in any week, reached 1 per cent. On the point of 
methods of enforcement, it has already been shown that 
it violates the very bases on which law rests. The final 
desperate offer of Germany to allow a fixed, small number 
of American vessels, marked in a conspicuous manner, to 
pass the zones, shows her utter failure to recognize the 
fundamentals of law, for it substituted absolutely the will 
of Germany, for freedom of trade under general rules, as 
the measure of our trade, and it threw the responsibility 
of maintaining her blockade upon the neutral instead of 
herself. Had we accepted, American industry to-day 



210 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

wQuld be ruined ; the American farmer would be fortunate 
to get fifty cents a bushel for his wheat, and the freedom 
of the seas would be at an end. 

The German government, in fact, did not strongly argue 
that her position was legal, but justified it on the ground 
that it was in retaliation for violations of law by Great 
Britain, and that it was ''necessary." 

THE GERMAN PLEA OF RETALIATION 

Retaliation is doubtless, at times, justified. When the 
Germans violated the rules of war by using poison gas, it 
was plain that the Allies must fight gas with gas. Whether 
airship attacks in the civilian populations of unfortified 
cities should be met by retaliation of the same kind is being 
discussed. 

It is doubtful, however, if the German case for retalia- 
tion by submarines exists. There is some evidence that 
von Tirpitz considered their use for purposes of blockade 
before the present war broke out. It has been proved, also, 
that the first step in the chain of events leading to Ger- 
many's declarations of submarine blockade was the sowing 
of floating mines, to the north of Ireland, in plain violation 
of international law. 

The case of the United States, however, is stronger and 
simpler, and does not depend on controverted facts. We 
deny absolutely that the act of one of two warring nations 
can justify the other in illegally treating a third, neutral, 
nation. The neutral deals with each belligerent separ- 
ately. If a belligerent nation can cast international law 
to the winds, because it believes its enemy has violated 
some law, law no longer exists. Rumor, prejudice, false 
witnesses will always give the occasion, and the outbreak 
of every war will see the rules, laboriously built up in 
time of peace, thrown into the scrap heap. 



GERMAN SUBMARINES AND THE BRITISH BLOCKADE 211 
GERMAN PLEA OF NECESSITY 

Necessity is a plea still more destructive. If the siab- 
marine cannot wage war according to legal methods, it is 
not a legal war weapon, and its use must be denied like 
poison and dumdum bullets. Law does, indeed, recognize 
self-defense as a plea against a charge of murder, but in 
such cases the court reviews the facts. In the case of the 
submarine no review is possible. According to the German 
argument, each nation is the judge of its own necessity. 
When a person or nation makes such a decision there is 
always a tendency to decide that a thing is necessary which 
is merely convenient. It puts the wish of the individual 
in the place of the judgment of the whole world. It sub- 
stitutes, finally and completely, force for law, might for 
right. 

THE BRITISH CASE VERSUS THE GERMAN 

Our controversies with Great Britain have all been con- 
ducted under the recognized forms of law ; disputed points 
have been as to what international law really meant, and 
they are on the way to a legal decision, which both parties 
will accept. They will surely result in adding valuable 
rules to international law, and in increasing the power of 
international law. They are like the disputes of individuals 
in everyday life, which are not inconsistent with peace. 

Our controversies with Germany all turned upon the 
point of whether international law was or was not binding 
upon nations. There was no legal outlet. We were forced 
to admit that law had no force, or to fight. If we win, we 
establish the binding power of law, and we may unite to 
perfect it as the basis for permanent international peace; 
if we lose, we must submit to a reign of force, to prepare 
perpetually for the next war. 



212 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 



Bibliography 

Documents 

International Conciliation, no. 94, Official Correspondence 
between the United States and Germaiiy, Aug. 6, 1914, 
to July 30, 1915. 

No. 95, Official Correspondence between tJie United 
States and Germany, Aug. 6, 1914, to April 8, 1915. 

No. 101, Great Britain's Measures against German 
Trade. 

These and other pamphlets may be obtained by writing 
to the American Association for International Concilia- 
tion, Substation 84 (407 West 117th St.), New York City. 

World Peace Foundation, Pamphlet Series, vol. V, no. 4, 
Pt. II, War Zones, 

Vol. V, no. 4, Pt. Ill, The Wilhelmina Case, Muni- 
tions of War, the Frye Case. 

Vol. V, no. 5, Pt. II, Sinking of the Lusitania. 

These and other pamphlets may be obtained by writing 
to World Peace Foundation, 40 Mt. Vernon St., Boston, 
Mass. 

Books 

Robinson, E. E., and West, V. J. The Foreign Policy of 
Woodrow Wilson. Macmillan Co. New York. 1917. 

Rogers, Lindsey. America's Case against Germany. E. P. 
Button & Co. New York. 1917. 



GERMANY'S GAIN FROM GERMANY'S DEFEAT 

By 

CHARLES S. SLIGHTER 

Professor of Applied Mathematics 

and 

GEORGE WAGNER 

Assistant Professor of Zoology 

To those who know Germany from personal experience, 
the question arises as to whether the German people, aside 
from the ruling caste, have anything to gain from a final 
victory in this war. If there is truth in the philosophy of 
democracy, the answ^er must be emphatically, NO. The 
German masses can gain nothing by a victory of German 
autocracy ; they have much to gain from its defeat. 

THE GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY 

The German Empire was founded at the end of the 
Franco-Prussian War. It was founded, and its constitu- 
tion was written, by the ruling princes and their ministers, 
Avithout consulting the people. The constitution has not 
been altered from that day to this. There is no provision 
for its alteration by any body that in any way represents 
the masses of the people. Any alteration in it can be abso- 
lutely prevented by the sole will of the emperor. 

The German Parliament consists of the Bundesrat, or 
Federal Council, and the Reichstag. Of these the Reichs- 
tag is the one we hear of most. It is elected by secret bal- 
lot and manhood suffrage. The voting age is 25, probably 



214 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

to let the arni}^ get its disciplinary power working on a 
man before he votes. Representation, however, can hardly 
bo railed equal, for the electoral districts were established 
on the basis of the population as it stood in 1871, and their 
boundaries have never been changed. Since then the cities 
have grown enormously in population, as compared with 
the rural districts. As a consequence the country districts, 
the great seats of ultra-conservatism, have a representation 
far beyond their rightful share. 

Prominent as it is in public accounts of German affairs, 
the powders of the Eeichstag are extremely limited. As 
late as January 1914, a mcinber, Dr. Friederich Naumann 
of Central Europe (Mittel-Europa) fame, said: 

We on the Left are altogether in favor of the parliamentary 
regime, by which we mean that the Reichstag can not forever 
remain in a position of subordination. Why does the Reichstag 
sit at all, why does it pass resolutions, if behind it is a waste- 
paper basket into which these resolutions are thrown? The prob- 
lem is to change the impotence of the Reichstag into some sort of 
power. . . . The man who compared this House to a hall of 
echoes was not far wrong. To those who are accustomed to do 
practical work in life it appears a mere waste of time to devote 
themselves to this difficult and monotonous mechanism. . . . 
When one asks the question, What part has the Reichstag in 
German history as a whole? it will be seen that the part is a 
very limited one. 

Both emperor and Bundesrat have absolute veto power 
over the acts of the Reichstag. This, and the fact is im- 
portant, applies to the repeal of the existing laws, as ^vell 
as to the enactment of new ones. In practice very little 
of any consequence comes to it that has not previously been 
sifted by the Bundesrat, and it comes usually with a clear 
statement as to what changes will be tolerated. Opposition 
to the government proposals by a Reichstag member, or any 
new proposals inconvenient to the government, are usually 



GERMANY'S GAIN FROM GERMANY'S DEFEAT 215 

met by such sneering retort from the chancellor or one of 
his ministers, that one wonders how any man of real char- 
acter can consent to give his time as a member under such 
conditions. By joint action of the emperor and the Bun- 
desrat the Reichstag can be dissolved at any time, and a 
new election ordered. In such an election every power 
the government possesses or dares to seize, is used to pro- 
duce a government majority. And this power is such that 
it has always succeeded. 

The Bundesrat is the controlling house. It is really a 
board of ambassadors sent by the ruling princes. The 
delegates are selected by the rulers of the states, and must 
vote as instructed by these rulers. The delegation from 
each state must vote as a unit. Of the sixty-one votes in 
the Bundesrat, seventeen are from Prussia ; the three votes 
supposed to represent Alsace-Lorraine are subjected to the 
instructions of the emperor; and as a matter of practice, 
the single A-otes of a number of smaller states are absolutely 
under Prussian tutelage. So Prussia, or the emperor, has 
a clear majority. 

The chancellor, the highest officer of the State, is ap- 
pointed by the emperor, and is responsible only to him. 
This fact Bismarck, von Biilow, Bethmann HoUweg, and 
lately von Hertling, have never ceased to emphasize. When 
after the Zabern scandal the Reichstag passed a vote of 
lack of confidence in the Chancellor by an enormous major- 
ity, he simply laughed at it. He represents and shields 
all other ministers. All administrative powers, not ex- 
pressly delegated to others, belong to him. He has charge 
of the enforcement of imperial laws in all the states. He 
orders not only what is to be done, but also prescribes the 
way in which it is to be done. 

A consideration of the above makes it clear that the 
German government is anything but democratic. What is 



216 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

more important, there is no legal way of changing any feat- 
ure of this government so long as the emperor does not de- 
sire the change. As long as he opposes it, there is only one 
way to bring it about and that is — Revolution. 

The emperor, theoretically, is only president among the 
princes of Germany. Practically he is the absolute auto- 
crat whose powers can be little interfered with. He is ir- 
responsible and his office belongs inalienably to the Prus- 
sian Crown. His control over the army is made absolute 
by law, and the Zabern affair showed the German people 
how far that power could be extended. His veto can pre- 
vent any change in the constitution, even though every 
other soul in Germany were for it. His veto can prevent 
the enactment of any proposition into law. He needs the 
consent of the Bundesrat only for dissolving the Reichstag 
and for declaring offensive war. But it has been shown 
above how thoroughly he controls the Bundesrat. For the 
declaration of defensive warfare he needs the consent of no 
one. The events of 1914 have shown how easy it is for a 
government not responsible to its people, to make any war 
appear a defensive one. After the recent remarkable dis- 
closures in the papers of Count Lichnowski, former Ger- 
man Ambassador in London, and of Dr. Miihlon, a former 
director of Krupp's, it is more certain than ever that the 
Emperor nnd his immodiatc supporters deliberately planned 
this war, without consulting even the Bundesrat. And they 
did not officially inform the Bundesrat until three days 
after the commencement of the first hostilities. 

THE PRUSSIAN SYSTEM 

One may well ask : How is all this possible in a modern 
state, with a public press, a public platform, a large class 
of highly educated citizens, a proletariat eagerly seeking a 
better place for itself ? The answer is : Prussia — Prussia, 



GERMANY'S GAIN FROM GERMANY'S DEFEAT 217 

with its militarism, its manufacture of public opinion, its 
caste system. All these things Prussia has forced upon the 
lesser states of Germany. 

For in judging Germany, one must never forget that 
Prussia constitutes about two-thirds of it, both in area and 
population, and that the German Emperor is also King of 
Prussia. The Prussian constitution nowhere recognizes 
the sovereignty of the people. By Prussian political theory 
all sovereignty belongs to the king, the government is the 
king; and it lies within his rights to withdraw at any time 
such privileges as may have been granted in the constitu- 
tion. 

Prussia also has two chambers in its legislature. Of 
these the upper house is constituted as the king wills, with- 
out restriction. As a matter of fact it is overwhelmingly 
dominated by the East Prussian Junkers, the most reac- 
tionary class in all the western world today. Even so, this 
body has no powers the king does not desire exercised. It 
has a veto over all legislation, as has the king. 

The lower house is elected by the people— after a fashion. 
Every Prussian man of 25 or more has the vote — after a 
fashion. Votes are weighted according to the property be- 
hind them. The voters of each district are divided into 
three classes, each casting one-third of the vote. First, 
those wealthiest persons who pay one-third of the taxes; 
second, the well-to-do and middle classes who pay the sec- 
ond third; lastly, the vast numbers of God's patient poor 
who pay the last third. The result? Of the male popula- 
tion 4 per cent cast one-third of the votes ; 14 per cent the 
second third; and the last third is shared by the remaining 
82 per cent. Get the first two classes to stand together, 
and 18 per cent will overwhelmingly defeat the wishes of 
the other 82 per cent. In 1900 the Social Democrats cast 



218 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

an actual majority of the votes in the election, yet they 
secured only 7 seats out of a total of 400. 

The whole thing is a government by property. But 
there is even more than this. The ballot is not secret, is 
not even printed. Voting is by word of mouth before. elec- 
tion officials. It is not hard to see what effect this has 
upon the men of the poorer classes. Knowing that an hon- 
est vote may lose them their positions, they quite commonly 
take no part in elections. In 1903 only 24 per cent of the 
Prussian electors voted for members of the Prussian Diet, 
while in the elections for the Reichstag, which are secret, 
75 per cent of the votes were cast. 

The story is not yet ended. The electoral districts were 
established in 1858. Since then they have not been changed. 
As a consequence, just as in the case of the Reichstag, the 
great cities which have grown enormously have no more 
representatives than they had then. One set of areas with 
three million people is allowed 9 representatives; another 
area with a similar population is allowed 66. All this 
much to the satisfaction of the Hohenzollern, for the pro- 
gressive elements live in the cities, while the peasant — who 
must never be looked upon as having any resemblance to 
our American farmer — is usually reactionary to the core. 

Even when so adroitly hand-picked, the lower house is 
carefully kept a very harmless, because powerless, institu- 
tion. Bismarck in the period from 1862-1866 defied it and 
the voters who elected it, not only once but many times. 

This is the school that Prussian parliamentarians are 
trained in. And as Prussians, by the nature of things, have 
the controlling voice in the Reichstag, and the King of 
Prussia, as German Emperor, has a veto over every action 
of the Reichstag, it is no wonder that this body is, as one of 
its own members said, a "Hall of Echoes." 



GERMANY'S GAIN FROM GERMANY'S DEFEAT 219 



THE POWER OE THE WAR LORD 

The emperor is commander-in-chief of the army and 
navy, and as such is under no restrictions; how far his 
power goes in this matter can be seen in the Zabern affair 
of 1913. A colonel committed gross breaches against the 
rights of civilians. Against the protest of practically all 
Germany, the Kaiser ruled that the case must be tried be- 
fore a military court. The colonel was, of course, promptly 
acquitted. He received a congratulatory telegram from the 
Crown Prince, and a new decoration from his King. 

The army and its General Staff are in reality above the 
law. Its supplies are voted by the Reichstag to be sure, 
but once voted they continue indefinitely without further 
action. The General Staff is the most powerful group of 
men in Germany. Their plans are made for years— even 
scores of years— ahead. And these plans are secret. As 
soon as war is declared, the army practically takes charge 
of all civil government in the Empire. And there is then 
no appeal from its actions. 

MANUFACTURING PUBLIC OPINION 

It is only natural that in this age of publicity, an auto- 
cratic system such as this will want to create a system 
for controlling and moulding public opinion. And Ger- 
many has done so in most thorough fashion. The system 
begins in the lowest school, and it has no end. Teachers 
are state officials, and as such are amenable to discipline by 
authorities other than those of the school ; and they are de- 
pendent upon these authorities for promotion. In recent 
years no one has been appointed to a professorship whose 
royalistic views have not been thoroughly examined. After 
appointment his faithfulness to the ruling class is re- 



220 UNIVERSITY OP WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

warded by special appointments to comniiss'ons, or by 
titles, decorations, admission to court circles, a visit to his 
laboratory by some prince or by the ''All-Highest" him- 
self. But should he dare to utter thoughts displeasing, 
there come quickly attacks in the press, difficulties in his 
budget, social neglect. 

Educational policy is finally controlled by rulers and 
statesmen, rather than by educational experts. The lower 
schools are strictly regulated in everything they do. His- 
tory to them is only one long story of the greatness of the 
Hohenzollern. The two great school holidays are Sedan 
Day and the Emperor's Birthday. Contempt of other na- 
tions is constantly taught. 

With all this goes a constant iron discipline intended to 
make obedience to authority an automatic thing. All this 
is continued in the army, is indeed one of the foremost 
tasks of the army. There follows lastly that universal sys- 
tem of ^^Verhoten", so that the German may never for a 
moment forget that his chief duty is to obey. 

But after all the greatest instrument in this work of con- 
trolling the very thoughts of the citizens is the press. 
There is probably no country in which the masses have been 
allowed to know so little about the facts of the war. Even 
in times of peace, the government wields enormous power 
over it. It can ruin a newspaper by withholding from it 
information. Any one who knows how much of the news 
in German papers refers to official matters, will realize 
what this means. Nor does it end here. Newspapers carry 
great quantities of official advertising, which can be given 
or withdrawn at will. Private advertising can be in- 
fluenced — ^a merchant who has been given the title ''Pur- 
veyor to the Court" will know, without being told, what 
papers he can advertise in. The sale of any paper in the 
state railroad stations can be forbidden at any time. Press 



GERMANY'S GAIN FROM GERMANY'S DEFEAT 221 

matter is not always censored before publication, but any 
issue of a paper can be suppressed by the police. One ed- 
itor must assume complete responsibility for everything 
that appears in a paper ; a paper of a non-royalistic attitude 
usually chooses for this position a man whose physical con- 
dition will withstand a deal of sitting in jail. Finally the 
government through its connections with private wealth, 
practically OAvns many papers. And by secret subsidies of 
which it need give no account to any one, it can and does 
control others. Bismarck's ''Reptilian Press" did not die 
with Bismarck. 

In time of war, the commander in each district becomes 
an absolute ruler. He can suspend any paper for a period 
or for the war. He can apply a real censorship. And by 
these powers he can practically dictate what the public 
shall read. Since the beginning of the war many important 
journals in Berlin, Hamburg, Dresden, Bremen, Leipzig, 
Dantzig, Essen, Diisseldorf, Frankfurt, Munich,, and Vi- 
enna, have by one means or another been forced to change 
their policy, or even their ownership. 

THE CASTE SYSTEM 

The perfection of this feudalistic system is perhaps best 
seen in the system of social castes. At the head stand of 
course the court circles, the army officers, the Junkers, — 
militaristic and royalistic to the marrow of their bones, the 
real props of the throne. Then comes the remarkable caste 
of civic officials. It is highly efficient, but its great curse 
is that its training tends to make each man in it a tyrant 
on a small scale. And the more important members of 
this caste have been born into it, or have been drawn in so 
early that they do not know any other life, and do not 
think any other thoughts than those of this officialdom. 



222 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

There is no real contact with the crowd, who are looked 
upon as mere pawns in the great game played by the State. 
At the bottom of this social scheme stand the peasants 
and the workingmen, with the small shopkeepers and clerks 
just above them. It is commonly believed that the work- 
ing classes are well cared for by the state. They hardly 
feel that way themselves. Of the families of the working 
class in Berlin 55 per cent live in a single room. The 
common schools provided for the children of the working 
man lead nowhere except to a life like that of their parents. 
Access to a secondary or university education is almost 
impossible for them. All positions requiring more than a 
very elementary education are thus practically closed to 
the common people. It is almost impossible for a working 
man to rise above his class. The scheme aims not only to 
keep him down, but also to keep the members of the upper 
classes up, whether fit or not. 

GERMANY'S GAIN FROM GERMANY'S DEFEAT 

A German victory in this war will be a victory of this 
whole pernicious system. Can any one believe that such a 
victory will be of any benefit to the masses of Germany? 
Is it not certain that the German people can only gain by a 
German defeat? 

The German people have a democratic origin. At heart 
the masses are still democratic. The democratic leaders are 
numerous enough and able enough now, but those who have 
come in contact with them know how hopeless they feel 
about achieving any material reform in a country that 
bristles with bayonets. 

Seldom if ever has a triumphant despot extended the 
civic rights of his people. Victory makes an autocratic 
government arrogant and overbearing. It is only in defeat 
that it yields to the demands of those who bear the burden. 



GERMANY'S GAIN FROM GERMANY'S DEFEAT 223 

It was thus with Prussia in 1806 and 1807 ; Austria made 
many reforms after her crushing defeat in 1866 ; France 
became a real republic only after the disasters of 1870; 
Russia awoke after her humiliation by Japan in 1904. And 
so it will inevitably be with Germany. A defeat of Prussia 
in 1866 would have SAvept away the whole Bismarckian 
tyranny. 

A victorious kaiserism will certainly not fail to make 
the Reichstag even more helpless than it is. Based on the 
claim that the Prussian sj^stem was the cause of its triumph, 
kaiserism would greatly increase its efforts to force that 
system on the smaller states. Even today that system is 
making dangerous inroads in Bavaria, in spite of valiant 
protests by the Liberal elements of that state. 

It will be only after a defeat that the people themselves 
will develop the courage to insist on a new deal. Faced by 
an appalling tax burden, shocked by the tales of Prussian 
conduct which their men will bring home, receiving at last 
the real facts about this war and its origin, will they not 
awaken and can we expect other than that their patience 
at last will end ? 

If by our efforts we can show that the Prussian system 
can be conquered, then may we expect the people of Ger- 
many to arise in their might and wipe it out. And then 
will the way be clear for that alliance for peace, in the path 
of which Prussia has so long been the stumbling block. 

But with a victorious militarism there can be no hope of a 
step toward democracy, whether in government, industry, 
social life, or the relations between nations. Such a democ- 
racy can be brought about only by a defeat of the per- 
nicious system that has so long dominated Germany, and 
now has disclosed its ambition to dominate the world. 



224 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 



Bibliography 

Barker, J. Ellis. Hoiv Education has Degraded Geniwn 
Character, in Nineteenth Century. September, 1917. 
An important article on the corruption of public opin- 
ion by government agencies. 

Hazen, C. D. The Government of Germany. Committee 
on Public Information. Washington, D. C. War In- 
formation Series No. 3. Can be secured free from 
Committee that publishes it. 

Ogg, F. A. The Governments of Europe. New York. 
Macmillan. 1913. Pt. II, pp. 193-287. A lucid ac- 
count of the government of Germany and of Prussia, 
with some notes on other German states. Much use- 
ful bibliography. 

Kobinson, J. II. The Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Prussia. With an introduction and notes. Annals, 
American Academy of Pol. & Soc. Science, Supple- 
ment, Sept. 1894. 

The German Bundesrath. A study in comparative 
constitutional law. Publications, University of Penn- 
sylvania, Pol. Econ. & Public Law Series, No. 10. 
1891. Verv readable. 



WHY WORKINGMEN SUPPORT THE WAR 

By 

JOHN R. COMMONS 

Professor of Economics 

A3IERICAN INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 

In no war that ever occurred have the government and 
the workingmen joined together as they are doing in the 
United States today. In every department of our govern- 
ment that employs labor, or fixes the prices that manufac- 
turers charge, or the wages that employers pay, a leading 
representative of labor is on the committee and he has as 
much power as the representative of the capitalists. The 
President of the United Mine Workers of America is assist- 
ant to Garfield, the Fuel Administrator. The President of 
the Building Trades Department of the American Federa- 
tion of Labor is on the Emergency Construction Board for 
building ships ; a leading organizer of the American Fed- 
eration of Labor is on the great War Industries Board 
which controls all kinds of manufacturing ; a trade union- 
ist is Secretary of Labor. 

These and many other trade union officials were named 
and placed there by the trade unions themselves, because 
these war boards have become the big employers of labor, 
or else they have control over the wages that private em- 
ployers pay. 

All through these industries of the country President 
Wilson is enforcing, as fast as the boards can get to it, the 
eight-hour day and time and one-half for over-time. 
15— W. B. 



226 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

Agreements with the unions also provide that wages 
shall be revised just as fast as the cost of living goes up, 
so that they will always keep ahead of the cost. 

But most important of all, these agreements with the 
trade unions give the same wages and hours to non-union 
men. All labor in this country is benefiting because or- 
ganized labor is actually taking its part in running the 
government. 

The manufacture of army clothing is taken out of sweat- 
shops, and minimum wages for women are fixed, with the 
well-known woman organizer of the Consumers' League in 
charge. The government is stopping child labor in all 
factories throughout the country. 

Nothing like it ever happened before, and anybody who 
says that this is a capitalistic war simply does not see what 
is going on. Never before has democracy for wage-earn- 
ing men and women made anywhere near the progress 
that it has made in the nine months of this war. If this is 
a capitalist's war it is just as much a workingman's war, 
conducted for workingmen, by workingmen. Capitalists 
are being controlled in their profits, and in the wages and 
hours of their laborers, with the help of leaders whom the 
workingmen themselves have put there. The President of 
the United States attends the great convention of organized 
labor at Buffalo, and notifies all employers of his stand for 
labor's claims. If American labor continues as it has be- 
gun, it will come out of this war with the universal eight- 
hour day and with as much power to fix its own wages hj 
its own representatives as employers have. And employ- 
ers are cooperating with labor for the common, purpose of 
winning the war. 

No wonder that the American Federation of Labor, as is 
shown by the vote at the recent Buffalo convention, sup- 
ports the war almost unanimously and stands for fighting 
it out to the limit, almost to a man. 



WHY WORKINGMEN SUlTORT THE WAR 227 

Its members know that this is really a war for democ 
racy, because they are taking part in it, and are sharing in 
the conduct of it. They see how it works from the inside 
every day in the week. Never before was a war carried on 
by workingmen to the extent that this war is being cari-ied 
on. And never before, in war or in peace, was the voice 
of labor in government so powerful as it is now in America. 

Any workingman in Wisconsin or any other state Avho 
backs off at this time and refuses to stand by the great 
majority of his fellow-workingmen who are doing this 
great work for labor, is injuring himself and his brothers. 
A democracy in which the wage-earner has his share of 
influence is coming; and if it does not come as it should, 
the reason will be that some wage-earners are misled and 
don't know democracy when thoy see it, or don't support 
it when they know it. 

THE GERMAN MENACE TO AMERICAN LABOR 

But there is one thing that will set labor back perma- 
nently, and that is a German victory. 

Twenty years ago the Czar of Russia proposed that all 
nations should cut down their standing armies, but they 
could not do it because Germany refused. Later Great 
Britain offered to join with Germany and cut down their 
navies but the Kaiser would not even talk about it. Ger- 
many was preparing for something like this war. 

If Germany defeats Great Britain, she will take over the 
British navy. She will then be far and away the most 
powerful country in the world, and we Americans will be 
compelled to have a permanent standing army and a huge 
navy to defend ourselves from sudden attack. 

About every hundred years some nation of Europe 
starts out to conquer the others and rule the world. First 
it was Spain, which in America owned everything from 



228 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

California to Patagonia. Then it was France and Napo- 
leon, who took Louisiana and the great country west of the 
Mississippi away from Spain. 

But though Spain conquered nearly every nation of 
Europe, and Napoleon conquered every nation on the con- 
tinent, they could not reach Great Britain. The British 
navy compelled Spain and France to let go of America; 
and such democracy as we have in North and South Amer- 
ica is possible because no one country in Europe could per- 
manently conquer the others as long as it could not con- 
quer Great Britain. Our country has been big and free 
and unarmed because Europe was divided among equal 
powers. Napoleon did not have a submarine with which 
to destroy Great Britain's power. But Germany is will- 
ing to fight the whole world if only she can succeed in her 
attempt to wipe out the British navy. Then she conquers 
not only Europe, as Napoleon did, but Asia, Africa, and 
America. 

If America had not come into the war, or if America had 
refused to sell food and munitions to the Allies, Europe 
would already have been conquered. If Germany wins, 
then there is nothing for North and South America to do 
but build up their navies and standing armies as big as 
possible, for when Germany strikes she hits suddenly and 
frightfully. 

Nations must look ahead. Individuals can be short- 
sighted, because they die anyhow. But not nations. If 
we do not win now, while Great Britain and France are 
able to fight, we shall have to be armed to the teeth for 
years and centuries ahead, as long as Germany rules the 
world. 

A huge and permanent army and navy, besides taking 
our boys and our workingmen every year for military serv- 
ice, means low wages, long hours of labor, suppression of 
labor unions, suppression of free speech, repeal of labor 



WHY WORKINGMEN SUPPORT THE WAR 229 

legislation on belialf of women and children, and all the 
hardships that millions of workingmen have come to 
America to escape. 

It is bad enough to be compelled to make this one tre- 
mendous effort right now to win the war. It will be far 
worse to be compelled to be ready all the time for another 
like it. 

GERMAN SOCIALISTIC IMPERIALISM 

Those Socialists who want the workingmen in this coun- 
try to give in to Germany are surely blind, and very in- 
consistent. In Germany, the Socialist party supports this 
war. That ought to be expected in any country after war 
is declared. But it was a year before the war, in 1913, 
that the Socialists of Germany voted with the capitalists 
for the enormous war taxes that enabled the Kaiser to get 
ready for war. 

No new appropriations of money for war purposes can 
be made in Germany without a majority vote in the Reichs- 
tag; and in 1913 it required the votes of the Socialists to 
make a majority. 

Always before that year, they had voted against the 
Kaiser when he asked the Reichstag to appropriate money 
for preparation for war. But in 1913 they made a trade 
with him. They voted indeed against the military bill as 
such, which provided for an increase in armaments but 
which did not provide for taxes to pay for the armaments. 
This bill was carried by the vote of other parties, the So- 
cialists' votes not being needed. Then on the tax bill, 
where their votes were needed, the Socialists turned around 
and voted for the extra military taxes. 

This they did on the excuse that the bill taxed the in- 
comes and property of capitalists and aristocrats instead 
of wage earners. The Kaiser could not get the aristocrats 
to vote for such a tax bill, but he did induce the Socialists 



230 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOit 

to vote for it. They excused themselves by claiming that 
the Kaiser offered in this bill to tax the rich, and that if 
they did not accept the offer, the taxes would afterwards 
be voted anyhow but would be levied on the working peo- 
ple. And they also put up the excuse that the Socialist 
party would lose out in the elections if they did not vote 
for the income and property taxes which they had always 
advocated. 

With this slim excuse they violated all the principles of 
anti-militarism and international brotherhood of wage- 
earners for which they had always claimed to stand. They 
sold out their comrades in other lands for the sake of lower 
taxes for themselves. 

These 110 votes that carried the new military taxes were 
a strict party vote, dictated by the caucus of the party. 
There were 37 Socialists who voted against it in the cau- 
cus, and 52 who voted for it. Then, according to their 
caucus rules, the whole 110 members voted in the Reich- 
stag as they were directed to do by the majority of 52 in 
the caucus. 

The minority protested, and one of their leaders truly 
exclaimed, ''The moment we give to the government the 
funds to cover military expenditure, our whole struggle 
against militarism becomes a farce." Yet the minority 
yielded and voted unanimously. 

It was worse than a farce. It was a crime against the 
Socialists and workingmen of every other land. Without 
the enormous war budget of 1913, for which these Social- 
ists voted, Germany could not have stored up the muni- 
tions in secret and have gotten ready to strike the next 
year before other countries could get ready. 

And, in order to clear themselves and make a record, 
this Socialist caucus in the German Reichstag played a 
cheap political trick. They asked the government to divide 
the question so that they could vote against armaments in 



WHY WORKINGMEN SUPPORT THE WAR 231 

one vote and then turn around and vote for the taxes to 
pay for the armaments by another vote. 

They added fraud to their crime. They sold out to the 
militarists, and did it in such a tricky way that they could 
still say they voted against militarism. 

But they did not deceive themselves. ''No high-sound- 
ing words," exclaimed Geyer, a leader of the minority, 
' ' not even your vote against the military bill as such will 
alter the fact that you have strengthened militarism by vot- 
ing the means to carry it into effect." Yet Geyer voted 
with the others to strengthen militarism. 

With such a record of double-dealing, charged and ad- 
mitted out of their own mouths, how can any Socialist have 
the audacity to ask the workingmen of America to give in 
to the Socialists of Germany? Indeed, a leading Ameri- 
can Socialist has said, there is nothing in the principles of 
Socialism that requires the Socialists of one nation to lie 
down and let the Socialists of Germany shoot them. 

Germany's alleged offer of peace to the Bolsheviki of 
Russia shows why the Socialists of Germany support the 
Kaiser. Germany is reported as demanding that Russia 
should admit German manufactures free of tariff duty and 
should give to Germany control of the entire Russian ex- 
portation of wheat. 

Whether these are the actual demands or not, they agree 
with Germany's record. It is the record of what she calls 
."peaceful penetration." This kind of "peaceful penetra- 
tion" means the destruction of Russian manufactures and 
the imposition of low wages for Russian workmen, in favor 
of high profits for German capitalists and high wages for 
German workingmen. It means that Russia will not have 
the industries or the skilled labor that can make munitions 
of war. It means cheap food for German workmen at the 
expense of Russian peasants and farmers. 



232 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

If the Kaiser offers such terms as these to the Socialists 
of Russia, in order to get Russia to desert the Allies, what 
will he do to the workingmen of France, England, and 
America if he whips us? 

And the Socialists of Germany have been the Kaiser's 
willing and eager agents to get the Socialists and working- 
men of the world to fall into the very trap laid for the 
Bolsheviki. This is shown by what they tried to do at 
Stockholm. 

They invited the Socialists and workingmen of the world 
to meet at Stockholm, in order to discuss terms of peace. 
Then they fixed up the representation so that the Kerensky 
Socialists would not be represented, but the Bolsheviki 
would send delegates. The Kerensky Socialists knew what 
Germany would do to Russia. The Bolsheviki were will- 
ing to yield to the Socialists of Germany. 

In the same way the German Socialists fixed up the rep- 
resentation at Stockholm so that the 100,000 Socialists in 
America would have 16 delegates and the 3,000,000 trade 
unionists only 4 delegates. 

What is happening to Russia is exactly what would have 
happened to the workingmen of France, England, and 
America if our Government had permitted the German 
Socialists in America to go to Stockholm to conspire with 
their brother Socialists from Germany and Austria. 

The German Socialists declared against indemnities and 
annexations. Indeed the Kaiser and the German Social- 
ists can well do without annexations or indemnities if they 
can do what they demand of the Bolsheviki — compel the 
Russian workingmen and farmers to become forever ex- 
ploited by Germany and the German Socialists. 

Finally, when the Kaiser showed his hand, he practically 
demanded the annexation of the territory occupied by 
Poles and Lithuanians which he had conquered from Russia. 

Germany's so-called peaceful penetration is worse for 



WHY WORKINGMEN SUPPORT THE WAR 233 

Russia than annexation. If Russia were annexed the Rus- 
sians would have representation in the Reichstag. If Ger- 
many controls the markets of Russia, the Russians are ex- 
ploited without a vote to protect themselves. 

Surely when the Socialists of Germany join with the 
Kaiser to rob the workingmen of Russia, no American 
workingman will listen to the German Socialists in 
America. 

TRUE INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY 

On the other hand, a leading Socialist of the world, 
Camille Huysmans, has said to the Chicago Daily News 
that the war demands of President Wilson are identical 
with the demands of the International Socialists. 

The American Alliance for Labor and Democracy, com- 
posed of trade unionists and socialists, at its meeting in 
Minneapolis endorsed and repeated these demands. They 
are America's aims in the war, clearly stated: Equal 
rights for all nations f big and little; no people to he forced 
under sovereignty under wJiicli it does not wish to live; 
freedom of the seas; a concert of nations to guarantee 
peace and justice; limitation of armaments on land and 
sea. 

These are America's demands and the aims of American 
labor in this war. Greatest of all, and the one that all 
others lead up to, is disarmament, by limitation of arma- 
ments on land and sea. Without this, labor cannot be 
free in this or any other country. 

Unhappily we must fight now in order not to fight after- 
wards. When the Socialists of Germany, in 1913, voted 
for the huge war taxes when other nations were unpre- 
pared, they violated their principles and forced the Social- 
ists of every nation to fight. 

And any Socialist in America, however honest, who tries 
to belittle the faith and weaken the morale of America in 



234 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

this great crisis, is simply false to his own principles. He . 
is playing the game of the German Socialists who have de- 
serted the workmen of other lands and have sold them- 
selves to the Kaiser. 

Rather than listen to such Socialists, let American work- 
ingmen join in with the magnificent patriotism of the 
American Alliance for Labor and Democracy. Let them 
say, as does the Alliance, that labor will take its part in con- 
ducting the war, and that the war shall be fought to a 
finish, for upon its success depend the freedom and the 
wages of American labor. 

WHAT WE ARE DOING FOR THE SOLDIERS 

Everybody must expect hardships out of a war. The 
greatest hardship is on the boys who go to the front. No- 
body can ever pay them what they are worth to the nation. . 

But our nation is doing the next best thing. We have 
more than doubled the pay the soldiers received before 
the war. The dollar a day, besides food, clothing, and 
expenses, which they now get while training and fighting 
is four times as much as the British soldier gets, eighteen 
times as much as the French, and nine times as much as the 
German. 

Besides, if they are disabled, the government compen- 
sates them for the rest of their lives, by givin<? them as 
high as $100 a month in case of total disability, in addition 
to teaching them new trades, if necessary, to enable them 
to make a living. 

Next to the boys at the front, the greatest hardship is 
on their families, who can never be paid what the boys are 
worth to them. But there, too, the nation does the next 
best thing. While the soldiers are serving their country. 
it pays their families according to the number of children 



WHY WORKINGMEN SUPPORT THE WAR 23b 

In case of death, it pays the family the compensation the 
boy would get after the war if he were disabled. It fur- 
nishes as high as $10,000 life insurance at less than half 
what an insurance company charges in time of peace — and 
furnishes it after the war as well as during the war, at sub- 
stantially the same rates. In short, the nation is doing 
everything possible for our boys and their families, with no 
distinction between a private and the highest officer. 

WHO ARE PAYING THE WAR TAXES 

The next great hardship is taxes. In former wars our 
government taxed the food and almost everything the peo- 
ple used. In this war it is taxing only liquor, tobacco, 
patent medicines, luxuries, amusements, new insurance 
premiums, business documents, transportation, and post- 



As far as taxes arc concerned, two-thirds of the people 
pay directly but very little extra taxes to support the war. 
The other one-third of the people are taxed on incomes 
and excess war profits. 

In the Civil War, fifty years ago, the income tax was 3 
per cent to 15 per cent, and every income as low as $600 
was taxed. In this war, three different income taxes are 
piled on top of each other, so that an income of $4,000 pays 
$40, an income of $1,000,000 pays $475,000, and larger in- 
comes pay up to 60 per cent. But no income of a married 
man less than $2,000 is taxed at all, and none less than 
01,000 for an unmarried man. No workingman with a 
family pays an income tax. 

The largest incomes, on the other hand, are not yet taxed 
as much as they can stand. The inheritance tax goes as 
high as 17 per cent on estates of $10,000,000 and over. A 
corporation pays two taxes— an excess profits tax that is 
said to average about one-fourth of the profits in excess 



236 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

of 9 per cent on its capital — and an income tax of 6 per 
cent on what is left. The total tax is perhaps, on the 
average, 30 per cent of the profits in excess of 9 per cent. 

The excess profits tax in Great Britain is higher than 
this, but nobody can tell how much higher, because the 
tax is figured on a different basis. During the first year 
of the war, Great Britain's excess profits tax was made 50 
per cent of the excess over what the corporation earned be- 
fore the war, and is now 80 per cent. 

But in Great Britain the pre-war income is deducted, 
no matter how high it was. In America, it is not deducted 
beyond 9 per cent. If, for example, a corporation in 
England earned 30 per cent on its capital before the war 
it would not be excess-taxed on that amount during the 
war. But in America it would be taxed on the excess over 
9 per cent — that is, 21 per cent would be its excess profits 
on which it would pay the tax. In both countries the in- 
come tax is additional to the excess profits tax. In both 
countries this democratic form of taxation is far ahead of 
any other country in the world. 

This is a new kind of tax never before collected. No- 
body in this country has ever had any experience in figur- 
ing it out and making it work. The encouraging thing is 
that our government has called in the greatest tax expert 
in the country to help figure it out and make it work. 
When that is done, the tax can be and should be greatly 
increased. 

WHO ARE DETERMINING PRICES 

The government is trying to cut down excess profits 
and as fast as possible is reducing the prices that pro- 
ducers are permitted to charge. This has been done in 
the manufacture of iron and steel and in practically every- 
thing else of which the government is a buyer. 



WHY WORKINGMEN SUPPORT THE WAR 237 

To do this and yet not discourage production is hard. 
If prices are cut too low, vv^ages cannot be paid; and if 
there are no profits, the commodity will not be produced 
in sufficient quantities. 

During the war, we must have an enormous increase of 
food, clothing, munitions, and many other essentials, on 
which prices must be limited. The government is fixing 
prices on these in the only possible way — through con- 
ference with the representatives of labor named by the 
American Federation of Labor, and the representatives of 
the manufacturers and farmers. For instance, the American 
Federation of Labor wanted the price of wheat fixed at 
$1.84 a bushel while the farmers desired $2.50. They com- 
promised on $2.20 a bushel. By similar means, the gov- 
ernment has succeeded fairly well in cutting down the 
prices of sugar and flour, and has fixed the prices of coal 
and other essentials. 

If any workingman is disposed to find fault with these 
prices, he is ignorant of the fact that the workingmen have 
just as much voice in fixing them as the capitalists and the 
farmers. 

It is the same with taxes. Our officials at Washington 
were just as unprepared to assess income taxes and excess 
war taxes, as they were unprepared to send out an army 
ready to fight. It takes time and experience to get ready 
for both. The government has done something as a starter 
in requiring war profits to pay for the war — not yet as 
much as England, but far more than was ever before done 
in this country. 

Furthermore, the government in all its contracts with 
manufacturers places a limit on the profits which they 
are entitled to make. Clothing, shoes, munitions of war, 
everything the government buys, are bought at prices that 
cut down the profits to about what will pay the rate of 
interest needed to procure the capital, and the wear, tear 



238 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

and depreciation of the machinery. The great majority 
of manufacturers are willingly taking contracts on this 
basis and the great profits made by some before America 
entered the war have been stopped. It is easy to arouse 
suspicion and to charge them with getting excessive profits ; 
but in all such cases we should first inquire whether the 
charge does not come from those who have been prevented 
from getting profits or who want to weaken the govern- 
ment in its efforts to carry on the war to a success. 

Instead of objecting, why not join together to help the 
government both to win the war and to finish the start 
already made towards taxing excessive wealth, reducing 
war profits, and keeping down the cost of living? 

WAR AND WAGES 

Increased cost of living always goes along with war. 
But here is something to remember : The war brought an 
increased demand for labor which stopped unemployment 
and raised wages. 

Before this war started in Europe, three years ago, we 
were going through about as bad a depression in business 
as the country had ever known. Workingmen were un- 
employed or only partly employed. 

In six months there were almost no unemployed people 
in the country. The demand of the Allies for munitions, 
equipment, and food, set everybody to Avork. At once 
wages began to rise. They went up fastest and highest in 
the industries that furnished munitions to the Allies. The 
employees of the United States Steel Corporation have had 
an increase of 60 per cent in their rates of wages, and 
when to this is added steady employment, their earn- 
ings by the week or year have gone up much more than 60 
per cent. 

In the state of New York, the only state where statistics 



WHY WORKINGMEN SUPPORT THE WAR 239 

have been collected on a large scale, the earnings of all 
factory wage-earners throughout the entire state have gone 
up, on an average, over 38 per cent since June, 1914. In 
some of the metal and machinery industries, they have 
more than doubled. 

Nobody can give exact figures, but the cost of living, 
taking everything into account, has increased about 30 per 
cent to 40 per cent. Wholesale prices have gone up much 
higher — some estimates show as high as 90 per cent. But 
the retail prices have gone up much less than wholesale 
prices — only 47 per cent, according to the figures of retail 
prices collected all over the country by the United States 
Department of Labor. But food is something less than 
half of the workingman's expenses. Other expenses, such 
as rent and so on, have not gone up so much, except in 
towns where there has been a large influx of labor in mu- 
nitions factories, and those are the towns where wages 
have risen highest. 

Taking into account the increased amount of work and 
the increase in wages, the total earnings of wage earners 
have about kept up with the cost of living.^ Some have 
gone far ahead, others have not kept up. Those who have, 
gained most are day laborers and organized labor. 

HOW LABOR CAN HELP 

For over twenty years Germany has been prepa;ring for 
war. America is trying to do in one year what Germany 
has been doing for twenty years. Of course there are mis- 
takes. Of course there are delay and confusion. Anybody 
who picks out the mistakes and delays can find plenty of 
material to arouse suspicion and encourage dissatisfaction. 

Our government is building up a great system of em- 
ployment offices which Germany and England had before 



^Estimates are made as of January 1, 1915 



240 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

the war started. This will do away with an immense 
amount of lost time by workmen in hunting jobs. 

The government is calling in hundreds of accountants 
to figure out the costs and profits of manufacturers, so that 
there need be no suspicion of excessive war profits. 

It is establishing boards of mediation to settle all wage 
disputes as fast as possible. 

It has started to build houses for workmen alongside the 
new factories working for the government. 

It has taken over the railroads and will take over other 
industries, if other methods fail, as fast as it is able. 

Wherever these new agencies have been set to work, they 
have accomplished good results. But they cannot be ex- 
pected to overcome every difficulty at once. In view of all 
that the government is trying to do for labor, labor can 
and should help. 

Instead of spending increased wages for luxuries, work- 
men can buy saving certificates at any postoffice. 

Instead of shifting restlessly from one job to another, 
workmen can stick to the jobs where the nation needs them. 

Instead of suddenly going out on strike, labor can call for 
the boards of mediation that have already been successful 
in settling disputes. 

Instead of stirring up dissatisfaction, labor can work 
with the Alliance for Labor and Democracy, and hold up 
the hands of the government in this biggest and most dif- 
ficult job the American people were ever forced to under- 
take. 



IF GERMANY WINS 
By 

WILLIAM H. KIEKHOPER 

Associate Professor of Economics 

A German victory is not impossible unless we will 
to make it so. But to-day the fate of the world still 
hangs in the balance. The fifty-three million men that 
have already been called to the colors of the warring 
nations have not been able to decide it. If the war 
lasts long enough we shall win, for our allied nations 
have nearly eight times the population and more than 
four times the wealth of our enemies. But it will take 
time effectively to concentrate our overwhelming su- 
periority in men and resources under the proper lead- 
ership. 

Meanwhile we may well shudder to think of what 
would happen if the men of France and the British 
Empire, of Belgium and Italy and America, should 
fail to hold the western front stretching from the Eng- 
lish Channel to the Adriatic Sea. Or if the farmers 
and miners failed to furnish increasing quantities of 
food and fuel. Or if Capital and Labor quarreled and 
we could not depend upon our industries to supply 
the necessary equipment, and above all the precious 
ships. Or if the morale of our peoples broke, and we 
failed to understand the issues at stake, and loyally to 
support every measure necessary for winning the war. 
However flattering to our vanity, let us banish the 
delusion that the mere entrance of the United States 
into this war settled its outcome. Germany is not yet 

16 — W. B. 



242 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

beaten, and we are certainly not yet victorious. Unless 
as a nation we mobilize our entire resources, and as in- 
dividuals subordinate every other interest to this fight 
for self-preservation, we are doomed to disastrous defeat. 

VICTORY CHEAPER THAN DEFEAT 

However great the sacrifice that has already been 
made, and staggering the price that we shall yet have 
to pay, it will cost us incomparably less to win this war 
than to lose it. There is no nation to-day, not even 
Great Britain, which Germany hates as she hates the 
United States of America. Former Ambassador Ger- 
ard says: ''I believe that to-day all the bitterness of 
hate formerly concentrated on Great Britain has now 
been concentrated on the United States. ' ' 

Germany feels that but for the steady stream of war 
supplies flowing from America to the Allies since the 
beginning of the war, her dream of world empire would 
long since have been realized. She believes that Amer- 
ica thwarted the consummation of her ambitions, and so 
America must pay, if Germany is in a position to exact 
a victor's terms. 

The Kaiser's haughty threat, repeatedly made to Mr. 
Gerard, ''America had better look out after this war," 
must never be given the slightest chance of translation 
into action, or woe will be ours. The Kaiser has de- 
clared "I shall stand no nonsense from America after 
the war." To Wilhelm Hohenzollern we must send 
this emphatic message in reply: ''There are more than 
one hundred million freedom-loving Americans who 
will never bend their knees to any kaiser, and who will 
rather die than surrender the principle that all govern- 
ments derive their just powers from the consent of the 
governed. ' ' 



IF GERMANY WINS 24! 



TH.E PRICE OF DEFEAT 



There are those who belittle the consequences to us 
of a German victory, who insist that even if Germany 
wins neither our institutions will be affected nor our 
vital interests threatened. Such people do not under- 
stand either the world-wide ambitions or the ruthless 
spirit of Prussianized Germany. There is no calamity, 
however seemingly improbable or impossible, that may 
not happen to us, as to Russia, if Germany wins. 

For nearly four years we have seen what we regarded 
as the absolutely impossible transformed into hideous 
realities. Sacred treaties have been considered "scraps 
of paper"; priceless art treasures that belong in reality 
to no single people but are the common possession of all 
mankind have been ruthlessly destroyed ; the rules of civ- 
ilized warfare have been utterly disregarded in the 
bombing of ambulances and hospitals, the bombardment 
of defenceless towns from sea and sky, the murder of 
non-combatants regardless of age and sex, the sinking 
of merchant vessels, neutral as well as enemy, without 
even concern for the safety of passengers and crew, and 
the carrying of tens of thousands of civilian working 
men and women into captivity. 

Experience with Germany's rulers should convince 
us that there is no punishment serving their purpose 
which they would hesitate to inflict, if they had a chance 
to answer their own prayer, ''Gott strafe Amerika." 
If Germany wins, what guarantee will we have that in 
the future as in the past we may enjoy "life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness"? Absolutely none. All the 
important conditions of life of every American, econo- 
mic, political, and social, depend upon the issue of 



244 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

arms on the western front. So we may well pray that 
the French and British, Belgians and Italians, who 
through all these years have been fighting for the pres- 
ervation of our national life and institutions no less 
than for their own, may have the strength to hold the 
line a little longer, until America can arrive and with 
the unspent vigor of her two million sons help our 
brothers go ''over the top" to an enduring victory. 

Any other result would make life unbearable. Con- 
sider the price of our defeat. Our dead would have 
died, and our wounded have suffered in vain; billions 
of treasure would have been spent to no purpose; in- 
ternational law, upon the recognition of which the safety 
of every nation in the world depends, would have been 
overthrown; might would have triumphed over right, 
and terrorism would rule the world. It cannot be. 

What would a German victory mean to us? There 
are at least four consequences of paramount importance 
to every man, woman, and child in America that would 
follow a German victory. 

THE PERPETUATION OF PAN-GERMANY 

First, if Germany wins, it will mean the perpetuation 
and extension of Pan-Germany, the gravest possible 
menace to the independence of the United States. It 
may seem at first blush that the realization by the Ger- 
mans of their plan of a Central European Empire, in- 
cluding Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey, ex- 
tending as a solid block from the Baltic Sea to the Per- 
sian Gulf, is of no very immediate or vital concern to 
the United States. Not so, for the continued existence 
of such an empire will radically change the world in 
which we live and imperil the safety of our democratic 
institutions. 



IF GERMANY WINS 245 

Pan-Germany already exists. It is no longer merely 
the substance of things hoped for. Austria-Hungary, 
Bulgaria, and Txirkey are to-day vassals, not allies, of 
Germany, and she intends that they shall so remain. 
In 1914 the German military machine controlled 68,- 
000,000 people; to-day about 200,000,000 people are 
under the domination of that machine. Not since the 
days of the Roman Empire has there been a power to 
compare with the Pan-Germany we have seen established 
during the last two years. Germany could afford to 
evacuate all the territory she has seized since the begin- 
ning of the war, to surrender all claim to the colonies 
she once had, and even to return Alsace-Lorraine to 
France, and yet win this war provided we let her keep 
Servia and the territory of the nations that fought on 
her side. As President Wilson has said, ''If she can 
keep that, she has kept all that her dreams contemplated 
when the war began. ' ' It will be a sorry day for Amer- 
ica and the world if we make peace upon the basis of 
' ' no annexations, no indemnities, ' ' and permit Pan-Ger- 
many to survive. 

Wherein lies the menace of Pan-Germany ? It lies in 
the determination of Germany to leave no first class 
power in the world strong enough to be a serious rival. 

''The triumph of the greater Germany, which some 
day must dominate all Europe is the single end for 
which we are fighting," Kaiser Wilhelm declared in 
1915. Ten years earlier he had said : ' ' God would never 
have taken such great pains with our German Father- 
land and its people if He had not been preparing us 
for something still greater. We are the salt of the 
earth." 

Listen to him again in the proclamation he issued in 
1914 to the Army of the East: "Remember that you 



246 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

are the chosen people! The Spirit of the Lord has 
descended upon me because I am the Emperor of the 
Germans ! I am the instrument of the Almighty, I am 
his sword, his agent. Woe and death to all those who 
shall oppose my will ! Woe and death to those who do 
not believe in my mission! Woe and death to the 
cowards! Let them perish, all the enemies of the Ger- 
man people ! God demands their destruction, God who, 
by my mouth, bids you to do His will ! ' ' 

Volumes have been filled with quotations of this kind 
from the utterances of the responsible leaders of Ger- 
man thought and action. 

Is there no menace to us in Pan-Germany? Can we 
afford to let an unscrupulous military class, obsessed 
with the idea that they are a ''chosen people" con- 
vinced that their Kultur is superior to that of any other 
people, drunk with the lust of power and crazed with a 
boundless ambition, keep control of 200,000,000 people 
in the heart of Europe? Can we afford to let them do 
so when we know that their rulers will consider at least 
100,000,000 of them members of ''inferior races"? 
Can we afford to let them control peoples that can supply 
an army of 20,000,000 men trained with characteristic 
German thoroughness and imbued Avith the German spir- 
it? After what we know of the spirit and plans and 
methods of the German imperialists, to permit Pan- 
Germany to survive is to invite destruction. 

Moreover, if Germany wins, there is not the slightest 
shadow of a doubt that she will seize the fleets of her 
enemies as a condition of peace. Then Pan-Germany 
need no longer confine herself to Europe and the Near 
East. Instead the octopus can extend its tentacles and 
seize the trade routes, lands, and riches of the world. 

We invite destruction if we fail to understand that 



IF GERMANY WINS 247 

the existence and extension of Pan-Germany as a highly 
organized military and economic state is absolutely in- 
compatible with the freedom and independence of the 
United States. 

Sooner or later we should clash over the Monroe 
Doctrine, which for nearly one hundred years has been 
a challenge to the world. When in 1823, speaking of 
the possibility of the territorial expansion in the western 
hemisphere of certain European Powers, President Mon- 
roe declared, ''We consider any attempt on their part 
to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere 
as dangerous to our peace and safety," he enunciated 
a national policy. German statesmen have never official- 
ly assented to this policy, but in Bismarck's phrase, have 
regarded it as ''an international impertinence." The 
establishment of German colonies, in South America, the 
desired acquisition of an island in the West Indies, or 
coveted control over the Panama Canal, might at any 
time in the future provoke another conflict between the 
United States and Germany, unless Pan-Germany is 
now decisively defeated. 

Sooner or later we should clash over the rights of trade 
and industry. *'Any man in America, or any where 
else," says President Wilson, "who supposes that the 
free industry and enterprises of the world can continue, 
if the Pan-German plan is achieved and German power 
fastened upon the world, is as fatuous as the dreamers 
of Russia." 

Sooner or later we might expect an invasion of our 
own territory. We were stunned a year ago to learn 
that while we were yet at peace, Germany through her 
foreign secretary, Zimmerman, had invited Mexico to 
make common cause with her, to invade us and ' ' recon- 
quer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas, and Ari- 



248 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

zona." We need no other evidence to convince us that 
Germany considers an invasion of our territory entirely 
feasible. Moreover, our own War College, as late as 
1916, calculated that using only one half of her possible 
tonnage, Germany could land on our ''Atlantic shores 
387,000 men in sixteen days and 440,000 additional men 
within thirty days thereafter." Surely Pan-Germany, 
existing and potential, is the greatest possible menace 
to the independence of the United States and the world. 

MILITARISM AND THE CERTAINTY OF ANOTHER WAR 

Second, if Germany wins it will mean the continuance 
of militarism and the certainty of another war. If the 
militarists of Germany win this war, they can justify 
them.selves to their people by pointing with pride to all 
that armed force has brought to Germany, a position 
of absolute supremacy among the nations of the world. 
It can be shown that all that Germany is, she owes to 
military force. By it she obtained Silesia a century 
and a half ago; by it came Schleswig-Holstein fifty 
years ago, and with these Danish provinces undisputed 
control over the Kiel canal, making possible the present 
German- navy ; out of military necessity arose the North 
German Confederation and later the modern German 
Empire; swift, hard military bloAvs wrested Alsace- 
Lorraine from France ; and now, if she succeeds, that 
same military force will have won her world dominion. 
The logic of the militarists will be unanswerable; the 
profits of war will justify the system that obtained them. 
Is there any chance of militarism decaying in Germany 
under such circumstances? Rather Germany's millions 
will unite with one of their leading economists, Werner 
Sombart, in saying: "Because only in war all the vir- 
tues which militarism regards highly are given a chance 



IF GERMANY WINS 249 

to unfold, because only in war the truly heroic comes 
into play, for the realization of which on earth militarism 
is above all concerned ; therefore it seems to us who are 
filled with the spirit of militarism that war is a holy 
thing, the holiest thing on earth ; and this high estimate 
of war in its turn makes an essential ingredient of the 
military spirit." 

But if Germany remains militaristic all the rest of 
the world must arm in self-defense as never before. 
The new international armament rivalry will beggar 
description. A great fear will haunt the nations of the 
world by night and by day. Unless we are willing to 
devote billions of dollars of our national income to the 
construction of the greatest navy and army in the world, 
accept lower real incomes for ourselves, and forego count- 
less internal improvements in schools, roads, and munici- 
pal enterprises; unless we are willing to face future 
wars of even more speechless horror, we must fight on 
now, though we fight alone, until militarism is crushed 
forever. 

If Germany wins, militarism and war will become 
universal. If Germany loses, permanent peace, not only 
for ourselves but for Germany as well, is a possibility. 
Upon the liberalization of Germany rests the only solid 
hope of a real world peace. But a German victory 
means the defeat of liberalism in Germany, and further 
allegiance to the sentiment of von Moltke : ' ' Perpetual 
peace is a dream, and it is not even a beautiful dream. 
War is a part of the eternal order instituted by God. ' ' 

We owe a solemn duty to our five millions of honored 
allied dead not to turn back now, until the defeat of mil- 
itarism is accomplished, and we are assured that they 
have not suffered and died in vain. 



250 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 



THE DEATH OF DEMOCRACY 

Third, if German}^ wins it will mean, in the end, the 
death of democracy. The inspiration and idealism in 
this war have largely been furnished by the belief that 
we are fighting for the independence of nations, small 
as well as large, for the defense of free democracies 
against autocracies. 

This is the supreme struggle between autocracy and 
democracy. If democracy wins, a new earth will arise 
in which nations shall have the right of self-determina- 
tion untrammeled by the fear of superior might. If 
autocracy wins, democracy must perish. Why? Be- 
cause Germany's victory will prove that a more slowly 
moving democracy in which important decisions rest 
with the many can be no match for a highly organized 
autocracy ready to strike at a moment's notice. No 
nation can escape the effects of this struggle. The days 
of isolation are gone forever. The world cannot any 
longer endure half autocratic, half democratic. Two 
such radically different systems cannot exist side by 
side. 

If Germany wins not only must our own country be- 
come militaristic and autocratic in order to exist in a 
German world, but the German autocracy itself, in self- 
defense, must seek to undermine popular government 
everywhere. It will seek by purchase or corruption to 
control our press, subsidize speakers, dominate our 
schools, encourage exploitation, and always promote re- 
actionaries into industrial and political power. 



If GERMANY WINS 2ol 



A STAGGERING INDEMNITY 



Fourth, if Germany wins, it will mean the imposition 
of a staggering indemnity upon the United States. If 
the war lasts until next August it is estimated that it 
will have cost Pan-Germany fifty billions of dollars, 
most of which represents a public debt, since very little 
money has been raised by taxation. These fifty billions 
of dollars constitute a mortgage of nearly forty per cent 
against the developed wealth of Pan-Germany. If this 
sum could be collected from the people of the United 
States as an indemnity, it would take approximately 
one fifth of the wealth of every person in the country 
to pay it. 

There is not the slightest doubt that Germany will 
impose an indemnity if she can. As long ago as 1898, 
the German Rear-Admiral von Goetzen, a friend of the 
Kaiser, told Admiral Dewey: ''In about fifteen years 
my country will begin a great war. Some months after 
we have done our job in Europe we shall take New York, 
and probably Washington, and we shall keep them for 
a time .... We shall extract one or two billions 
of dollars from New York and other towns." 

At the beginning of the war Germany boldly pro- 
claimed that she would settle her accounts through the 
collection of an indemnity. 

In June, 1915, a petition signed by 1341 leading in- 
tellectuals of Germany, and sent to the Imperial Chan- 
cellor as a confidential document, declared on the sub- 
ject of indemnities: "Should we be in a position to 
exact an indemnity from England, which has always 
been so thrifty in devoting English blood to the war, no 
amount of money that could be exacted would be suf- 
ficiently large." 



252 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

The United States has twice the wealth of the British 
Empire, and Germany hates ns more. What would not 
the German Imperialists do if they could lay their 
heavy, blood-soaked hands upon the fabulous wealth 
of America ! 

WE MUST WIN 

We must win this war. We can't afford to lose. 
Pan-Germany must be dissolved ; militarism overthrown ; 
democracy vindicated ; the self-determination of nations 
established; secret diplomacy abolished; armaments 
limited. Ruthless military autocracy must be blotted 
from the earth. In the attainment of this end we must 
persevere with our bleeding sister nations, and if neces- 
sary now go on alone. There must be no peace until the 
world shall be free from future aggressions, no peace 
until Germany herself shall regain the soul which, Faust- 
like, she sold to the Devil, and in chastened spirit shall 
restore the lands she has stolen and make what repara- 
tion she can for the outrages she has inflicted upon 
civilization. 



^'THE WORLD MUST BE MADE SAFE FOR 
DEMOCRACY" 

By 

W. L. WESTERMANN 
Professor of History 

''We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of 
false pretence about them, to fight thus for the ultimate 
peace of the world and for the liberation of its people, the 
German peoples included : for the rights of nations great 
and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose 
their way of life and of obedience. The world must be 
made safe for democracy." 

In these words, spoken before the joint session of Con- 
gress upon April 2, 1917, when he asked Congress to de- 
clare the existence of a state of war between our own gov- 
ernment and the government of the German Empire, Presi- 
dent Wilson gave to us and to the world the fighting slogan 
of the people of*the United States: ''The world must be 
made safe for democracy. " In it is the note of danger to 
the great thing which we have ben attempting to realize 
for over a century, the great ideal of popular government. 
Had we made an utter failure of the great experiment of 
democracy — which we have not — the people of the United 
States are still and always committed to fight for it and die 
for it, just because it is a great ideal. 

So the question is a vital one to us: Is the world safe 
for democracy so long as the present German government 
remains in control of the German people, exploiting the 



254 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

great military power of that nation in pursuance of na- 
tionalistic ambitions which the government has carefully 
formed and consistently fed? 

THE SERVIAN DEMOCRACY AND ITS FATE 

In 1829 the Servian people at last freed themselves com- 
pletely from the despotism of their Turkish overlords who 
had ruled them for 400 years. The new Servian state then 
bought the land from the Turkish nobles who had held it in 
feudal tenure. The land was distributed among the Ser- 
vian peasants whose forefathers had farmed it during 
those centuries of bitter Turkish misrule. So Servia be- 
came what it was in June of 1914, economically an abso- 
lute democracy. Eighty per cent of the Servians were 
peasant farmers who actually owned the land which they 
tilled. That is, out of their population of 2,750,000 people 
in 1910, approximately 2,200,000 owned farm lands. Much 
of this land was held under a communistic system, called 
the Zardrouga, an old Slavic system in which the land is 
owned, not by individuals, but by a family group. Its 
members share as a group in the profits and advantages of 
their cooperation. Before the great war there were but 
three farmers in all Servia who owned more than 500 acres 
each. 

Across the Danube from Servia lay the Magyar state of 
Hungary, also an agricultural state, much more so, in fact, 
than Servia. Seventy per cent of the land of Hungary is 
productive and three persons out of every four of its 
20,000,000 population depend upon agriculture for their 
living. Yet the entire number of land owners is only 
2,450,000 persons, or about 12 per cent of the total popula- 
tion. Out of these 2,450,000 who own land, 1,945, or one 
one hundredth of one per cent of the population own 31 
per cent of all the arable land. Out of the 2,450,000 per- 



"THE WORLD MUST BE MADE SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY" 255 

sons who hold land, 1,354,000 (about 55 per cent) own but 
6.1 per cent of the agricultural land.^ 

In other words, Servia in 1914 was a small country con- 
taining a people economically democratic. Hungary was, 
and still is, economically a feudal state, a remnant out of 
the dead past of Europe. Forty nobles control vast 
stretches of the fertile plains of Hungary. In some cases 
their holdings run beyond a half million acres. These are 
the noble land barons of Hungary who guide the political 
destinies of its people. The upper house of the two Hun- 
garian legislative bodies contains only the great land bar- 
ons. The lower house is controlled by the lesser land bar- 
ons. Careful restrictions put the privilege of voting out 
of the reach of the working classes. In 1912 the electorate 
of Hungary was but 24.9 per cent of the total male popu- 
lation over 20 years of age.^ 

The Servians, on the other hand, were politically, as 
well as economically, democratic. Any male citizen who 
paid $3 a year in direct taxes had the right of suffrage. 
The Servian government was a constitutional monarchy. 
The king was a member of the national assembly and sat 
in that assembly along with the elected representatives of 
the Servian people.^ 

These were the elements — a political and economic democ- 
racy against a feudal autocracy — which faced each other 
across the Danube in 1914, when the Archduke of Austria 
was murdered by a Bosnian boy, an Austrian subject. The 
nobles who rule the Austro-Hungarian empire decided to 
take that occasion to square their long-standing accounts 



1 statistics from Handw. der Staatsicissenschaften, V: 150, and Percy 
Alden, Hungary of Today, p. 261. 

^ Statesman's Year Book, 1917. 

2 Much of this information may be found in the Encyclopaedia Brit- 
tanica in the articles on "Hungary" and "Servia" and in the Review 
of Reviews for February, 1915, p. 205. 



256 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

with Servia. The basis of the hatred of the Hungarian 
land-barons against ^ervia is both political and economic. 
Economically the frugal Servians undersold them in the 
pork market.^ Political friction arose because there were 
a half million Servians living in Hungary, subject to Hun- 
garian oppression and exploitation. The hatred of the 
Austrians for Servia is almost entirely political. For in 
lower Austria there were several millions of the Jougo- 
Slavs, related to the Servians by race, who had been incor- 
porated into the Austro-Hungarian empire, and desired 
the freedom which the independent Servians enjoyed. To 
the ruling class of Austria the murder of the Austrian 
Crown Prince offered a welcome opportunity to settle once 
for all the Jougo-Slavic longing for the establishment of a 
large state of the southern Slavs, independent of Austria- 
Hungary. It was equally w^elcome to the imperialistic rul- 
ing class of the German empire. For in it they saw their 
chance of using the constant ill-feeling of the Austrians 
and Hungarians against the Servians to sweep out of the 
way of German ambitions the Servian state. For Servia 
stood in the path of the German imperialistic plans and the 
long-cherished dream of controlling the route from the 
North Sea through the Balkans and Asiatic Turkey to the 
Persian Gulf. 

The blow was struck. Its consequences to Servia are 
known to us all. Is the world safe for democracy so long 
as the present German government wields its power over 
the deluded people of Germany? Ask the remnants of the 
peasant state of Servia. The land which they owned is no 
longer theirs. Ask the old men, the women and the chil- 
dren who alone remain in Servia. Where is now the free 
people of the Serbs? 



* Carl Ackerman, in Saturday Evening Post, Aug-. 25, 1917. 



'THE WORLD MUST BE MADE SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY" 257 



THE FATE OP THE BELGIAN PEOPUE 

In August of 1914 the little state of Belgium refused to 
permit the German armies to cross its territory that they 
might crush the republic of France. The Belgians had 
guarantees, signed by Germany as well as all the other great 
powers of Europe, to the effect that their territory was to be 
neutral and uninvaded in case of a war between the other 
powers. All honor to them for their brave decision ! The 
tragic result of their bravery is known the world over. 

What does Germany intend to do with Belgium? Is 
Belgium to be free again and honored by the Germans for 
its hopeless fight for the rights guaranteed to it by the 
solemn pledge of Germany? Not at all. In April, 1917, 
von Bissing, the German Governor-General of Belgium, 
died. On May 18, 1917, a German paper, the Bergiscli- 
Mdrkische Zeitung, printed a memorandum of Governor 
von Bissing containing his views upon Belgium, which 
needs no comment : 

Just as was the case before the war, a neutral Belgium, or an 
independent Belgium- based upon treaties of another kind, will 
succumb to the disastrous influence of England and France, and 
to the effort of America to exploit Belgian resources. Against 
all this our only weapon is the policy of power, and this policy 
must see to it that the Belgian population, now still hostile to 
us, shall adapt itself and subordinate itself, if only gradually, to 
the German domination. ... In the same way, it is only by 
complete domination of Belgium that we can utilize for German 
interests the capital created by Belgian savings and the Belgian 
companies which already exist in large number in the countries 
of our enemies .... Belgium must be seized and held, as 
it now is, and as it must be in future. ... He who remains 
in the country must declare his allegiance to Germany, and 
after a time must declare his allegiance to Germanism [Deutsch- 
tum, the superior German civilization]. In connection with this 
it cannot be tolerated that wealthy Belgians should leave the 
17— W. B. 



258 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

country, and nevertheless draw profit from their possessions in 
Belgium. Expropriation is absolutely necessary in order to pre- 
vent such a state of things as exists in Alsace-Lorraine to the 
present day/ 

These are the recommendations of the former Governor 
of Belgium. They have been adopted as a policy by his 
successor, von Falkenhausen, and represent the present at- 
titude of Germany's ruling class, to which these two men 
belong. Was President Wilson right, then, in telling us 
that the ''rights of nations great and small" were endan- 
gered so long as the present German government remains 
free to misuse the great power of the German people? 
Read the memorandum of Freiherr von Bissing. It 
breathes throughout the spirit of autocracy, that crass po- 
litical brutality which has compelled our entrance into the 
war and will keep us in it to the end. There is no question 
as to the answer. 



GERMANY AND THE BAL.TIC STATES 

Let us turn to northeastern Europe. East and north- 
ward of the eastern boundary of Prussia lives a people 
called the Lithuanians, numbering perhaps 3,000,000. 
They, too, are largely small farmers, with a tradition of 
freedom up to the time of their union with Poland in 1569. 
From the division of Poland at the end of the 18th century 
to the outbreak of the great war, they had been under the 
hard rule of the old regime of Russia. Since the abolish- 
ment of serfdom in Russia the Lithuanian peasants have 
been able to buy the land they worked from the big Rus- 
sian land owners resident among them. In recent years 
the nationalistic desire in Lithuania has been strong. The 



" Translation published by T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1917. Another 
translation is g-iven in the New York Times Current History, Feb., 1917. 



"THE WORLD MUST BE MADE SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY" 259 

movement comes from the peasantry. The dream of inde- 
pendence has always shaped itself in the form of a repub- 
lican government. 

In the three Baltic states north of the Lithuanians, Cour- 
land, Livonia, and Esthonia, the condition of the Lettish 
and Esthonian peasants is far less favorable. There the 
German element, numbering about 8 per cent of the total 
population, has always been the instrument of Russian 
autocracy. Their reward has been preferment in the Rus- 
sian service, high honors, and great riches. They are the 
big German land owners of the Baltic regions. In Livonia 
a few hundred land barons, almost all German, own more 
land than a half million Lettish peasants.^ 

In the months of February-June of 1915, the German 
armies advanced northward and eastward from the Prus- 
sian border into Lithuanian Russia, bringing under their 
control a large section of the Lithuanian people. Repeat- 
edly since the war began delegates chosen by the Lithu- 
anian people, from the territories occupied by Germany, 
from the Lithuanians still under Russian control, and from 
the United States, have met and asserted their right to and 
demand for absolute independence under a republican type 
of government. Did Germany heed the Lithuanian desire 
for democracy? She did not. In 1915 Prince Joachim, 
by all accounts the most attractive of the Hohenzollern 
princes, was sent upon a tour through the Lithuanian 
province of Suwalki. The intention was clear — to sound 
the feeling of the Lithuanians upon his acceptance as their 
ruler. Orders were issued to decorate the city of Suwalki. 
But the city was only beflagged officially, and the Lithu- 
anians made their feeling of opposition perfectly clear. 

Since the breakdown of the old Russian regime in March, 



^ New York Times History of the War, V: 86. 



260 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

1917, German armies have gained control over all the Baltic 
provinces. Quite consistently with their German sympa- 
thies, their position as feudal land barons, and their class 
consciousness as the autocratic rulers of these regions, the 
German land barons of the Baltic provinces have sent in a 
request to Berlin that they be governed by a German 
prince. Lying between the Baltic-German land barons on 
the north and the Junkers, or great land owners of Prussia, 
what hope is there for the free peasantry of Lithuania ? 

At present Germany controls all industry and agricul- 
ture in the country. The Lithuanians have been con- 
scripted, as the Belgians were, for enforced labor for 
German military needs. The peasant population is per- 
mitted to sell its products only to agents of the German 
government. The economic despotism of Germany over 
Lithuania is absolute.^ When the Pan-Soviet Congress in 
Russia had ratified the disastrous treaty of Brest-Litovsk 
with Germany (March 14-16, 1918), the German Imperial 
Chancellor, von Hertling, finally expressed the German pol- 
icy toward the Baltic states: ''Under the mighty protec- 
tion of the German Empire they can give themselves a 
political form corresponding to their situation and the 
tendency of their kultur, while at the same time we are 
safeguarding our own interests." The independence of 
Courland has been recognized ; but Germany is pleased to 
respond to the desire of Courland ' ' to lean on the German 
Empire". Lithuania is also to be recognized as an inde- 
pendent state. Livonia and Esthonia are to be policed by 
Germany, ''on their own invitation," until order shall be 
established. Why, of course, at their own invitation! 
Then later, the matter will be settled. "We hope and de- 



^ Cf . the New Yoi^k Times Current History, March. 1918, pp. 504-509. 



"THE WORLD MUST BE MADE SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY" 261 

sire that they too will place themselves in close and friendly 
relationship to the German Empire."^ 

Verily, in the pathway of German conquest there is no 
place or sympathy for democratic longings. Between the 
upper and nether mill stones of the Baltic-German and the 
Prussian land barons another peasant people, the Lith- 
uanians, will be crushed — if Germany wins this war. 

RUSSIA BETRAYED 

In the spring of 1917, the situation in the world war was 
vastly changed by two great events, the overthrow of the 
Romanoff dynasty of Russia and the entrance of the United 
States into the struggle for freedom. On March 15, 1917, 
the Czar of all the Russias abdicated. An autocracy, one of 
the worst in the world, fell at a blow. The presence of the 
Russian Empire under the Romanoff regime in the camp of 
the western allies had always complicated sadly the most 
vital issue involved in the war and vitiated beforehand 
the greatest gain to be derived from its successful outcome. 
The issue for which we fight is now absolutely clarified. 
In the unified armies of our allies the great nations of the 
world which rule themselves under democratic principles 
stand clear. Aligned against them are three of the re- 
maining great autocracies of the world, Germany, Austro- 
Hungarj^, and Turkey. The future of Russia is dark and 
problematic. But there can be no doubt that the aim and 
desire of the Russian people is liberty and the right to rule 
themselves. 

On March 14-16, 1918, the Pan-Soviet Congress at Mos- 
cow signed a treaty of peace dictated to them at Brest- 
Litovsk by the militaristic leaders of Germany. The east- 
ern frontiers of the Baltic states, Esthonia, Livonia, and 



^Nevs York Times Current History, April, 1918. p. 51. 



262 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

Lithuania, were fixed as the western boundary line of the 
new Eussia. Despite the treaty of peace which they signed, 
German troops have continued to advance into Russian 
territory. ' ' Their knees are on our chest, and our position 
is hopeless," said the Bolshevik leader, Lenine.^ Again 
the German leaders have broken their plighted word to a 
helpless people. Again a free people, struggling blindly 
through license toward liberty, is in danger of losing that 
new-found liberty before Germany's policy of land loot and 
her lust of power. 

Early in February the Ukraine region in southwestern 
Russia signed a peace treaty with the Central Powers. The 
Ukrainians had previously declared themselves an inde- 
pendent republic, free from connection with the rest of 
Russia. Their independence has been acknowledged by 
Germany. But German troops are already in the Ukraine. 
They were "invited" by the Ukrainians, according to the 
German Chancellor's statement.^^ On April 26 some of 
these troops entered the Chamber of the Rada, the Ukrain- 
ian representative assembly, crying "Hands up", arrested 
some of its members, and suppressed the entire body.^- 
This outrage to the sovereignty of the Ukraine was com- 
mitted because the Rada was unable or unwilling to en- 
force Germany's demands for food. After this suppres- 
sion a German military dictatorship was established and is 
now ruling the country under cover of a self-appointed 
autocrat or Hetman, General Skoropodski. This govern- 
ment is seizing grain and instituting forced labor, so that 
the peasants are fleeing to Great Russia in large numbers. 



^ New York Times Current History, April, 1918, p. 46. 
^'>Ihid., p. 51. 

" See a speech of Erzberger, Centrist leader of the Reichstag, New 
York Times, May 11, 1918. 



"THE WORLD MUST BE MADE SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY" 263 

Thus has disappeared the last vestige of democratic rule 
in the Ukraine. 

Finland, too, has declared itself a separate state, inde- 
pendent of Russia. There, too, German troops are now 
present. Again they were ' ' invited ' ' by the Finns. Again 
the course of Germany's rulers is the age-old course of 
ruthless imperialism. Their methods are obvious, their 
purposes translucent. In fighting the war against Ger- 
many, we are fighting also for the freedom of the Lith- 
uanians, of Russia, of Finland, and of the Ukrainians, ' ' to 
choose their own way of life and of obedience." 

WHY WE MUST FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE 

Long before Germany's direct and underground as- 
saults upon our own independence and freedom of action 
had forced us into the war, the sympathies and hearts of 
our people had gone into the trenches of our present allies. 
Why is this? What have we of the United States to do 
with the defence and growth of democracy in Europe? 
Why was President Wilson able to coin a phrase and sym- 
bolize in it our fears and our longings, and crystallize in it 
our national will? 

There are two outstanding reasons for this: First, a 
sympathetic attitude toward any movement having freedom 
in view has been the political tradition of our leaders and 
our people since the beginning of our national existence. 
Second, the danger from Germany's imperialism is a vital 
one to the free institutions of all democratically ruled 
peoples of the world, those of Europe and ourselves as well. 

In 1822 the Greeks were in the midst of their long strug- 
gle for liberty against the terrible oppression of the alien 
Turks. In his presidential address to Congress in that 



264 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WAR BOOK 

year. President Monroe spoke of tlie " " great excitement and 
s:\Tnpatliy in favor (of the Greeks; which have been so 
signally displayed throughout the United States." 

In 182-i AVebster declared that the s^inpathy of our 
people for the Greeks sprang from the nature of our gov- 
ernment and the spirit of all her institutions. "Our side 
of this question," said Webster. *''is settled for us without 
our own volition. . . . Our place is on the side of free 
institutions. ' '^^ 

In the German revolution of 1848 and 1849 the attitude 
of our government and our people was a similar one. 
The provisional government of the German confederation 
was recognized. The instructions to our envoy contained 
the following words: ''Should either a republican form 
of government, or that of a limited monarchy (founded on 
a popular and permanent basis), be adopted by any of 
the states of Germany, we are bound to be the first, if pos- 
sible, to hail the birth of the new government and to cheer 
it in every progressive movement that has for its aim the 
att-ainment of the priceless and countless blessings of 
freedom. ' ' 

This is our great tradition of readiness to help any 
people to attain freedom from superimposed rule. In 1910, 
a prominent American historian summed up this case in the 
following prophetic words : 

If there is to be in the coming century a great battle of 
Armageddon — once more Europe against the Huns — we can no 
more help taking our part with the hosts of freedom than we can 
help educating our children, building our churches, or maintain- 
ing the rights of the individual.'^ 



"See War Information Series, No. 8. published t-y the Committee on 
Public Information, Washing^ton. D. C. 

"Albert Eushnell Hart, in Foundations of American Policy, p. 240. 



-THE WORLD MUST 3E MADE SAFE FOR DEM'XTRACY- 265 

Shonld the plans of militaristic Prussia be succ^sfnh 
all democracies of the world, inclndin^ our own, would be 
in grave danger. The program of the German militarists 
was,, and still is. to break forever the power of our sister 
democracy. France. France must be ' ' bled white I ' ' Then 
England, that ''nation of shop-keepers,'' with its liberal 
institutions, must be made subservient to Grerman auto- 
cratic ideals. It must be removed forever from the path- 
way of the expansion and spread of the G-erman rule. 

Indirectly, the success of autocracy in Europe would, by 
the glamour of its achievement, force all the freedom-lov- 
ing people of the world to adopt the methods of military 
autocracy. The menace of German autocratic power would 
compel us to enter upon an indefinite, constantly increas- 
ing program of military armament. 

There would be no safety in the world for the free col- 
onies of the British Empire. Canada. New Zealand, and 
Australia have been fighting for three years the fight for 
democracy — for our democracy as ivell as iheir oxen. We 
know, now, that their fight is our fight. 

Directly, also, our own democracy like those of Canada. 
New Zealand, and Australia, would be in danger. The 
South American republics would be the first to meet the 
onslaught of militaristic autocracy. German imperialistic 
policy has aimed for twenty years or more at the control of 
the South American republics — and then our turn was to 
come. 

After the Spanish- American war a German military at- 
tache, in explaining to an American officer the Gn?rman 
plan of conquest, declared: 

Some montlis after we finisli our work in Europe (the taking 
of Paris and the crushing of England) we will take Xew York 



266 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN AVAR BOOK 

and probably Washington and hold them for some time. We will 
put your country in its place with reference to Germany 
. . . . The Monroe doctrine will be taken charge of by us, 
. . . . and we will take charge of South America, as far as 
we want to. 

There is no doubt as to the great issue involved in this 
war. The world must be made safe for democracy. And 
now is the time for the democratic peoples of the world to 
fight this issue to a finish. It will be fought to a finish — 
and democracy will win. 



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